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Abstract
One of the main advantages of cognitive linguistics (and in particular Cognitive Grammar)
over other approaches to the study of language structure is the fact that every descriptive
construct is defined in psychological terms. This means, ideally, that any cognitive lin-
guistic description of a word or grammatical construction constitutes a hypothesis about
the mental representation of that structure. It should thus be possible to verify such de-
scriptions, or to decide between competing analyses of a phenomenon, by experimentally
testing the hypotheses that they entail. Such tests have been rare, however, due to the
difficulty of operationalising many of the semantic notions used in Cognitive Grammar.
The present thesis reports on attempts to operationalise and test (using questionnaires,
production tasks, and reaction time measurements) four descriptive claims formulated in
the framework of CognitiveGrammar: that finite complementation constructions are headed
by the complement-taking predicate; that the first object in a three-argument clause is more
“figure-like” than the second object; that impersonal there in an existential clause refers to
the locative scene as a whole; and that non-finite clauses encourage the hearer to imagine
the described event as a single gestalt, whereas finite clauses encourage them to imagine it
unfolding over time. These grammatical analyses crucially involve the notions of “profil-
ing”, “focal prominence”, and “mode of scanning”, which are central to Cognitive Grammar.
None of the experiments conducted produced conclusive results, leaving open the ques-
tion of whether the descriptive constructs used in the analyses are really necessary. Ac-
cordingly, the second part of the thesis presents an attempt to reconceptualise Cognitive
Grammar using only descriptive constructs that are known to be easily operationalisable;
in particular, giving prominence to notions from discourse pragmatics and prosodic phon-
ology.
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Preface
The work that led to this thesis started in 2009, when I first read Ewa Dąbrowska’s re-
view of the Oxford Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics, which had just appeared in Language
(Dąbrowska 2009). By that point, I had become enamoured of construction grammar (in
all its varieties), and its twin promise of descriptive comprehensiveness and psychological
realism—promises that seemed most nearly fulfilled by Cognitive Grammar, which almost
alone seeks to describe the whole of language (not only syntax and semantics, but also
phonology, morphology and discourse) in terms of psychological notions (Langacker 1987,
1991, 2008a). Yet Dąbrowska (2009: 723) made me realise that Cognitive Grammar, as it
had been developed up to that point, relied on “semantic notions…which are very diffi-
cult to operationalize”, and thus it might not entirely live up to its claims of psychological
plausibility. Thus began an obsession with operationalising Cognitive Grammar.
While no-one (to my knowledge) had tackled the full scale of this problem, there were
a few studies that insightfully addressed parts of it: for example, Forrest (1992) and Tomlin
(1997) on subjecthood, Madden & Zwaan (2003) on perfective vs. imperfective aspect, and
Matlock (2004) on fictive motion, to name a few. This existing work largely formed the
basis of the ideas that I initially proposed to work on for my thesis (see Chapters 2–4).
But there remained deeper questions which (I felt) hadn’t been given due attention in
existing experimental work. By far the most important of these was the question of how to
operationalise the notion of “profile”—what an expression designates. The vast majority of
semantic analyses in Cognitive Grammar consist of claims about what a particular gram-
matical formative profiles; if there was no way of empirically determining this, then there
seemed little hope of making Cognitive Grammar analyses experimentally testable.
To be clear, what was at issue was not how to determine the profile of full phrases or
utterances such as my chair and I’m hungry; such things seemed sufficiently accessible
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to intuition to not require much by way of experimental evidence. The issue was how to
determine the profile of sub-phrasal units: grammatical morphemes such as the, my and
should, as well as words like chair and hungry which generally do not appear on their own.
This is the problem that Tomasello (2003: 92) refers to, in the context of language acquisition,
as “blame assignment”; but to my knowledge it is not addressed there or anywhere else
(though see Langacker 2005, 2009).
For a few years (see Kalyan 2012a,b), I tried approaching this problem using the notion
of “cue validity” (e.g. Goldberg 2006: 107–113): basically, since chair generally appears as
part of a noun phrase referring to a chair, its profile would have whatever properties are
common to the real-world referents of these noun phrases—in other words, the properties of
a chair. Likewise, sincemy always appears as part of a noun phrase referring to something
possessed by the speaker, its profile would have whatever properties are common to the
real-world referents of these noun phrases—in particular, the property of belonging to the
speaker.¹ This of course raised the question of how to account for the distributional differ-
ences between noun phrases, determiners, and head nouns, a question that I addressed by
unwittingly reinventing the basics of Categorial Grammar (Lambek 1958; Steedman 2000).
(See e.g. Kalyan 2013a,b.) The question of how to experimentally test this theory remained
(given that I was dealing with meanings that are not all easily accessible to intuition); but
I managed to come up with a suitably baroque set of experimental procedures which could
be argued to suffice.
The framework I was developing held out the promise of making cognitive analyses
of meaning testable by tying meaning directly to real-world referents; and along the way,
providing a natural account of language acquisition. However, by the end of 2013, it had
dawned on me that an approach to meaning based on cue validity would have no way of
dealing with mental-space phenomena of any kind (Fauconnier 1985)—including reported
speech, questions, negation, or even definiteness. In effect, I had rediscovered the short-
comings of behaviourism (Chomsky 1959); obviously, it was time to start over.
Slowly, I began to rethink my approach to the notion of profiling, and eventually de-
cided to define it in terms of the entities that an expression makes available as discourse
¹Encouragingly, this confirmed the analysis in Langacker (1991) of grounding predications as profiling the
grounded entity rather than the grounding relationship.
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referents. This seemed a promising approach, as it is quite easy to test (without recourse to
subtle experimental methods) whether an entity has been activated as a discourse referent:
simply check if it can be referred to anaphorically. Furthermore, rebuilding the descriptive
framework on the basis of discourse activation revealed that many of the types of salience
appealed to in Cognitive Grammar could be done away with (Kalyan 2015).² Additionally,
I started to realise that (contrary to my earlier understanding of Cognitive Grammar) per-
haps not every morpheme has an identifiable, independent meaning; perhaps the only units
of speech that are capable of bearing meaning are full prosodic constituents (an idea which
is present in Categorial Grammar: Steedman 2000, and turned out to have precedents in
late American structuralism: Trager & Henry Lee Smith 1957, as well as Cognitive Gram-
mar itself: Langacker 1987: 337–338). These ideas, with a few further refinements, define
the framework that is laid out in Chapters 5 and 6 as (what ended up being) an attempted
reformulation of Cognitive Grammar.
²This was roughly the point at which I abruptly had to expand my thesis topic, since the experiments reported
in Chapters 2–4 had all turned up inconclusive. It’s fortunate that by this point, my theoretical ideas had
solidified to the point where they could be committed to writing.
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Interlinear glosses follow the LeipzigGlossing Rules (http://www.eva.mpg.de/lingua/
resources/glossing-rules.php). The following abbreviations will be used multiple
times in the body text and in diagrams:
A set of entities that are currently active in the discourse
char x is characterised by property y
E event time
inv eventuality x involves eventuality y
IU intonation unit
loc x is located at/in y
occ x is a state of affairs constituting the occurrence of eventuality y
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S speech time
SEP Schema Extraction Procedure
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temp x is temporarily in state y
Other (single-use) abbreviations will be introduced and explained as needed.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Psychological realism as a goal of linguistic theory
The idea that grammatical descriptions should be understood as models of the human mind
is usually traced back to the Port-Royal Grammar (Arnauld & Lancelot 1660), which ex-
plicitly treated Latin grammar (the default framework for grammatical description at the
time) as a model of logical thought. In fact, this idea can probably be traced back further:
as has been pointed out by Vandeloise (2001) among others, the conceptual categories in
Aristotle’s work seem to be closely based on the grammatical categories of Attic Greek.
(See also Coward 1980 for similar trends in 7th-century Indian philosophy.)
The use of grammar to model thought can also be seen in writings from the “lan-
guage psychology” (Sprachpsychologie) tradition at the turn of the 20th century, e.g. von
der Gabelentz (1901); Paul (1886); see Lambrecht (1994: 2, 122 et passim) for discussion.
However, in the early twentieth century, American structuralists began to reject the idea
that grammatical descriptions should make claims about mental representations, and in
particular that they should have anything to say about meaning. Partly this was a result
of the emphasis placed on documenting endangered languages; untangling the complex
phonological and morphological systems of North American languages generally left little
time for pondering their conceptual structure. Partly, too, it was a result of discomfort with
the introspective methods that had dominated psychology up to that point, and a feeling
that linguists should leave such speculations to those who specialise in them. In the words
of Bloomfield (1933):
1
1.1. PSYCHOLOGICAL REALISM AS A GOAL OF LINGUISTIC THEORY
…we define the meaning of a linguistic form, wherever we can, in terms of
some other science. Where this is impossible, we resort to makeshift devices.
(Bloomfield 1933: 140, cited in Harris 1995: 26)
However, things changed with the early work of Noam Chomsky (1959, 1965):
Chomsky came to see any study of language that didn’t attend to its men-
tal tendencies as completely sterile, and began promoting linguistics as a fun-
damentally psychological enterprise, coupling this promotion with a crushing
attack on behaviorism. (Harris 1995: 68)
That Chomsky saw his new framework of transformational grammar as a model of how
language is represented in the mind is shown by quotations such as the following:
What we are suggesting is that the notion of “understanding a sentence“ be
explained in part in terms of the notion of “linguistic level”. To understand a
sentence, then, it is first necessary to reconstruct its analysis on each linguistic
level; and we can test the adequacy of a given set of abstract linguistic levels by
asking whether or not grammars formulated in terms of these levels enable us
to provide a satisfactory analysis of the notion of “understanding”. (Chomsky
1965: 87)
Thus it was only natural that researchers in the newly emerging field of cognitive psycho-
logy (a field that itself traced its roots to the attack on behaviourism by Chomsky 1959)
would try to operationalise the descriptive constructs and analyses of transformational
grammar, and test them using psychological experiments. Perhaps the most famous ex-
ample of this was G. A. Miller (1962), who cited evidence for the psychological reality of
syntactic categories (and in particular, the distinction between content words and func-
tion words); of syntactic constituency; of the preference for left- and right-branching over
center-embedding; and of transformations. Other studies in this tradition include Fodor &
Bever (1965); Garrett, Bever & Fodor (1966); Levelt (1970a,b). While these kinds of studies
may now seem somewhat dated, the tradition is carried on by articles such as Friedman
et al. (2008), which purport to find experimental evidence for particular kinds of syntactic
movement.
2
1.1. PSYCHOLOGICAL REALISM AS A GOAL OF LINGUISTIC THEORY
As is well known among linguists, generative grammar went through a series of convul-
sions in the 1960s and 1970s—the debate between interpretive semanticists and generative
semanticists, which eventually came to be known as the “linguistics wars” (Harris 1995).
There is neither space nor pretext for entering into the historical details of this period; but
by the end of it, scholars from other disciplines—and in particular, psychologists—had for
the most part lost interest in generative grammar. It is hard to describe the situation more
eloquently than Harris (1995: 215–216):
For one thing, [Chomsky’s program] wasn’t panning out experimentally.
Psychologists had come up with a very pretty cognitive theory of transforma-
tional grammar that had clear empirical consequences: The more transforma-
tions involved in a sentence, the longer it should take for someone to under-
stand it. A passive sentence should take longer than its active counterpart. A
negative should take longer than a positive. A negative-passive should take
proportionally longer than a positive-active. You get the picture. At first, this
model—known as the derivational theory of complexity—seemed spectacularly
successful, giving a psychological boost to transformational grammar, a gram-
matical boost to cognitive psychology, and an empirical boost to the hybrid
fledgling, psycholinguistics. It did take people longer to understand sentences
with more transformations in their derivation. But all too soon, when sentence
length and meaning were factored in (passives are longer than actives, for in-
stance, and have subtle differences in meaning; negatives are slightly longer
than positives, and very different in meaning), transformations receded in im-
portance; at best, they now seemed untestable. Worse, transformations which
had no differences in length or meaning (relating sentences like Debbie called
up Jeff and Debbie called Jeff up) also had no appreciable impact on compre-
hension time. A similar story unfolded for experimental attempts to confirm
the psychological reality of deep structure: initial success, followed by reinter-
pretations of that success considering other factors, and then outright failure.
Evenmore problematically, the consequences of Chomsky’s theoretical and
methodological positions inAspectswere beginning tomake psychologists nervous.
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In particular, the confluence of three factors—his competence-performance dis-
tinction, his insistence that transformational-generative grammar directly con-
cerned only competence, and his focus on ideal constructs—seemed like a con-
spiracy of sneakymaneuvers to relieve his work of any empirical responsibility.
“The adventure into transformational grammar,” recalls Eric Wanner, looked to
many psychologists to have “reached a dead end” (1988: 150).
Around this time, a number of alternative grammatical frameworks began to arise,
each stressing empiricism and psychological plausibility to a greater or lesser degree. Not-
able among these are Lexical-Functional Grammar (Bresnan 1981; Kaplan & Bresnan 1982),
which initially billed itself as a “realistic transformational grammar”, and concerned itself
with processing and acquisition from an early stage; Generalised (and later Head-Driven)
Phrase Structure Grammar (Gazdar et al. 1985; Pollard & Sag 1994), which emphasised us-
ability in computational modelling; and of course, Cognitive Grammar (originally “space
grammar”; Langacker 1982, 1987, 1991). Of these, it was the last that made psychological
plausibility its overarching concern, and addressed this concern by seeking to define every
descriptive construct in terms of notions that were already known from perceptual and
cognitive psychology.¹
Cognitive Grammar was only one strand in what eventually came to be known as “cog-
nitive linguistics”. The other major strand was the work of George Lakoff, in particular
his application of prototype theory (Mervis & Rosch 1981) and fuzzy logic to the descrip-
tion of gradient phenomena in syntax such as those uncovered by J. R. Ross (1967) (Lakoff
1987; see Langacker 1988 for a cautious appraisal). This approach also strongly emphasised
the psychological plausibility of the proposed models, indeed enshrining this as a guiding
principle:
For me, cognitive linguistics is defined by two primary commitments, what
¹Cognitive Grammar was not, however, the most self-consciously empiricist framework that arose; that dis-
tinctionwould go to Victor Yngve’s “hard-science linguistics” (Yngve 1986, 1996). Yngve advocated a complete
rejection of descriptive constructs such as “word”, “noun”, “sentence”, and “utterance”, on the basis that these
do not refer to anything directly observable. Instead, he advocated an approach that claimed inspiration from
the natural sciences (and was effectively a reversion to behaviourism), combining acoustic phonetics with the
formal analysis of simple signalling systems (see Yngve 1989: esp. 244 for his critique of Cognitive Grammar
as “yet another type of grammar grow[ing] up in the thicket” of conflicting theories). However, as noted
by Sampson (1998), this conception of linguistics narrows the scope of the discipline in a way that would
severely limit the usable insights that could be derived from it.
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I will call the Generalization Commitment and the Cognitive Commitment….
The cognitive commitment forces one to be responsive to a wide variety of
empirical results from a number of disciplines. Examples include:
Categorization results from cognitive psychology, developmental psy-
chology, and anthropology that demonstrate the existence of basic-
level categorization and prototype effects.
Psychophysical, neurophysiological, anthropological results about
the nature of color perception and categorization.
Results from cognitive psychology concerning human imaging ca-
pacities and the association of conventional imagery with language.
Results from cognitive neuroscience and connectionism regarding
the computational mechanisms of the brain.
If we are fortunate, these commitments will mesh: the general principles we
seek will be cognitively real. If not, the cognitive commitment takes priority:
we are concerned with cognitively real generalizations. (Lakoff 1990: 40–41)
Also joining this traditionwere the works of Fauconnier (1985), Talmy (2000b), and Fillmore
(1975), which again took psychological plausibility as a central concern.
There has periodically been a certain amount of soul-searching concerning whether
cognitive linguistics can truly (or exclusively) be called “cognitive”. In particular, as noted
by Gibbs (1996: 28–29):²
There has been great debate as to whether the cognitive commitment is
a defining or characteristic feature of cognitive linguistics…. Various people
complained [in 1991] that linguistics has always been cognitive and that re-
search in other cognitive disciplines confirms many of the ideas touted by gen-
erative linguists.…Some critics stated that there is nothing special about cog-
nitive linguistics to warrant calling itself cognitive.…Over the past year many
psychologists have conveyed to me their skepticism about the term cognitive
linguistics because it implies that there is something missing from what they
do as cognitive psychologists in studying language and language users.
²See also Lazard (2007) for a related view from a linguist outside the Anglo-American tradition.
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See Gibbs (1996: 29 ff.) for arguments that cognitive linguistics is indeed cognitive in a way
that sets it apart from other approaches to linguistics, notably by adhering to the Content
Requirement (see further below).
More seriously, Peeters (1998: 226–227) argued that
…many linguists, or more precisely many Cognitive Linguists, don’t seem
to care about [the work of neuroscientist] Edelman nor perhaps even about
cognitive science.…
The question must be asked how strong the cognitive commitment of Cog-
nitive Linguists really is. Personally, I have grave doubts as to whether Cognit-
ive Linguistics is cognitive linguistics. It would seem to me that the latter is the
sort of linguistics that uses findings from cognitive psychology and neurobio-
logy and the like to explore how the human brain produces and interprets lan-
guage.…[L]arge numbers of linguists have avoided dealing with the cognitive
infrastructure of human beings. Many would not want to admit it, but others
are not at all ashamed to profess that they believe issues of mind and brain to
be fundamentally irrelevant to the linguistic profession.…Is th[e] openness of
Cognitive Linguistics [to the other cognitive sciences] reflected in any serious
attempts to link psychological and neurological mechanisms to the mechan-
isms of language? Regrettably, the answer is (all too often) “no”. Many do not
seem to realize that they are not really doing any cognitive work at all…. Do-
ing what one has always done, while paying lip-service to the old claim that
somehow the study of language will give us insights into the inner workings
of the mind, carries no genuine entitlement to the adjective cognitive. Many do
not seem to realize that what they do is not dramatically different from what
is done elsewhere…
Similar concerns can be found in the course of the debate on the mental representation of
polysemy that took place in the pages of Cognitive Linguistics between 1995 and 2001 (Croft
1998; Sandra 1998; Sandra & Rice 1995; Tuggy 2001).
Nevertheless, over the last couple of decades, there has been an increasing awareness
that the claims of cognitive linguistic theories to psychological plausibility need to be sub-
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jected to experimental scrutiny. Peeters (1999) quotes Langacker as saying, “Are we really
doing so badly? I notice that the pages of Cognitive Linguistics are starting to fill up with
the results of experimental investigations, and that is symptomatic of what is happening in
the field in general”. To cite just a few examples, Gibbs & Colston (1995) have experiment-
ally studied image schemas; Coulson & Van Petten (2002) blending (see also Gibbs 2000);
Casasanto (2009) conceptual metaphors; and Cienki (2008) mental spaces (see also Sweetser
2007).
In the domain of grammar, Verfaillie & Daems (1996), Tomlin (1997) and others have
run experiments on subject assignment which Langacker (2001: 31–32) takes to support the
analysis of subjects as profiling trajectors; Kellogg (1996) has studied the neurological basis
of part-of-speech categories (Langacker 2008a: 95); and de Vega et al. (2007) have tested
Talmy’s (2000a) analysis of complex sentences in terms of figure-ground relations. In addi-
tion, there is a huge experimental literature on construction grammar and its consequences
for processing and acquisition (Ambridge, Pine et al. 2009; Bybee 2001, 2010; Dąbrowska
2004, 2008; Goldberg 2006; Tomasello 2003).
Still, only a small fraction of the analyses of grammatical phenomena proposed by cog-
nitive linguists have been the object of experimental studies. To a good extent, this is be-
cause (despite the commitment to using only concepts known from psychology) it is often
far from clear how a given analysis should be operationalised. Dąbrowska (2009: 722–723)
cites an example of this, with reference to the chapter on “Complementation” in the Oxford
handbook of cognitive linguistics (Geeraerts & Cuyckens 2007):
Achard [(2007)] notes that [in French]when themain and subordinate clauses
have the same subject, the subordinate verb normally occurs in the infinitive
(Marie aime aller au cinéma), and when they have different subjects, the sub-
ordinate verb is finite (Marie aime que son frère aille au cinéma avec elle), and
proposes that this is because
the presence of a finite complement…reflects an objective construal
of the scene coded in the complement….Because the vantage point
from which it is construed is external to its scope of predication…,
the whole scene, including the subject of the subordinate process, is
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part of the objective scene and thus profiled. (792)
But how does one determine if the scene is construed objectively or subject-
ively, whether the vantage point is external or internal to the scope of pre-
dication, or even which parts of the scene are profiled? Achard offers no hint
of how any part of the explanation could be independently verified. This is a
serious problem, since linguists often disagree even about seemingly straight-
forward issues such as what a particular construction profiles. For instance,
Achard himself, Langacker (1991), and Boye & Harder (2007) maintain that in
a complex sentence like I know she left the main clause is the profile determ-
inant (the sentence designates a process of knowing, not leaving). But S. A.
Thompson (2002), Verhagen (2005), and others have claimed that it is normally
the complement clause that conveys the speaker’s communicative intention,
while the main clause acts as an epistemic/evidential/evaluative fragment ex-
pressing speaker stance toward the content of the subordinate clause. Lang-
acker (2008: 419) suggests that both views are right, and that we need to distin-
guish ‘various kinds of prominence and dimensions of subordination’. This is
almost certainly correct: but how does one determine which kind of promin-
ence, or which dimension of subordination, is relevant for explaining a partic-
ular aspect of linguistic organization?
The questions raised in the above passage (and elsewhere in Dąbrowska 2009), both spe-
cifically about complementation as well as more generally about the operationalisation of
the semantic notions used in cognitive linguistic analyses, will serve to motivate this thesis.
1.2 Thumbnail sketch of Cognitive Grammar
Before discussing how the descriptive constructs and analyses of Cognitive Grammarmight
be operationalised, it will be useful to summarise these descriptive constructs and analyses.
What follows is a heavily abridged description of the framework laid out in Langacker (1987,
1991, 2008a) and in numerous articles.
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1.2.1 Methodological principles
Themain guiding principle of Cognitive Grammar, which serves as the ultimate test of any
proposed analysis, is the Content Requirement (Langacker 1987: 53–54):
[T]he only structures permitted in the grammar of a language…are
1. phonological, semantic, or symbolic structures that actually occur in lin-
guistic expressions;
2. schemas for such structures;
3. categorizing relationships involving the elements in (1) and (2).
Phonological structures are constructs that are known from structuralist approaches to
phonology: mainly phonemes, suprasegmentals (such as stress), and prosodic units (such
as moras, syllables, phonological words and intonation units). (Autosegmental tiers are
needed for phonological analysis in many languages, particularly for tone and intona-
tion; these are not discussed by Langacker, but they are presumably not excluded.) Taylor
(2002: ch. 5), in a chapter on phonological structure in Cognitive Grammar, explicitly uses
the prosodic hierarchy of Nespor & Vogel (2007); see also Uehara & Kumashiro (2007). Un-
derlying representations are forbidden by the Content Requirement, as they do not “actually
occur in linguistic expressions”; thus, Cognitive Grammar approaches to phonology tend
to be constraint-based (Nathan 2008; Nesset 2008; Uehara & Kumashiro 2007).³
Semantic structures are described in terms of concepts from perceptual and cognitive
psychology (especially Gestalt psychology: cf. Koffka 1963 [1935]; Wertheimer 1923); for
example, attention, categorisation, comparison, and figure–ground organisation.⁴ In ad-
dition, linguistic meanings are assumed to be of the same kind as actual experiences; the
mental operations involved are the same ones as in perception or action, but “attenuated”
³An approach that is even more in the spirit of the Content Requirement, however, is Declarative Phono-
logy, which “captures [only] generalizations that are always surface-true of the phonology” (Bird & Ellison
1994: 87), and where “surface forms and generalizations about them are stated directly in a hierarchical lex-
icon” (Bird & Ellison 1994: 65). Unfortunately, Declarative Phonology was soon eclipsed by Optimality The-
ory, which is easier to use for phonological analysis, but permits the positing of underlying representations.
I am not aware of any attempt to link Declarative Phonology with Cognitive Grammar (though see Bird &
Klein 1993 for an integration with head-driven phrase structure grammar). I am grateful to T. Mark Ellison
for bringing this research to my attention.
⁴Interestingly, this could be said to mark a return to the American structuralist approach of “defining meaning
in terms of some other discipline” (Bloomfield 1933: 140).
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(e.g. Langacker 1987: 105). (This is what later came to be known as “simulation semantics”
or “embodied meaning”; see also Barsalou 1999; Johnson-Laird 1983; Zwaan 2015.)
Symbolic structures are (Saussurean) signs, involving a “phonological pole” in the rôle
of signifier, and a “semantic pole” in the rôle of signified. (See Verhagen 2009 for some
long-needed cautions regarding the equation of signifier and signified with phonological
pole and semantic pole; and see e.g. Yngve 1989: 240 for the suggestion that symbolic struc-
tures may need to have three sides, as in Peircean semiotics.) The relationship of “sym-
bolisation” linking the phonological pole with the semantic pole is taken to be atomic, and
self-explanatory.
Schemas are abstractions that are derived from actual usage events by “blanking out”
those aspects of structure that are not shared, and retaining only those aspects that are
shared exceptionlessly (see Langacker 1987: 68, 132–138; Tuggy 1993: esp. fn. 7; Tuggy
2007). Schemas may be phonological, semantic or symbolic; and they may exist at varying
levels of generality. For example, [tree] would be a semantic schema extracted from lower-
level schemas such as [pine tree], [oak tree], etc., and /V/ (“vowel”) would be a phono-
logical schema extracted from lower-level schemas such as /a/, /i/, /u/, etc.⁵ Schemas are
not claimed to be represented separately from their instantiations, but are rather said to be
“immanent” in their instantiations (cf. the “schematic-transparency principle” in Langacker
1987: 438). Another way of looking at this (e.g. Dąbrowska 2000: 93–95), which has some
support from neurology (Singer 2000), is that themental representations of individual usage
events “overlap” in various ways, and it is these regions of overlap that we call schemas.
The relation between one schema and another is called a “categorising relationship” or
“relationship of schematicity” (e.g. Langacker 1987: 74): a schema is said to “fully categor-
ise” (or “be fully schematic for”) the schemas from which it is extracted (e.g. Langacker
1987: 470), and “partially categorise” (or “be partially schematic for”) all other schemas (e.g.
Langacker 1987: 69).
⁵A phoneme is a schema extracted from its allophones, and ultimately from its realisations in particular utter-
ances; see e.g. Mompeán (2006).
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1.2.2 Types of entities
The bulk of analytical effort in the framework of Cognitive Grammar has been devoted
to the semantic explication of grammatical constructions; thus it is important to give an
overview of the semantic notions that are used in Cognitive Grammar.
Every meaningful unit (or predication) has a semantic pole that consists of some con-
ceptual content, to which is applied some construal. Conceptual content can be thought
of as mental simulation of objects and events, disregarding the particular viewpoint one
takes. For example, the verbs give and receive have the same conceptual content, as they
represent different ways of viewing the same event of transfer. Construal mainly involves
various types of salience, most importantly profiling and focal prominence (see Croft &
Cruse 2004: §3.2 for a fuller listing).
The entity profiled by a predication is the one that it “designates”; this notion of “des-
ignation” is taken to be self-evident, and is not explicated further—but see Chapters 2 and
5 below. Focal prominence refers to figure/ground organisation; the primary figure in a
conception is called the trajector, and the secondary figure the (primary) landmark. There
may in some cases be a tertiary figure or “secondary landmark”; and any entity that is not
a figure is part of the ground. Cognitive Grammar claims that the subject of a clause is
the trajector, the (first) object is the (primary) landmark, and the second object (e.g. in a
ditransitive) is the secondary landmark.
The entities that a predication might profile are divided into two major classes: things
and relations. A “thing” is defined as “a region in some domain” (Langacker 1987: 189),
where a “domain” is prototypically space or time, but may also be an abstract scale (such as
happiness), a multidimensional conceptual space (such as colour), or even a mental space
(such as “everything the hearer knows”). (As pointed out by Clausner & Croft 1999, the
notions “domain”, “base”, and “frame” are more or less interchangeable.) For example, a
beep is a thing that is a region in the domain of time as well as in the domain of frequency.
A major claim of Cognitive Grammar is that all nominal expressions (including nouns,
pronouns, noun phrases, and nominalised clauses) profile things.
Typically, a thing is bounded in at least one of its domains; Cognitive Grammar claims
that a count noun (such as puddle) is bounded in its “primary domain of instantiation”
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(in this case, space), whereas a mass noun (such as water) is unbounded in its primary do-
main, but is usually bounded in some other domain (such as “quality space”); see Langacker
(1987: 206–208).
A relation is a set of connections between entities. Typically, when apprehending a
configuration of entities (such as the points that make up a square, or the people who make
up a sports team), we execute a number of “comparison events” among those entities, to
verify that they are indeed in that configuration (see Langacker 1987: 103 ff.; see also Good-
man 1977 for a possible intellectual precursor). The entities in the configuration collectively
constitute a thing (which may be profiled by square (noun) and team); but the comparison
events collectively constitute a relation (which would be profiled by square (adjective) and
together).
Within relations, a distinction is drawn between simple (stative) relations, and “com-
plex” relations (Langacker 1987: 220). The difference lies in whether there is any conceived
change in the relation over time. A claim of Cognitive Grammar is that adjectives and
adpositions profile stative relations—relations whose change over time is not relevant.
Within complex relations, a distinction is drawn between complex atemporal relations
and processes (Langacker 1987: 220). These differ by whether the temporal extension of
the complex relation is part of the profile—or alternatively, whether the complex relation is
“summarily scanned” or “sequentially scanned”. Sequential scanning is what occurs when
one imagines an event unfolding over time, as if watching a video of it; summary scanning is
what occurswhen one imagines the entire course of an event in a single gestalt, as if viewing
a multiple-exposure photograph. Cognitive Grammar claims that finite verbs and finite
clauses profile processes, whereas non-finite verbs and clauses profile complex atemporal
relations. Note that stative verbs profile processes, and not stative relations, because the
profiled relation is specifically conceived as persisting over time, whereas this is not the
case with the relations profiled by adjectives and adpositions, where persistence over time
is not even considered relevant.
(An alternative way of classifying relations is as temporal relations (processes) versus
atemporal relations; and within atemporal relations, complex atemporal relations versus
stative relations.)
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1.2.3 Grounding
Things and processes (but not atemporal relations!) may be “(epistemically) grounded”, i.e.
situated with respect to the speech situation (Langacker 1987: 126–129, 489). A grounded
thing is one that has an identifiability (or “definiteness”) value—i.e., is marked for whether it
is already known to the speaker and/or addressee (Langacker 1991: 53). A grounded process
is situated with respect to the here-and-now by means of tense and modality (Langacker
1991: 240); see Langacker (2010b) for a discussion of the relation between the grounding of
things and the grounding of processes (and see Chapter 5 below for an alternative view).
Cognitive Grammar claims that full noun phrases, as well as determiners, profile grounded
things (Langacker 1991: 53–54, 89–95), and that finite verbs and clauses, as well as tense
andmood inflections and auxiliaries, profile grounded processes (Langacker 1991: 240, 261).
Conversely, bare noun stems profile ungrounded things (Langacker 1991: 51), and uninflec-
ted verbs in finite clauses (e.g. come in He will come) profile ungrounded processes (Lang-
acker 1991: 32–33).
1.2.4 Constructional schemas
The above descriptive constructs can clearly be used to describe individual morphemes or
monomorphemic words. What about internally complex, analysable expressions? These
are described using constructional schemas (Langacker 1987: 84–85). A constructional
schema consists of a composite structure (the analysable expression itself), and one or
more component structures. Typically, one of these component structures profiles the
same entity as does the composite structure (e.g. in jar lid, lid designates the same entity
as does the entire compound, whereas jar does not); this component is called the head or
profile determinant (Langacker 1987: 235). It is possible that there may be no component
structure that profiles the same entity as the composite structure; or alternatively, it may be
that there is more than one such component structure (Langacker 1987: 285). In either case,
we say that there is no profile determinant (though see Croft 2001: 256–257, who proposes
to define a head of a construction schema as a “profile equivalent”, thus allowing for the
possibility that there is more than one head).⁶
⁶Construction schemas exist for phonological structures as well as symbolic and semantic ones; however, the
notion of “profile determinacy” does not really apply for phonology, pace Taylor (2002: 252).
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A component structure in a construction may be autonomous or dependent. Depend-
ence means that the semantic pole contains a salient substructure (an “elaboration site” or
“e-site”) that corresponds to the semantic pole of some other component structure (Lang-
acker 1987: 304). For example, in above the tree, the relation profiled by above has the two
spatially-related objects (i.e. the trajector and landmark) as salient substructures; the land-
mark corresponds to the thing profiled by the tree, and so we can say that the semantic
pole of above is dependent on that of the tree. In general, relations are usually conceptually
dependent, with the focal participants being the e-sites (except in the case of the relation
profiled by a full clause, where the focal participants are all specified). Things are usually
conceptually autonomous, but it is possible for a thing to be at least somewhat dependent,
as in the case of relational nouns such as uncle and beard (Langacker 1987: 218; Langacker
1991: 204), which saliently evoke some entity that is related to the profiled thing (e.g. the
Ego with respect to whom the uncle is an uncle, or the person possessing the beard).
1.2.5 Sanctioning
A grammatical framework not only needs to be able to provide a structural description
for every encountered utterance, but also provide a procedure for discriminating ungram-
matical utterances from grammatical ones. In Cognitive Grammar, this is accomplished by
comparing a usage event (an utterance, or some part thereof) with the (symbolic) schemas
that are part of the speaker’s mental grammar. Some of these schemas will be fully schem-
atic for the usage event, i.e. fully sanction the usage event; others will only partially sanc-
tion the usage event (Langacker 1987: 372). Further, some schemas will be highly salient,
while others will be low in salience. Salience of a schema is a function of both the frequency
with which the speaker encounters instances of the schema (i.e. the entrenchment of the
schema) as well as the specificity or (low) elaborative distance between the schema and
the usage event (Langacker 1987: 414). Clearly these two factors are in opposition (highly
entrenched schemas are often nonspecific, and highly specific schemas are often low in
entrenchment); the most salient schemas are thus those that are at a medium level of gen-
erality.
A usage event is judged grammatical if it is fully sanctioned by a number of salient
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schemas. It is judged ungrammatical if it is only partially sanctioned by some highly sa-
lient (and relevant) schema. For example, the past-tense form *drinked is judged ungram-
matical, even though it is fully sanctioned by the general [V-ed] schema, because it is only
partially sanctioned by the schema for the conventional form drank, which is both relevant
and highly entrenched (Langacker 1987: 432–433). (The issue of which schemas are “rel-
evant” for grammaticality judgment is quite involved, and has not yet been systematically
addressed; see Bybee 2010; Kalyan 2012c for discussion). For more on grammaticality judg-
ment by means of “schema competition”, see Nesset (2008); Uehara & Kumashiro (2007).
Finally, it is worth noting that in the domain of morphology, it is necessary to distin-
guish between “source-oriented schemas” and “product-oriented schemas” (Bybee 2001: 126;
Kapatsinski 2009). A source-oriented schema specifies a particular relation between the
phonological pole of a morphologically basic form and that of a derived form (e.g. the addi-
tion of /d/ to form regular past-tense forms in English), whereas a product-oriented schema
merely constrains the phonological pole of the derived form and “doesn’t care how you get
there” from the basic form. Evidence for product-oriented schemas is found in errors made
by L1 learners (e.g. failure to add /d/ in the past tense to verb stems that already end in a
/d/; see Bybee & Slobin 1982), and in cases of “morphological haplology” (e.g. friendly as an
adverb, not *friendlily; see Bybee 2001: 128; Stemberger 1981 for further examples). Croft
& Cruse (2004: 313–318) as well as M. D. Ross & Teng (2005) have argued that there also
exist product-oriented schemas in syntax.
In Cognitive Grammar, source-oriented schemas may be modeled using “second-order
schemas” (Nesset 2008: 18–21): schemas that are extracted not from individual usage events,
but from morphologically-related pairs of usage events, such as fill :filled, push : pushed, ar-
rive : arrived, etc. Product-oriented schemas may be modeled using “first-order schemas”
(Nesset 2008: ibid.), i.e. schemas as conventionally understood, such as […ly]Adv; these do
not specify a particular base form, and will sanction any derived form of the appropriate
shape, however it may be constructed. See Nesset (2008) for a detailed exploration of how
first- and second-order schemas may be used to capture morphological generalisations.
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1.3 Outline of the rest of the thesis
Operationalising all of the descriptive constructs and analyses described in the previous
section would obviously be a monumental undertaking. For this thesis, I have thus de-
cided to concentrate on three central constructs: profile determinacy, focal prominence,
and sequential vs. summary scanning. In particular, the analyses I propose to test are the
following:
1. In finite complementation (e.g. I know she left), the complement-taking predicate
(know) is the head (or profile determinant) of the sentence, not the content clause
(she left). (Langacker 1991: 436)
2. In both the prepositional-object and direct-object alternants in the dative alternation
(e.g. She gave a book to the boy vs. She gave the boy a book), the first object (a book and
the boy, respectively) is the primary landmark, and the second object (to the boy and a
book, respectively) is the secondary landmark; and in both the locative and existential
alternants in the existential alternation (e.g. A book is on the table vs. There is a book
on the table), the subject (a book and there, respectively) is the trajector or primary
figure. (Langacker 2008a: 393–394; Langacker 2010e: 147)
3. Finite clauses (e.g. She said that he wiped the table) profile a sequentially-scanned pro-
cess, whereas non-finite complements of perception verbs (e.g. She saw himwipe the table)
profile a summarily-scanned process. (Langacker 1991: 442–445)
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 attempt to operationalise the above analyses (respectively), based
on a close reading of the psychological intuitions underlying them. They also report the
results of experimental tests of these operationalisations. Chapters 5 and 6 analyse the
theoretical consequences of this research for the framework of Cognitive Grammar; and
Chapter 7 suggests consequences for other branches of linguistics.
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Part I
Operationalising Cognitive Grammar
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Chapter 2
Profile determinacy in
propositional-attitude constructions
2.1 Introduction
The topic of this chapter is sentences that express propositional attitudes, such as the fol-
lowing:
(1) I know that she left.
When discussing sentences such as this, I will refer to the verb in bold as the propositional-
attitude verb or PAV (since it expresses a state of mind with respect to a proposition), and
the underlined finite clause as the content clause (since it expresses the content of the said
proposition—this usage follows Huddleston & Pullum 2002: 62).
Traditionally, the PAV is considered to be the “head” of the sentence, determining its
essential content, and the content clause is considered to be “embedded” as a comple-
ment of the PAV; accordingly, the PAV is also known as the “matrix verb” or “main verb”,
and the content clause is also known as the “(finite) complement clause” or “subordinate
clause”. This is the analysis that is assumed, e.g., in Langacker (1991), Halliday (1994), Van
Valin & LaPolla (1997), etc. (considering just functionalist frameworks; see S. A. Thompson
2002: 128, 131 for further references).
But what exactly does it mean to say that the PAV is the “head” of a propositional-
attitude construction? In Cognitive Grammar—the theoretical framework adopted in this
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thesis—the “head” of a grammatical construction is defined as the component that desig-
nates (or “profiles”) the same entity as the composite structure; in other words, the “profile
determinant”. Thus, to say that the PAV is the head of the sentence is to say that the sen-
tence as a whole designates the same entity as does the PAV: “I know she left designates
the process of knowing, not of leaving” (Langacker 1991: 436; boldface in original).
Unfortunately, it is not universally agreed that the profile determinant of a propositional-
attitude construction is the PAV. S. A.Thompson (2002: 130–136), for instance, argues against
this analysis. She interprets profile determinacy in terms of “prominence”, and under-
stands Langacker’s (1991: 436ff) analysis as being a claim that the content of the PAV is
more “prominent” than that of the content clause.¹ However, she finds extensive evidence
from conversational data showing that in actual usage, it is typically the content clause,
not the PAV, that is more “prominent”, in the sense of “accomplishing the action towards
which the [speech-act] participants are oriented” (S. A. Thompson 2002: 132).
(2) 1 JOANNE: % % you know,
2 as much as he’s abu=sed his liver,
3 and %all other .. other things in his
4 life,
5 he’s still healthy as an o=x.
6 ...
7 JOANNE: yet he’s still healthy.
9 he reminds me [of my brother].
10 LENORE: [he’s still walking around,]
11 I don’t know how healthy he is.
(S. A. Thompson 2002: 133)
In this example, the action towardswhich Joanne and Lenore are oriented is that of “arguing
about the health of their friend”; the talkwhich fulfils this purpose (shown in boldface) takes
the form of monoclausal utterances (in lines 5, 7, and 10) and then a content clause (line
11).
S. A. Thompson (2002: 134) also notes that the most frequent subject-PAV combinations
in spoken (American) English (I think and I guess) are so secondary to the content clause
that they have been “reanalyzed as epistemic parentheticals, that is, epistemic adverbial
phrases” (as in (3)), and thus cannot on any grounds be considered to be “heads” (see S. A.
¹Whether this is in fact an accurate understanding of the notion of profile determinacy is a question that I will
return to later.
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Thompson & Mulac 1991 for further details).
(3) because she uh= has had enough I guess.
A similar point regarding the relative prominence of PAVs and content clauses is made
by Verhagen (2005), for written Dutch (and English). In the example below (Verhagen
2005: 96), the “matrix clauses” and content clauses in a short text have been separated into
two columns. It is obvious that the essential content of the text can be gleaned by looking
at just the right-hand column, but not at all by looking at just the left-hand column.
(4) ‘Main’ clauses ’Subordinate’ clauses
I have reported before that there has already been success in
breeding clones of mammalian em-
bryos.
From the above it may now be con-
cluded that
it will become possible in the near
future to make new embryos with
the DNA of full-grown animals as
well.
The director of GenTech even ex-
pects that
this will happen as soon as next year.
Others believe that it may take somewhat longer,
but nobody doubts that the cloning of a full-grown sheep
or horse will be a reality within ten
years.
The question is whether society is mentally and morally
ready for this,
or whether we will once again be hopelessly
overtaken by the technical develop-
ments.
Finally, Diessel & Tomasello (2001: 132), looking at language acquisition data, find that
in the “vast majority” of propositional-attitude structures produced by children, “[t]he com-
posite structure contains…only a single proposition expressed by the COMP-clause [con-
tent clause]. The CTV-clauses [PAV-containing clauses] are propositionally empty”.
Boye & Harder (2007) argue for a compromise between the traditional analysis and the
discourse-based approaches just mentioned. They suggest that it is possible that in a sen-
tence instantiating finite complementation, the PAV-containing clause can be the primary
predicate “at the level of structure”, while the content clause can be the primary predicate
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“at the level of usage”. Boye and Harder’s proposal will be considered further in §2.3.4.
Dąbrowska (2009: 723) argues that the question of which clause in a biclausal structure
is the “profile determinant” should ultimately be resolved empirically. She points out that
there has so far been no attempt to even define “profile determinant” operationally, in such
a way that analyses formulated in terms of this concept might in principle be empirically
verified. This operationalisation is all the more important, as it cannot be taken for granted
that S. A. Thompson’s (2002: 131) notion of “prominence” (or that of other authors) neces-
sarily corresponds to Langacker’s notion of “profile determinant”, at least with regard to
the analysis of finite complementation.
In the next subsection, I look again at the definition of “profile determinant” in Cognit-
ive Grammar, and then suggest a way of operationalising this concept so that analyses of
grammatical constructions that make use of it can in principle be verified experimentally.
The rest of the chapter reports on two experiments based on this operationalisation, which
aim to determine, for a range of sentences exhibiting finite complementation, whether it is
the PAV or the content clause that is the head.
2.1.1 Operationalising profile determinacy
As mentioned before, in Cognitive Grammar, the head of a construction is defined as that
component which designates, or “profiles”, the same entity as the composite structure; it
is the component that determines the composite structure’s profile, hence, the “profile de-
terminant” (Langacker 1987: 288). For example, in a nominal compound such as jar lid, the
profile determinant is lid, because the composite structure jar lid designates (profiles) the
lid, and not the jar; a jar lid is a lid, and not a jar.
A consequence of this definition is that the profile determinant is necessarily more
“schematic” than (i.e., more general than) the composite structure (Langacker 1987: 467).
In other words, all of the semantic properties contributed by the head are present among
those of the composite structure; the head has no semantic properties that are not present
in the composite structure (although the composite structure often has semantic properties
not contributed by the head). For example, in the compound jar lid, all of the properties
of lid (e.g. “flat”, “round”, “covering”, etc.) are present among the properties of jar lid; jar,
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however, has many properties that do not apply to jar lid (e.g. “long”, “hollow”, etc.).
In an analogous fashion, we can say that if the PAV in (1) is the head of the sentence, this
means that the semantic properties of know (e.g. awareness, certainty, etc.) are all present
among those of I know that she left; whereas if it is the content clause (she left) that is the
head, then the properties of the content clause (e.g. movement, increasing distance from the
deictic centre, etc.) are all present among those of the sentence. It is also conceivable that
both may be profile determinants, or that neither may be fully profile-determining; in these
cases the sentence could have properties of both the PAV and the content clause.² Examples
of these three situations are given below (see §2.3.3 for the empirical evidence):
(5) a. I suspect that he had read the book. (p.d. = matrix clause)
b. She realised that he had broken the law. (p.d. = complement clause)
c. She suggested that he had crossed the border. (p.d. = both clauses)
I propose that it is possible to empirically determine which of the above situations holds,
for any given sentence, by eliciting semantic features of the PAV and of the content clause,
and measuring the extent to which speakers feel that the features of each are applicable to
the sentence as a whole. This is intended as a way of operationalising the definition of the
profile determinant as the component whosemeaning is schematic for that of the composite
structure, i.e., whose semantic properties are all present among those of the whole sentence.
An experiment that implements this operationalisation is described in the following two
sections. The experiment proceeds in two stages. In the first stage, each subject is shown
sixteen sentences exhibiting finite complementation; the task is to list the semantic proper-
ties of either the PAV or the main verb of the content clause (depending on the condition).
The features thus elicited are used to create the stimuli for the second stage (the main ex-
periment). In this stage, each subject is shown the same sixteen sentences as before, but
each sentence is now followed by four (or three) elicited features of the PAV, four (or three)
of the content-clause verb, and an equal number of fillers (all in a randomised order). The
task is to pick among the features those that apply to the sentence as a whole. For a given
sentence, if subjects pick all and only the features of the PAV, then this is evidence that the
²In other words, the sentence may designate two separate events at once; or it may not fully designate either
one.
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PAV is the profile determinant; if they pick all and only the features of the content-clause
verb, then this is evidence that the content clause is the profile determinant; and if they
pick some of both, then we have an intermediate situation.
2.2 Feature elicitation for Experiment 1
2.2.1 Participants
Initially, an online version of this task was distributed via the mailing lists for first- and
second-year students in various undergraduate programmes at Northumbria University.
In this manner responses were collected from sixteen participants, one of whom was a
non-native English speaker (this person’s response was thus discarded). Subsequently, re-
sponses were collected from a further seventeen members of the Northumbria University
community by approaching them in person; of these responses, one was from a non-native
speaker of English (and hence discarded).
In total, responses from 31 participants were used.
2.2.2 Materials
Sixteen sentences exhibiting finite complementation were created; each of these was eight
words long, and conformed to the pattern [{She/I } V-ed that [he had V-en the N]]. Each
sentence exemplified a different PAV in the first verb slot (V-ed). (The sixteen sentences
are given in (7)–(10).)
These matrix verbs were arrived at by searching the British National Corpus (at http:
//corpus.byu.edu/bnc/: Davies 2004–) for “[vv0*] that” (i.e. a base-form verb fol-
lowed by that), and for “[v?d*] that” (a past-tense verb form followed by that). The
combined results were then (intuitively) sorted into the four semantic classes given in (6);
this was done simply in order to be able to take a (hopefully) representative sampling of
PAVs across semantic space, and not for the purpose of making comparisons between dif-
ferent verb classes. The four verb classes used, drawn from the classifications in Langacker
(2010c), were as follows:
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(6) a. Inclination: The subject is inclined towards accepting the truth of the proposi-
tion coded by the content clause, but has not yet done so.
Examples: believe, think, suppose, imagine, etc.
Note: These verbs are often called “bridge verbs”, and form the class of neg-
raising verbs in English (Langacker 2010c: 317).
b. Action: The proposition coded by the content clause undergoes a change in
epistemic status relative to the subject, from “unknown” to either “accepted as
part of reality” or “rejected from consideration”.
Examples: learn, realise, notice, decide, etc.
c. Result: The subject has accepted the proposition coded by the content clause as
part of their conception of reality, or has rejected it.
Examples: know, understand, remember, forget, etc.
Note: Verbs in this class tend to be factive verbs (i.e., presuppose the truth of
the proposition coded by the content clause).
d. Communication: More than one conceptualiser interacts with the proposition
coded by the content clause; one of these conceptualisers is coded as the subject,
and the other(s) may be left implicit.
Examples: say, ask, persuade, confess, etc.
Once the [V that] sequences had been sorted into verb classes, they were then sorted
(within each class) by frequency (total number of hits in the corpus). Table 2.2 shows the
highest-frequency results in each verb class (with the verbs eventually selected shown in
boldface).
Notice that different inflected forms of the same verb were kept separate; this is because
different forms of a verb may have different behaviour (in terms of whether they tend to
make the content clause the profile determinant).
From each of the four classes, four verb-forms were chosen. I chose the most frequent
verb-forms in each class except when:
1. they are unable to appear with a third-person singular subject (e.g. think, know: cf.
*She think, *He know);
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Table 2.2: Most frequent complement-taking verbs in the BNC in each class.
Action Inclination Result Communication
item freq. item freq. item freq. item freq.
found 3408 think 5395 know 4917 said 9660
realised 1815 says 3760 knew 3487 showed 2273
saw 1424 believe 3248 believes 1401 suggested 2182
decided 1311 thought 2500 believed 1386 claimed 1747
find 1201 felt 2351 remember 1268 argued 1564
concluded 997 say 2227 see 948 announced 1435
discovered 842 feel 1599 agree 926 stated 1197
noticed 609 argues 1429 agreed 881 reported 1145
heard 583 states 933 knows 832 claims 998
estimated 364 argue 924 held 821 insisted 869
accepted 321 suppose 737 understand 702 indicated 867
ruled 290 claim 480 assume 646 added 734
observed 289 thinks 471 accept 620 noted 729
learned 251 suspect 466 admitted 488 revealed 702
2. they aremorphological variants of verbs that have already been selected (e.g. believed,
knows); or
3. their classification is ambiguous or unclear (e.g. said, which can either suggest Inclin-
ation towards a proposition, or be neutral).
The eventual choice of verbs was perhaps not optimal, as it did end up including three
verb forms that are incompatible with a third-person singular subject (believe, suspect and
remember); for these verb-forms, I used a first-person singular subject. A further study will
of course have to include a larger number of verbs, and ideally multiple inflected forms of
each verb.
The content-clause verb phrases were arbitrarily chosen by searching the British Na-
tional Corpus and the Corpus of Contemporary American English (Davies 2008–) for “had
[v?n*] the [nn*]” (i.e. [had V-en the N]), and manually looking through the results
for sixteen semantically well-distributed verb phrases. (The reason two corpora were used
is that I was not able to find enough appropriate results in the BNC.) These verb phrases
were not controlled in any other way (e.g. by matching lemma frequencies of the verbs, or
their concreteness etc.).³
³Perhaps because of the way the BNC and the COCA were compiled, many of the verb phrases chosen seem
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The sixteen sentences that were finally used are given below, sorted by the semantic
class of the PAV: (Notice that in this experiment, each PAV appeared with only one content
clause; Experiment 2 below used all combinations of PAVs and content clauses.)
(7) Action:
a. She found that he had closed the door.
b. She realised that he had broken the law.
c. She saw that he had called the police.
d. She concluded that he had seen the man.
(8) Inclination:
a. She thought that he had left the room.
b. She says that he had found the body.
c. I believe that he had heard the sound.
d. I suspect that he had read the book.
(9) Result:
a. She knew that he had pulled the trigger.
b. She agreed that he had stopped the car.
c. I remember that he had taken the money.
d. She admitted that he had joined the army.
(10) Communication:
a. She announced that he had got the job.
b. She showed that he had won the battle.
c. She suggested that he had crossed the border.
d. She claimed that he had solved the problem.
The sentences were presented to participants in the following, interleaved order: (7a)–(8a)–
(9a)–(10a)–(7b)–(8b)–(9b)–(10b)–etc.
to exemplify a “journalistic” or “crime novel” genre (see below). It is hard to imagine, though, what effect this
could be expected to have on the results of the experiments.
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2.2.3 Procedure
There were two conditions, the “PAV condition” and the “content-clause verb condition”,
to which participants were randomly assigned. In both conditions, participants were given
the following instructions:
For each of the following sentences, please describe what you think the cap-
italised word means, in this particular context, using up to ten features. Don’t
worry if you can’t think of ten features for every word; write in as many as
you can easily think of. Once you are done with an item, please do not go back
over it.
The following is an example of the sort of response you could give:
She invited him to her house.
make a request
friend
come over
event
joint activity
welcome
polite action
(etc.)
followed by all sixteen sentences, each with either the PAV in capitals (e.g. She found that
he had closed the door), or the content-clause verb in capitals (e.g. She found that he had
closed the door). Each sentence was followed by some space in which to type (or write)
the features of the highlighted word. At the beginning of the form (in the online version)
or at the end (in the printed version) were two questions, asking for the participant’s native
language (“English” or “Other (please specify):”), and whether they had already participated
in the study before. If a participant indicated their native language as “Other”, or that they
had already participated in the study once before, they were excluded from the analysis.
(In fact, no participants were excluded on the basis of the latter criterion in this study.)
2.2.4 Results
The features most commonly generated for each PAV and its corresponding content-clause
verb (i.e. those features produced by at least two different people each) are shown in Tables
2.7–2.10 in the Appendix, together with the percentage of respondents who produced each
feature. (Features which differed only morphologically were counted together: thus, “saw”
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includes both “see” and “saw”. In the tables, I have given only the most frequent or repres-
entative form of each feature.)
For each verb, the features shown in boldface underneath it are the ones which were
chosen for use in the stimuli for the applicability-judgment study described in the next
section. (I chose four features for each verb, unless there were too few commonly-generated
ones, in which case only three were chosen. The number of features used for the PAV and
content-clause verb in a sentence was always the same: thus, only three features were
used for solved, even though more were available, because there were only three features
available for the corresponding PAV claimed.) Notice that the features that were chosen
were not always the features at the tops of the lists. This was for two reasons:
1. A feature was not chosen if it was morphologically related to the verb it describes
(e.g. I did not choose think as a feature of thought);
2. The average frequency of the PAV features was roughly matched with the average
frequency of the features for content-clause verbs. This usually meant discarding
some of the super-high-frequency features of complement verbs: e.g., I did not choose
phone and ring as features of called, as this would have made the features of the
content-clause verb in She saw that he had called the police too much more frequent
than the features of PAVs (taken as a whole).
One could argue about whether the features that best describe a concept can really be
found by looking for the ones that participants come up with most frequently. An informal
inspection of Tables 2.7–2.10 reveals that some of the infrequently-generated features are
in fact quite appropriate, and some of the frequently-generated features can be somewhat
off the mark. In Experiment 2, this shortcoming was addressed by having participants rate
each feature for appropriateness, and using these ratings as the basis for selecting features
to be used in the experiment.
2.3 Experiment 1
This experiment directly tests, for each of the sixteen sentences in (7a)–(10d), towhat degree
the PAV and the content clause are profile determinants. It does so by having participants
28
2.3. EXPERIMENT 1
look at a list of features, among which are the features of the PAV and the features of the
content-clause verb selected in the previous (norming) study, and having them select those
features which they judge as applying to the overall meaning of the sentence. The more
features of the PAV are selected, the more profile-determining the PAV can be concluded to
be, and likewise for the content clause.
2.3.1 Participants
A hundred and six responses for this study were collected by distributing it via the mailing
lists for first- and second-year students in various undergraduate programmes at Northum-
bria University. Out of these hundred and six responses, three were from non-native speak-
ers of English, one was from a person who had already participated in the study once, and
one was a duplicate response; these five were excluded from the analysis.
Additionally, responses were collected from six participants by approaching them dir-
ectly. Out of these, one was discarded, as it came from a native speaker of French.
In total, 106 responses were used.
2.3.2 Materials and procedure
The same 16 sentences were used as in the feature elicitation task. Each sentence was
followed by four features of the PAV, four features of the content-clause verb, and four filler
features (except for the sentences with agreed and claimed, for which only three features of
each type were used; see above), all presented in a random order. There were four versions
of the stimuli, each with a different random order for the features following each sentence.
Participants were given the following instructions at the beginning of the questionnaire:
Each of the following sentences is followed by a list of words. Tick (or circle)
those words which you think are most closely related to the overall meaning
of the entire sentence—not just related to one of the words in the sentence.
The following is an example of the sort of response you could give:
She stole the muffin.
[ ] baked
[x] took
[x] sneaky
[ ] sweet
[x] not allowed
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[ ] edible
[ ] None of the above
Notice that ”baked”, ”sweet”, and ”edible” are related to only the muffin.
They are not very closely related to what the sentence refers to as a whole,
namely an act of stealing. Thus you would probably not want to tick those
boxes.
This was followed by the sixteen sentences, each with twelve (or nine) features to choose
from, together with a “None of the above” option, as follows:
She found that he had closed the door.
• refused
• unopened
• blocked
• saw
• looked
• locked
• grew
• slept
• lost
• wrote
• wiped
• realised
• None of the above
(The ”None of the above” option was included so that if a participant did not pick any of
the features, it would be possible to tell whether they had done so deliberately, or whether
they had simply not attempted the question. In fact, no responses were excluded by this
criterion.)⁴
At the end was a question asking if the participant had noticed any pattern in their
responses, and if so, what it was.
2.3.3 Results
For each sentence, I recorded the number of PAV features that each participant chose as
most descriptive of the overall sentence meaning, as well as the number of content-clause
⁴A few participants ticked “None of the above” in addition to one or more features; I chose to treat these
responses as if “None of the above” had not been ticked.
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Figure 2.1: Results: Action verbs
verb features; these numbers ranged from 0 to 3 or 4. On the basis of these, a “PAV-
biasedness” score was computed for each sentence, as the number of PAV features divided
by the total number of features selected. (“Content-clause-biasedness” was defined analog-
ously.)
There were huge individual differences in PAV- vs. content-clause-biasedness; parti-
cipants ran the gamut from completely PAV-biased (four of them) to almost completely
content-clause-biased. To factor out these individual differences, the biasedness scores
were converted into “tied ranks” for each participant; that is, for each participant, the
biasedness scores for all the sentences were given ranks from highest to lowest; and if
there were two or more scores that were identical (i.e., whose relative ranking would be
ambiguous), their ranking was defined as the average of all their possible ranks. This en-
sured, for example, that if a participant’s biasedness score was exactly the same for every
sentence, the tied ranks of all these scores would come out as 0.5.
Figures 2.1–2.4 show the distribution of participant-relative biases for each sentence,
and whether each sentence shows a significant bias (as judged by a Mann–Whitney U-test).
In each pair of box plots, the one on the left shows the distribution of PAV-biasedness scores,
and the one on the right shows the distribution of content-clause-biasedness scores. In one
sense, the second box plot does not add new information, since it is entirely determined by
the first. However, seeing both box plots makes it easier to see how extreme the biases are.
As there were sixteen PAV/content-clause comparisons being made, the Bonferroni cor-
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Figure 2.2: Results: Inclination verbs
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Figure 2.3: Results: Result verbs
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Figure 2.4: Results: Communication verbs
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Table 2.3: Summary of PAV-biasedness results for Experiment 1. Significance thresholds: *
p < 0.0516 , ** p <
0.01
16 , *** p <
0.001
16 .
Verb Z r significance
realised −7.01 −0.68 ***
believe −5.24 −0.51 ***
agreed −2.96 −0.29 *
announced −2.16 −0.21
claimed −0.96 −0.09
found −0.37 −0.04
suggested −0.01 0.00
concluded 0.90 0.09
showed 2.12 0.21
says 3.30 0.32 *
thought 4.77 0.46 ***
knew 5.82 0.57 ***
saw 6.16 0.60 ***
admitted 6.88 0.67 ***
remember 7.19 0.70 ***
suspect 7.21 0.70 ***
rection was applied, and a significance threshold of 0.05 ÷ 16 = 0.003125 was used. By this
criterion, the sentences with thought, knew, says, saw, remember, suspect and admitted all
had a significant PAV bias (thought: p < 0.00116 , Z = 4.77, r = 0.46; knew: p <
0.001
16 , Z = 5.82,
r = 0.57; says: p < 0.0516 , Z = 3.30, r = 0.32; saw: p <
0.001
16 , Z = 6.16, r = 0.60; remem-
ber : p < 0.00116 , Z = 7.19, r = 0.70; suspect: p <
0.001
16 , Z = 7.21, r = 0.70; admitted: p <
0.001
16 ,
Z = 6.88, r = 0.67), and the sentences with realised, agreed and believe had a significant
content-clause bias (realised: p < 0.00116 , Z = 7.01, r = 0.68; agreed: p <
0.01
16 , Z = 2.96, r = 0.29;
believe: p < 0.00116 , Z = 5.24, r = 0.51). The other sentences did not exhibit any bias that
approached significance when multiple comparisons were corrected for. These results are
summarised in Table 2.3, sorted by effect size (r).
Looking at the results by verb class, we find that the Inclination and Result classes show
a statistically significant PAV bias (Inclination: p < 0.0014 , Z = 5.73, r = 0.56; Result: p <
0.001
4 ,
Z = 9.10, r = 0.88). In each of these classes, however, there is one verb that exhibits the
opposite tendency (believe and agreed are unexpectedly content-clause-biased).
The results can be summarised as follows:
(11) a. PAV-biased verbs: thought, knew, says, saw, remember, suspect, admitted
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b. Content-clause-biased verbs: realised, agreed, believe
c. Unbiased verbs: found, announced, showed, suggested, concluded, claimed
Actually, while the above labels are convenient and compact, they are rather mislead-
ing, in that they suggest that we have discovered (semantic) properties of the verbs thought,
realised (etc.) themselves. It would be more accurate to say that we are dealing with prop-
erties of the constructions [NP thought that S], [NP realised that S], etc. Thus, the three
groups of verbs shown above would more accurately be labeled as follows:
(12) a. Verbs V such that [NP V that S] profiles the process designated by V to a greater
extent than it profiles the process designated by S;
b. Verbs V such that [NP V that S] profiles the process designated by S to a greater
extent than it profiles the process designated by V;
c. Verbs V such that [NP V that S] profiles the processes designated by V and S to
roughly equal (or at least, not significantly different) degrees.
The next section considers possible explanations of these results; the following section
then reports on an extension of this study that addresses some of the shortcomings that
have been mentioned.
2.3.4 Discussion
The results of the current experiment hint at a semantic pattern underlying profile determ-
inacy in finite-complementation constructions: namely, that constructions involving bridge
verbs and factive verbs tend to have the PAV as the main verb, and the content clause as
a subordinate clause. Constructions involving other types of complement-taking verbs do
not have a clear pattern. (It should be borne in mind, though, that a sample of four verbs
is not really adequate for making a generalisation about a verb class; but this was not the
purpose of the study.)
The result for bridge verbs (which, the reader will recall, are neg-raising) is surprising.
According to Boye &Harder (2007: 578), if a verb is neg-raising (i.e. if I don’t V that S implies
I V that not-S), then the content clause is the profile determinant. However, three of the four
bridge verbs used in the study are actually PAV-biased.
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The exception, as noted earlier, is the verb believe. It is possible that the content-clause
bias here is due to the fact that this verb form had a first-person subject (which indicates
that the content clause is part of what the speaker is asserting). However, this explanation
fails to account for the fact that suspect, which also appeared with a first-person subject,
shows a strong PAV bias.
The exceptional verb in the factive-verb class is agreed, which unexpectedly shows a
content-clause bias; however, the effect size is smaller than for any of the other significantly-
biased verbs (r = 0.29, just under the threshold of 0.3 for a “medium effect size”). It is
possible, though, that this verb should not really be considered a factive verb (although it
can certainly be used as such). One can think of contexts in which the truth of the content
clause is not presupposed:
(13) He agrees (with her) that the water is too cold—{but no one else does/but I don’t}.⁵
Indeed, there is probably a good case for classifying agreed as a communication verb, since
one can only agree with a proposition that someone else has asserted (i.e., at least two
conceptualisers need to be involved).
Finally, we may consider the two Action verbs that show a significant bias: realised
(content-clause-biased) and saw (PAV-biased). A plausible explanation of the behaviour of
realised does not come to mind; but notice that saw is a factive verb (if she saw that he had
called the police, then it is necessarily true that he had called the police), and its behaviour
is not surprising in this context.
Is there a larger pattern here? Perhaps; consider which of the verbs are capable of taking
NP complements:
(14) a. [Until last week, she was unaware that he had broken the law. Then, suddenly,]
*she realised that.
b. [Did he hear the sound?] *She believes that. [cf. She believes so.]
c. [They claimed that he had stopped the car.] *She agreed that. [cf. She agreed
with that.]
d. [As soon as she found that he had got the job,] she announced it [to all her
friends.]
⁵In certain languages, the content clause in this sentence would be in the subjunctive.
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e. [Did he really solve that problem?] She claimed that, [but was later proven
wrong.]
f. [Does she know that he had closed the door?—Yes,] *she found that.
g. [She thinks he crossed the border, doesn’t she?—Yes,] she suggested that [at one
point.]
h. [I’m not convinced that he saw the man, but] ?she concluded that.
i. [They didn’t believe that he had won the battle, but] she showed that [beyond a
shadow of doubt.]
j. [We’re not sure that he found the body, although] ?she says that.
k. [Didn’t she say he had left the room?] She thought that, [but now she isn’t sure.]
l. [Did you tell her that he had pulled the trigger?] She knew that [already.]
m. [Does she know that he called the police?—Yes,] she saw that.
n. [They asked her point-blank whether he had joined the army.] She admitted
that [readily.]
o. [She has forgotten that he had taken the money, but] I [still] remember that.
p. [Does she know that he read the book?—Yes, or at least] she suspects that.
(Here, the verbs have been sorted from least PAV-biased to most PAV-biased.) It seems
as though the verbs that are least PAV-biased are those that do not readily take an NP
complement. We will see how well this hypothesis fares in Experiment 2, reported in the
next few sections.
2.4 Introduction to Experiment 2
There were two potential shortcomings with Experiment 1. The first is that the features
of the PAVs and content-clause verbs had been generated freely; but, as noted earlier, the
features of a word that come most easily to mind are not necessarily the ones that are
most apt, and the most apt features do not always come easily to mind. To address this
concern, a norming study was done in which participants were shown, for each verb, all of
the features that had been generated for it in the earlier feature-elicitation study, and they
had to select those features that best matched the verb. The features that were selected
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by the most participants would be treated as the features that most accurately reflect the
meaning of that verb.
Another shortcoming of the previous study was that each PAV was always paired with
the same content clause; thus, one cannot shake off the suspicion that the content-clause
verbs might be having an effect that is not being controlled for. To address this, the study
was run with all possible pairings of PAVs and content clauses.
2.5 Norming study for Experiment 2
2.5.1 Participants
Forty-three participants (undergraduate students at Northumbria University) participated
in the norming study. All self-identified as native speakers of English.
2.5.2 Materials and procedure
As in the earlier feature-elicitation study, there were two conditions: PAV and content-
clause. In both cases, the following instructions were given:
Below, you will find a list of sentences, each with one word in it italicised.
Each sentence is followed by a list of features. Take a moment to look through
the features, and then circle the oneswhich you think best describe themeaning
of the italicised word in the context of the sentence. You may circle as many
features as you think are appropriate.
The following is an illustration of the sort of response you might give:
She invited him to her house.
• make a request
• avalanche
• skated
• come over
• event
• Velcro
• joint activity
• chopped down
• rectangular
• welcome
• fried
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• polite action
• staircase
These instructions were followed by the sixteen finite-complementation sentences that
were used in the previous study. Depending on the condition, either the PAVs or the
content-clause verbs were italicised. Each sentence was followed by a list of between thirty
and fifty features, which were drawn from the features that had been elicited in the earlier
feature-elicitation task.
2.5.3 Results
The features of each verb that were ultimately chosen are shown in Table 2.4. (The num-
bers are the absolute number of participants that chose a given feature. As before, feature
frequencies were roughly equalised across PAVs and content-clause verbs.)
2.6 Experiment 2
2.6.1 Participants
A hundred and sixty-three responses were collected by distributing the study by e-mail to
undergraduates at Northumbria University. Out of these participants, five self-identified
as native speakers of a language other than English. In addition, thirty-eight of the parti-
cipants (including one of the non-native English speakers) reported that they were aware
of a response strategy that they were using; these participants were excluded from the ana-
lysis, as the response strategy might have led to their consistently picking features of the
PAV, or consistently picking features of the content-clause verb.⁶
In total, 121 responses were used.
2.6.2 Materials and procedure
Sixteen questionnaireswere constructed, in such away as to cover all possible combinations
of the sixteen PAVs with the sixteen content clauses. The first questionnaire was identical
to the one used in the initial version of the experiment, except that the answer choices
⁶I have not yet tested whether participants who indicated a response strategy actually behaved in this way.
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Table 2.4: Results of norming study for Experiment 2.
found realised saw concluded
discovered 19 concluded 15 witnessed 15 ascertained 12
realised 18 discovered 15 observation 13 worked out 11
saw 14 revelation 10 realised 12 decided 10
notice 10 knew 9 discovered 8 revealed 9
observe 10 observed 8 visual con-
firmation
8 drew from
facts/evidence
9
confirmed 7 found out 8 knew 7 summary 8
thought says believe suspect
assumed 16 suggests 11 strong feel-
ing
11 thinks but
can’t prove
12
believed 15 told people 10 have faith 11 believe 11
guessed 13 might not be
true
9 trust 10 perhaps 9
perceived 9 alleged 9 think 10 assume 9
suspect 8 rumour 9 conclude 9 guess 8
lack of cer-
tainty
5 stated 8 opinion 9 speculate 8
knew agreed remember admitted
was certain 16 confirmed 15 recall 17 confessed 17
definite 12 mutual
decision
12 memory 15 revealed 15
100% 12 comply 11 recollected 12 confirmed 13
positive 11 same opinion 10 look back 11 opened up 11
fact 10 conceded 10 returning
thought
8 announced 10
sure 10 consent 8 flashback 7 came clean 9
announced showed suggested claimed
revealed 18 demonstrated
something
14 put forward 15 put forward 11
declared 15 boasted 12 indicated 13 said 9
told 13 displayed 12 proposal 12 suggested 9
said 11 presented 10 could have 11 announced 9
proclaimed 11 indicated 9 implied 10 perceived 8
broadcast 10 conveyed 8 hinted 10 believed 8
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included eighteen features: six of the PAV, six of the content-clause verb, and six fillers
(all randomly ordered). The second questionnaire differed from the first, in that content
clause #1 was paired with PAV #2, content clause #2 with PAV #3, and so on. In the third
questionnaire, content clause #1was pairedwith PAV #3, content clause #2with PAV #4, and
so on; and so on for the rest of the questionnaires. Thus, every PAV was (as far as possible)
paired with every content clause, reducing the possibility that the observed differences
between PAVs might be driven by differences in the content-clause verbs.
There was one problem with the crossing of PAVs and content clauses: the verbs find
and see appear both as PAVs (in she found and she saw) as well as in content clauses (in that
he had found the body and that he had seen the man). It would be problematic to collect
responses for the sentences She found that he had found the body and She saw that he had
seen the man, because it would be nearly impossible to tell whether the participant was
selecting features of the PAV or of the content-clause verb. Thus, these sentences were
replaced with She found that he had bought the book and She saw that he had broken the law
(in questionnaires 12 and 13, respectively).
Participants were assigned to questionnaires in the following manner: the e-mail invit-
ation contained a link to http://www.random.org/integers/?num=1&min=1&max=
16&col=1&base=10&format=html&rnd=new, which displays a single, random integer
between 1 and 16 (inclusive). This link was followed by a numbered list of links to the 16
questionnaires, and participants were instructed to click on the link corresponding to the
random number that they had been assigned.
2.6.3 Results
For each sentence that each participant saw, I coded the proportion of selected PAV and
content-clause features relative to the total number of relevant features selected.
Generalising over all participants, and all sentences, there was no significant bias in the
direction of either the PAV or the content clause; the average PAV bias was 0.51. In other
words, on the whole, participants showed no preference for one verb over the other.
As in Experiment 1, there were huge between-participant differences: some participants
were consistently PAV-biased, and others consistently content-clause-biased. This variation
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was continuous; i.e. there were no discrete PAV-biased and content-clause-biased groups.
To control for these individual differences, the bias scores for each participant were con-
verted into tied ranks (as explained earlier), so that even if the bias scores for a participant
were consistently high (or consistently low), the ranked scores would always have a mean
of 0.5.
Tied ranks were computed for the PAV biases as well as the content-clause biases. Thus,
for each participant, the distribution of tied ranks for the PAV bias and the content-clause
bias of each verb were compared. The following verbs were found to have a significant PAV
bias: (All of these verbs were found to be PAV-biased in the previous experiment as well.)
• thought (p < 0.00116 , Z = 4.50, r = 0.41)
• remembered (p < 0.00116 , Z = 4.88, r = 0.44)
• suspect (p < 0.00116 , Z = 6.01, r = 0.55)
• admitted (p < 0.00116 , Z = 5.45, r = 0.50)
In addition, the following verbs were found to have a significant content-clause bias:
• found (p < 0.0116 , Z = −3.53, r = −0.32)
• realised (p < 0.00116 , Z = −4.21, r = −0.38)
• says (p < 0.0516 , Z = −3.33, r = −0.30)
• agreed (p < 0.0116 , Z = −3.45, r = −0.31)
• believe (p < 0.0116 , Z = −3.87, r = −0.35)
This leaves the following verbs that did not show a significant bias:
• knew (p > 0.05, Z = −0.35, r = −0.03)
• announced (p > 0.05, Z = −0.02, r = 0.00)
• showed (0.05 > p > 0.0516 , Z = −2.87, r = −0.26)
• saw (p > 0.05, Z = 1.43, r = 0.13)
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Table 2.5: Summary of PAV-biasedness results for Experiment 2. Significance thresholds: *
p < 0.0516 , ** p <
0.01
16 , *** p <
0.001
16 .
Verb Z r significance
realised −4.21 −0.38 *
believe −3.87 −0.35 *
found −3.53 −0.32 *
agreed −3.45 −0.31 *
says −3.33 −0.30 *
showed −2.87 −0.26
claimed −1.21 −0.11
knew −0.35 −0.03
concluded −0.33 −0.03
announced −0.02 0.00
saw 1.43 0.13
suggested 2.05 0.19
thought 4.50 0.41 *
remember 4.88 0.44 *
admitted 5.45 0.50 *
suspect 6.01 0.55 *
• suggested (0.05 > p > 0.0516 , Z = 2.05, r = 0.19)
• concluded (p > 0.05, Z = −0.33, r = −0.03)
• claimed (p > 0.05, Z = −1.21, r = −0.11)
These results are summarised in Table 2.5, sorted by effect size (r). It is worth noting the
relatively large effect size of showed (in the direction of content-clause bias), which ap-
proaches the 0.3 threshold for a “medium effect size”. In Experiment 1, the effect size for
showed was −0.21 (but so was the effect size for announced, which is now zero). It is unclear
what, if anything, this means.
An analysis was also done by verb class. The results were as follows:
• Action verbs (verbs of realisation): content-clause-biased (p < 0.0116 , Z = −3.84, r =
−0.35)
• Inclination verbs (bridge/neg-raising verbs): neutral (p > 0.05, Z = 1.82, r = 0.17)
• Result verbs (factive verbs): PAV-biased (p < 0.0516 , Z = 3.37, r = 0.31)
• Interaction verbs (verbs of communication): neutral (p > 0.05, Z = −1.04, r = −0.09)
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Notice, though, that the effect for action verbs is driven by only found and realised; but
the effect for result verbs is driven by three of the four verbs (agreed, remembered and
admitted; knew being the exception). The class of inclination verbs contains both PAV-
biased verbs (thought and suspect) and content-clause-biased verbs (says and believe). None
of the interaction verbs has a significant bias one way or the other.
2.6.4 Discussion
As before, we find hints of semantic explicability of profile determinacy in propositional-
attitude constructions. Factive verbs seem to be PAV-biased (with the exception of believe,
perplexing as before). We now find that bridge verbs no longer show an overall bias; but
a closer look reveals that this is because says has “flipped” from being PAV-biased to be-
ing content-clause-biased. This is perhaps to be expected, as say is ambiguous between a
bridge-verb reading (in which it is used to introduce an assertion with which the speaker
agrees), and a purely communicative reading (in which the speaker makes no claim as to
the truth of what is said). It is entirely possible that the sentence She says that he had found
the body nudged participants towards the bridge-verb reading. (Note, too, that in both the
previous experiment and the current one, the effect size for says was fairly close to the
“medium” threshold.)
Another difference from the earlier result is in the behaviour of the Action verbs. Real-
ised remains content-clause-biased; however, saw is now neutral, and found (which was
previously neutral) is content-clause-biased.
2.7 Follow-up to Experiment 2
Let us now consider the hypothesis advanced earlier, that the PAV-biased propositional-
attitude verbs are ones for which the content clause can be substituted with an NP, and
that the content-clause-biased verbs are ones for which this substitution is not possible.
This follow-up study verifies to what degree the 16 PAVs under study are capable of taking
NP complements, and whether this indeed correlates with the effect sizes found in the main
study.
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2.7.1 Participants
Questionnaires were distributed to undergraduate students at Northumbria University. In
this way, 20 responses were collected.
2.7.2 Materials and procedure
Participants were provided the following instructions:
In each of the following question-answer pairs, please rate how natural-
sounding B’s answer is, on a scale from 1 (“I would never say this”) to 5 (“this
is something I would readily say”).
If you’re unsure of your rating, feel free to explain as best you can why
you’re unsure (we will find this information useful).
A: Did he close the door?
B: Yes—she found that.
1 2 3 4 5
(and likewise for the other 15 PAVs).
2.7.3 Results and discussion
For each propositional-attitude verb, ratings were averaged across participants, and then
converted into values between 0 and 1 (by subtracting 1 and dividing by 4); the results are
shown in Table 2.6. These values were then correlated with the effect sizes (r) found in the
main study described in the previous section. The correlation was 0.40 (t = 1.66, df = 14,
p = 0.12). In other words, there was no significant correlation between the degree to which
a PAV allows for an NP complement and the degree to which it is PAV-biased.
2.8 General discussion
Ultimately, we should not be overly concerned by the fact that the profile of a propositional-
attitude sentence cannot be predicted using the factors considered in this chapter. In es-
sence, there were two major hypotheses being tested:
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Table 2.6: Results for the NP-complement acceptability study.
Verb Acceptability of NP complement
found 0.19
showed 0.26
agreed 0.28
concluded 0.28
saw 0.45
knew 0.48
admitted 0.50
thought 0.50
realized 0.54
announced 0.59
believe 0.61
suggested 0.61
suspect 0.63
says 0.64
claimed 0.66
remember 0.80
(a) that the PAV is always the profile determinant (the traditional view);
(b) that the content clause is always the profile determinant (the extreme version of the
discourse-based view);
and both of these extremes have clearly been shown to be false. Individual propositional-
attitude verbs may be biased one way or the other, but there is no overall bias. This certainly
makes the lack of consensus on how to analyse these verbs understandable.
In particular, we should not worry that profile determinacy seems to have nothing to do
with which clause is more contentful or “prominent”; as mentioned earlier, what a sentence
profiles (i.e. designates) can be (and usually is) distinct from what it makes prominent. In
fact, I suspect that it is precisely this distinction that Boye & Harder 2007 are trying to
capture by distinguishing “structure-level” vs. “usage-level” properties of a propositional-
attitude verb. See also §5.2.6 below for further discussion of the relation between profile
determinacy and prominence.
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2.9 Conclusions
In this chapter I hope to have shown that in finite complementation constructions in Eng-
lish, neither the propositional-attitude verb nor the content clause can always be said to
be the “head”. The extent to which each constituent is the “head” appears to depend on
the particular PAV that is being used, in a way that cannot obviously be predicted from
semantic or distributional properties of the verb.
This may seem like a disappointing conclusion. However, under a usage-based model,
there is no problem at all with saying that verb-specific constructions such as [NP saw that
S], [NP realised that S], etc. (or perhaps constructions that are more schematic: [NP see
(that) S], [NP realise (that) S], etc.; or more specific: [We saw that S], [I realised that S],
etc.) are learned and represented separately in the speaker’s mind, and that information
about profile determinacy is stored separately with each of these.
Furthermore, there is a broader, methodological point being made here: that it is indeed
possible, as Dąbrowska (2009) urges, to operationalise semantic analyses of grammatical
phenomena of the sort proposed in Cognitive Grammar (as concretely illustrated here for
the construct “profile determinant”)—provided we are clear about our definitions. This is
after all the unifying thread that runs through this work.
2.A Features of PAVs and content-clause verbs
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Table 2.7: Action verb sentence verb-features.
found realised saw concluded
discover 64.71 concluded 23.53 acknowledged11.76 decided 17.65
realised 35.29 knew 23.53 eyes 11.76 final 17.65
saw 23.53 thought 17.65 heard 11.76 finished 17.65
aggressive 11.76 confusion 11.76 knew 11.76 confirmed 11.76
look 11.76 crime 11.76 looked 11.76 finalised 11.76
lost 11.76 discovered 11.76 observed 11.76 realised 11.76
shut out 11.76 found out 11.76 resulted 11.76
law 11.76 summarised 11.76
remember 11.76 thought 11.76
closed broken called seen
shut 71.43 illegal 28.57 phone 42.86 eyes 28.57
locked 28.57 bad 14.29 ring 42.86 looked 21.43
blocked 21.43 crime 14.29 shouted 35.71 noticed 21.43
refused 21.43 damaged 14.29 dialled 21.43 belief 14.29
unopened 21.43 guilty 14.29 spoke 21.43 past tense 14.29
barred 14.29 infringed
upon
14.29 asked for
help
14.29 saw 14.29
denied 14.29 mended 14.29 contacted 14.29 sense 14.29
goodbye 14.29 opposed 14.29 emergency 14.29 sight 14.29
prevented 14.29 snapped 14.29 help 14.29
rejected 14.29 informed 14.29
sealed 14.29 telephoned 14.29
slammed 14.29
stopped 14.29
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Table 2.8: Inclination verb sentence verb-features.
thought says believe suspect
assumed 23.53 told 29.41 belief 17.65 think 35.29
think 23.53 spoken 23.53 conclude 17.65 believe 23.53
brain 17.65 communicate11.76 faith 17.65 suspicion 23.53
ponder 17.65 informed 11.76 agree 11.76 guess 17.65
unsure 17.65 iterates 11.76 certain 11.76 maybe 17.65
believed 11.76 report 11.76 consider 11.76 assume 11.76
talk 11.76 know 11.76 negative 11.76
words 11.76 opinion 11.76
uncertain 11.76
left found heard read
gone 42.86 discovered 42.86 listen 57.14 information 21.43
not there 35.71 looked 14.29 noise 42.86 knowledge 21.43
exit 21.43 lost 14.29 ears 35.71 look 21.43
movement 21.43 realised 14.29 music 14.29 words 21.43
abandoned 14.29 retrieved 14.29 sense 14.29 absorbed 14.29
departed 14.29 searched 14.29 sound 14.29 studied 14.29
direction 14.29 seen 14.29 speaking 14.29 writing 14.29
vacated 14.29 shock 14.29
stumbled
upon
14.29
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Table 2.9: Result verb sentence verb-features.
knew agreed remember admitted
certain 41.18 decision 17.65 memory 35.29 truth 23.53
confident 17.65 yes 17.65 recall 29.41 came clean 17.65
definite 17.65 comply 11.76 thought 17.65 confessed 17.65
fear 17.65 confirmed 11.76 witness 17.65 revealed 17.65
knowledge 17.65 look back 11.76 accepted 11.76
fact 11.76 recollection 11.76 announced 11.76
positive 11.76 saw 11.76 ashamed 11.76
saw 11.76 conceded 11.76
sure 11.76 embarrassed 11.76
let out 11.76
owned up 11.76
told 11.76
pulled stopped taken joined
shot 50.00 halted 57.14 stolen 78.57 part of 28.57
death 28.57 braked 35.71 thief 21.43 connect 21.43
fired 28.57 (not mov-
ing)
borrowed 14.29 signed up 21.43
force 21.43 withdraw 14.29 accepted 14.29
killed 21.43 merged 14.29
end 14.29 recruitment 14.29
murdered 14.29 united 14.29
pressure 14.29 voluntary 14.29
squeezed 14.29
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Table 2.10: Communication verb sentence verb-features.
announced showed suggested claimed
told 29.41 presented 23.53 implied 23.53 believed 17.65
shouted 23.53 displayed 17.65 hinted 17.65 lie 11.76
spoke 23.53 confirmed 11.76 idea 17.65 statement 11.76
celebration 17.65 demonstrated11.76 advice 11.76
declared 17.65 pride 11.76 guessed 11.76
loud 17.65 revealed 11.76 opinion 11.76
pleased 17.65 victory 11.76 proclaimed 11.76
proud 17.65 put for-
ward
11.76
revealed 17.65 said 11.76
bragged 11.76 thought 11.76
excited 11.76
inform 11.76
news 11.76
proclaim 11.76
public 11.76
said 11.76
got won crossed solved
successful 28.57 victory 42.86 escape 28.57 answered 35.71
won 28.57 success 35.71 travel 28.57 completed 21.43
accepted 21.43 achievement 28.57 immigrate 21.43 puzzle 21.43
achieved 21.43 celebration 21.43 country 14.29 achieved 14.29
employment 21.43 beaten 14.29 freedom 14.29 explained 14.29
received 21.43 defeated 14.29 illegal 14.29 finished 14.29
acquired 14.29 first 14.29 moved 14.29 relieved 14.29
work 14.29 fought 14.29 went over 14.29 thought 14.29
medal 14.29
violence 14.29
winner 14.29
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Chapter 3
Focal prominence in the dative and
existential alternations
3.1 Introduction
The previous chapter started with a problem of linguistic description, where different au-
thors have analysed the same construction in different ways. The alternative analyses were
reformulated in terms of the descriptive constructs of Cognitive Grammar, and these formu-
lations were then turned into hypotheses that were tested experimentally. The purpose was
to show how Cognitive Grammar could be used as a tool for empirically deciding between
competing analyses.
This chapter and the next focus more narrowly on descriptive constructs of Cognitive
Grammar itself, in particular “trajector”, “landmark”, “sequential scanning” and “summary
scanning”. The purpose will be to identify what (if anything) these notions correspond to in
terms of the observable dynamics of language processing, and to determine whether these
notions have been correctly applied in the analysis of English grammar.
The present chapter will focus on the notions “trajector” and “landmark”, which are
used as semantic characterisations of “subject” and “(primary) object”, respectively. As
such, they figure in the analyses of the following two constructional alternations:
(15) Dative alternation:
a. The teacher gave the swimmer a banana. [ditransitive]
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b. The teacher gave a banana to the swimmer. [dative]
(16) Existential alternation:
a. The book is on the shelf. [locative]
b. There is a book on the shelf. [existential]
The ditransitive and dative constructions differ in terms of whether the (first) object denotes
the recipient of an event of transfer, or rather its theme (the transferred object). The locative
and existential constructions differ in terms of whether the subject denotes the located
object, or is an “expletive” (or “ambient”; cf. Bolinger 1973) pro-form.
Thus, if it is true that trajector and landmark correspond to subject and object, and if
there is an experimental method for determining what the trajector or landmark is in a
given sentence, then this method should reveal that in the ditransitive construction, the
landmark is the recipient, whereas in the dative construction, it is the theme. Likewise, it
should reveal that in the locative construction, the trajector is the located object, whereas
in the existential construction, it is the “ambience” (this notion is elaborated further below).
These are the hypotheses that will be tested in this chapter. However, we will start by
examining more closely the notions of trajector and landmark, and asking how these could
be operationalised.
3.1.1 Trajector and landmark
According to Cognitive Grammar, an expression can designate either a “thing” or a “rela-
tion”; a relation consists of interconnections between entities (Langacker 1987: 215). The
entities that are directly interconnected by a relation (in other words, the arguments of
the relation) are called “focal participants” (Langacker 1991: 301), and are characterised as
“figures” (in the Gestalt psychology sense of the term).
For relations which have two or more arguments (e.g. the relations profiled by divalent
and trivalent verbs, adpositions, or adverbs), a distinction is drawn between the “primary”
and “secondary” focal participants, or primary and secondary figures (Langacker 1991: 308).
These are also called the “trajector” and “landmark”, respectively (Langacker 1987: 231–236).
For example, in a sentence such asThe lamp is above the table, the lamp is the primary figure
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or trajector, and the table is the secondary figure or landmark (Langacker 2008a: 71, 73).¹
Conversely, in The table is below the lamp, the table is the trajector and the lamp is the
landmark.
One of the main uses of the trajector/landmark distinction is to characterise the dis-
tinction between subject and object. Langacker (1991: 305–313) argues that while subjects
prototypically exhibit a number of properties such as animacy, (relative) agentivity, defin-
iteness, topicality, and so on, the only property that they necessarily exhibit is that of being
construed as the (primary) figure. This is particularly clear in clauses involving spatial
relations (e.g. The lamp is above the table), or symmetric predicates (e.g. Joshua resembles
Jonathan), where the two arguments need not differ at all in animacy, agentivity, definite-
ness or topicality.
In a clause with two arguments, the object, by virtue of being the only focal participant
that is not primary, is by default the (unique) landmark (Langacker 1987: 270). For three-
argument clauses, Langacker distinguishes between a “primary landmark” and a “second-
ary landmark” (Langacker 2008a: 393–394),² expressed in English as the “primary object”
and “secondary object” in a ditransitive clause (Dryer 1986). While Langacker does not ar-
gue explicitly for this analysis (as he does for his analysis of subjects and objects), it accords
well with work showing that the primary object in a ditransitive clause tends to have more
prototypical “subject-like” properties than the secondary object (e.g. it is more likely to be
animate, definite, topical, etc.; cf. Bresnan et al. 2007).
3.1.2 Experimental evidence
How might one go about operationalising notions such as trajector and landmark? A clear
indication comes from Tomlin (1997) (building on Forrest 1992), who experimentally in-
vestigates the effect of visual attention on the choice of active or passive voice.
In Tomlin’s experiments, participants were shown a series of short film clips; in each of
them, two cartoon fish of different colours swim towards each other. Shortly before they
meet, an arrow is flashed next to one of the fish. Then one of the fish (not always the one
¹In the approach presented in Talmy (2000a), the table would be analysed as the “Ground”. Langacker reserves
“ground” for non-focal relational participants (e.g. Langacker 1991: 323).
²Logically, these terms should be equivalent to “secondary figure” and “tertiary figure”; however, Langacker
tends to avoid the term “tertiary figure” (Langacker 1991: 326). In any case, little hinges on this.
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that has been cued) swallows the other and continues swimming to the other side of the
screen. Participants were instructed to describe this eating event as soon as they saw it.
Tomlin (1997: 178–179) found that English speakers virtually always used the active
voice when the eating fish (the agent) was cued, and virtually always used the passive
voice when the eaten fish (the patient) was cued. Thus, the visually-cued fish was always
coded as the subject of the sentence used to describe the viewed event.
Tomlin’s study has subsequently been criticised for using a blatantly overt attention
cue (e.g. Gleitman et al. 2007). Further, Diderichsen (2001) found that the attention cue had
been presented so early that the participant’s attention could in principle have switched to
a different target by the time they began to formulate their description. These issues were
addressed by Myachykov (2007) and Gleitman et al. (2007), who were able to replicate and
extend Tomlin’s results, but with a less striking effect size.
Thus, “trajector” has been successfully and fruitfully operationalised as “the event par-
ticipant which is (visually) attended to at the onset of the utterance”. This not only matches
the idea of trajector as primary figure (cf. Vecera, Flevaris & Filapek 2004, who find that at-
tention influences figure/ground assignment in ambiguous visual scenes), but also Chafe’s
(1994: 83) characterisation of subjects as “starting points” (see also MacWhinney 1977).
This immediately suggests that “landmark” could be operationalised as “the event parti-
cipant besides the trajector that is most saliently attended to at the onset of the utterance”;
see Myachykov, D. Thompson et al. (2011: 104) for a suggestion along these lines.
3.1.3 Application to the questions at hand
Wemay now return to the dative and existential alternations; the examples at the beginning
of this chapter are repeated below for convenience:
(17) Dative alternation:
a. The teacher gave the swimmer a banana. [ditransitive]
b. The teacher gave a banana to the swimmer. [dative]
(18) Existential alternation:
a. The book is on the shelf. [locative]
b. There is a book on the shelf. [existential]
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In light of the discussion in the preceding subsection, how would the Cognitive Grammar
analyses of these alternations be experimentally tested?
For the dative alternation, one could use a straightforward extension of Tomlin’s paradigm
(as suggested in Myachykov, D. Thompson et al. 2011: 104): show a picture of a transfer
event (e.g. a teacher giving a banana to a swimmer), directing attention to either the recip-
ient (the swimmer) or the theme (the banana). If the primary object is indeed the (primary)
landmark, then directing attention to the recipient would cause participants to be more
likely to use the ditransitive construction (i.e., make the recipient the primary object); like-
wise, directing attention to the theme would cause participants to be more likely to use the
dative construction (i.e., make the theme the primary object).
For the existential alternation, things are not so straightforward. For the locative al-
ternant, one can direct attention to the located object (the book). What would one direct
attention to for the existential alternant (assuming that there is the subject/trajector: e.g.
Hartmann 2010)? Conventional wisdom suggests that in this usage, there has no referent.
Here, inspiration may be taken from Langacker’s (2010e) analysis of impersonal it in
sentences such as It’s raining or It’s fun when old friends get together. He suggests that
it refers to “the conceptualizer’s scope of awareness for the issue at hand” (Langacker
2010e: 139)—basically, the scene as a whole rather than any particular element within it.
While he does not address existential there in detail, he suggests that essentially the same
analysis could be applied (Langacker 2010e: 147).
What this means, in practical terms, is that in order to direct attention to an entity that
would be coded as the subject of an existential sentence, one would need to direct attention
in a diffuse fashion, rather than to any particular location.
The next section describes an attempt to run an experiment along the lines just de-
scribed.
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3.2 Experiment
3.2.1 Participants
Thirty-seven undergraduate psychology students at the Australian National University par-
ticipated in the experiment.³ They received course credit for participation.
Among these, five were excluded from the analysis because they were not native speak-
ers of English; and another four were excluded because they were able to work out what
kind of hypothesis was being tested.
Thus, in total, there were 28 participants, 20 female and 8 male.
3.2.2 Materials
The stimuli consisted of 24 pictures of transfer events, 24 pictures of locative scenes, and
24 fillers.
The pictures of transfer events were selected from a set of stimuli kindly provided by
Andriy Myachykov. These 24 pictures were arranged in six blocks; each block had a picture
of “giving”, a picture of “selling”, a picture of “showing” and one of “throwing” (in that
order). Within each block, the horizontal direction of transfer alternated. Odd-numbered
blocks started with rightwards transfer, and even-numbered blocks with leftwards transfer.
To create the locative scenes, a selection of pictures from the BowPed Topological
Relations Picture Series (Bowerman & Pederson 1992) was decomposed into figures and
grounds, and these were recombined to create 24 distinct scenes. These 24 scenes were ar-
ranged in six blocks; each block contained an example of “on”, one of “under”, one of “in”,
and one of “right (of)” (in that order).
Twenty-four fillers were taken from among the pictures of intransitive events provided
by Andriy Myachykov.
The transfer-event pictures, fillers, and locative scenes were interleaved (in that order).
An additional four fillers were added to the beginning.
In total, participants were presented with 76 pictures to respond to.
³I am indebted to Evan Kidd for his guidance, and for providing access to lab space, equipment and participants.
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3.2.3 Procedure
Participants were seated in front of a computer running PowerPoint, and saw the following
instructions:
In this experiment, you will be shown a series of pictures. You will be asked to
describe each picture as soon as you see it, in one sentence.
In the next few slides, however, you will be shown some of the people who will
appear in the pictures. Just practice identifying each of them.
Press the spacebar when you are ready to continue.
The next 16 slides each showed a picture of a person in occupational clothing, with a la-
bel underneathwhich the participantwas to read aloud. The purpose of these identification-
practice trials was to ensure that participants’ responses to the transfer-event pictures
would not be delayed because of difficulty in naming the actors. (The more a participant’s
response is delayed, the weaker the potential effect of the attention cue.)
After completing the identification trials, participants saw the following directions:
On the following slides are some examples of pictures you will be asked to
describe in this experiment. Just read out the descriptions that are provided.
(Press the spacebar to continue.)
In the next nine slides, they saw four examples of transfer-event scenes (such as Figure
3.1), four examples of locative scenes (such as Figure 3.2), and one filler (such as Figure
3.3). Each of these had a description shown underneath, which the participant was to read
aloud. For the transfer-event scenes, both ditransitive and dative frames were illustrated
twice. For the locative scenes, both the existential and presentational constructions were
illustrated twice.
After the practice trials were over, the experiment began. Each trial began with a fixa-
tion cross.
For each of the experimental trials, there were four conditions:
1. Transfer events
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The teacher is giving the swimmer a banana.
Figure 3.1: Example of a transfer-event picture.
The dog is to the right of the kennel.
Figure 3.2: Example of a locative scene.
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The fireman is sneezing.
Figure 3.3: Example of a filler item.
(a) In the “theme-cueing” condition, before the picture was presented, a red dot was
flashed in the eventual location of the theme, in order to draw attention to the
theme once the picture appeared;
(b) In the “recipient-cueing” condition, the dot was flashed in the eventual location
of the recipient;
(c) In the “agent-cueing” condition, the agent was cued (this served as a baseline
condition);
(d) In the “no-cueing” condition, there was no cueing (this was another baseline).
2. Locative scenes
(a) In the “figure-cueing” condition, a white rectangle on a black background was
flashed in the area eventually occupied by the figure, in order to draw attention
to the figure once the picture appeared;
(b) In the “scene-cueing” condition, the entire scene (including both figure and
ground) was cued with a white rectangle;
(c) In the “filler” condition, a filler was shown, and attention was cued to the entire
scene (this condition is not of interest, and was included simply to balance out
the number of conditions for each type of experimental stimulus);
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(d) In the “no-cueing” condition, there was no attention-cueing (this served as a
baseline condition).
The four conditions were cycled over the 76 stimuli (including the fillers), and four lists
were created, each starting with a different condition.
Participants’ oral responses were audio-recorded, and subsequently transcribed and
coded for the construction used.
At the end of the experiment, participants were debriefed. They were first asked to
guess the hypotheses being tested, and then the hypotheses were explained to them.
3.2.4 Results
Dative alternation
All responses that did not use either the ditransitive construction or the prepositional-object
construction (in the active voice) were excluded. Among the remaining responses, when
the recipient was cued, participants used the (expected) ditransitive construction 26% of
the time, and the (unexpected) dative construction 74% of the time. When the theme was
cued, participants used the (expected) dative construction 80% of the time, and the ditrans-
itive construction 20% of the time. In the control conditions (agent-cueing and no-cueing),
participants used the ditransitive construction 18% of the time, and the dative construction
82% of the time. There were no significant differences among any of these proportions
(recipient-cueing vs. theme-cueing: χ2 < 0.005, df = 1, p = 0.95; recipient-cueing vs. con-
trols: χ2 = 0.11, df = 1, p = 0.74; theme-cueing vs. controls: χ2 = 0.01, df = 1, p = 0.90).
Existential alternation
Responses that did not use either the locative or existential constructions were excluded.
Among the remaining responses, regardless of condition (figure-cueing, scene-cueing, or
no-cueing), participants used the locative construction 55% of the time, and the existential
construction 45% of the time. Needless to say, there were no significant differences between
conditions.
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3.3 Discussion
There are several possible reasons why the experiment may have turned up null results.
One is that there is genuinely no effect to be found, either because the analyses that were
being tested are not valid, or because these analyses were improperly operationalised.
Even if there was an effect to be found, however, there are reasons why the present
experiment may have failed to detect the effect. It is possible that the attention-cueing
mechanism was too weak (there was a delay of 100msec between the cue and the stimulus,
compared to 75msec in Tomlin’s design). Additionally, it could be that there was a general
constructional bias that was sufficiently strong to completely mask the effect of the percep-
tual priming. It is not possible to know, with the given data, whether these explanations
are correct. However, Myachykov (pers. comm., forthcoming) finds that using a stronger
attention-capture mechanism (verified with eye-tracking) still produces null results.
It is well worth considering the possibility that the underlying Cognitive Grammar ana-
lyses need to be revised. Indeed, a closer analysis of the linguistic data reveals that notions
such as “trajector” and “landmark” are not really necessary for characterising grammatical
relations, once one gives a proper account of information structure. An alternative analysis
of grammatical relations in Cognitive Grammar will be suggested in §5.3.
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Chapter 4
Modes of scanning in finite and non-finite
subordinate clauses
4.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the distinction drawn in Cognitive Grammar between “sequential
scanning” and “summary scanning”, which is used to describe the distinction between finite
and non-finite clauses in English, as in the following examples:
(19) a. She said he wiped the table. [finite]
b. She watched him wipe the table. [non-finite]
Intuitively speaking, a finite clause is something that can be used on its own as a main
clause (Crystal 1997: 427, cited in Evans 2007: 366); in other words something that can be
used as a “complete sentence”. Clearly, he wiped the table can be a complete sentence on its
own. By contrast, a non-finite clause must be subordinate; it cannot stand on its own as a
complete sentence: *(him) wipe the table is not a complete sentence on its own.
Langacker (1991: 439–442) describes the distinction between finite clauses and non-
finite clauses partly in terms of how the described event is “scanned” or viewed mentally:
whether it is viewed as unfolding from start to finish, like a motion picture (“sequential
scanning”), or whether it is viewed in a single gestalt, like a multiple-exposure photograph
(“summary scanning”). The following subsection explains these notions in greater detail.
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4.1.1 Sequential and summary scanning
As mentioned before, in Cognitive Grammar an expression may designate either a thing (a
region in a domain) or a relation (a set of interconnections among entities). Relations are
further subdivided (Langacker 1987: 220–222) into “stative relations” (those that do not need
to be characterised with reference to the passage of time) and “complex relations” (those
that incorporate the conception of passing time). For example, in English, adjectives (e.g.
red) and prepositional phrases (e.g. under the tree) profile stative relations, as they do not
inherently refer to the passage of time.¹ By contrast, verbs (e.g. walk, sleep, understand), as
well as constructions that are built from verbs, generally profile complex relations, as they
do include the conception of passing time.²
Among complex relations, Langacker (1987: 249) distinguishes between “processes” and
“complex atemporal relations”, according to whether the time interval in the conceptual
base is part of the profile or not. Equivalently, processes and complex atemporal rela-
tions are distinguished by whether the relation is “sequentially scanned” through time, or
is “summarily scanned”.
Langacker (1987: 250–253) explains this distinction as follows: Let
[R/tC ]T
represent the conceptualisation, at time T, of a relation R holding at time t, by conceptu-
aliser C. Then the conceptualisation involved in sequential scanning takes the form of the
following sequence:
[R0/t0C ]T0
> [R1/t1C ]T1
> [R2/t2C ]T2
> ⋯ > [Rn/tnC ]Tn
.
In other words, at successivemoments of processing time (T0, T1, T2, … , Tn), the conceptual-
iser imagines the successive states of the process (R0,R1,R2, … , Rn) occurring at successive
moments of conceived time (t0, t1, t2, … , tn). In summary scanning, the sequence is of the
¹If these expressions are used predicatively in a finite clause (e.g., The ball is {red/under the tree}), then the
conception of passing time is introduced by the finite auxiliary (is), and the clause as a whole profiles a
complex relation.
²This is true even of “imperfective verbs” such as understand, which denote a stable state, because this state is
conceived as enduring over a certain time period.
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form
[R0/t0C ]T0
> [R0/t0,R1/t1C ]T1
> [R0/t0, R1/t1,R2/t2C ]T2
> ⋯ > [R0/t0,R1/t1,R2/t2, … , Rn/tnC ]Tn
.
In other words, at successive moments of processing time, the conceptualiser adds suc-
cessive states of the process to their overall conceptualisation. That is, each stage of the
conceptualisation is inclusive of all the previous stages.
How does this relate to finite and non-finite clauses? Langacker (1991: 439–442) claims
that non-finite clauses are “ungrounded” (unmarked for tense and modality), and that there
is thus no “viewing frame” within which the described event is “immediately accessible for
focused observation”. He argues that “this focal-point status is necessary for the state-by-
state, sequential scanning characteristic of a process”; thus, it follows as a consequence
that ungrounded clauses (which, by virtue of lacking tense and modality marking, cannot
be main clauses and are hence non-finite) profile an event that is summarily scanned, not
sequentially scanned.
Among all the descriptive constructs proposed in Cognitive Grammar, those of se-
quential and summary scanning have turned out to be the most controversial; Langacker
(1987: 253) had already anticipated that the “hard-nosed linguist” would request justifica-
tion for such constructs, while cautioning that such a request may “embody methodolo-
gically unreasonable expectations”. Francis (2000: 100) (cited in Taylor 2002: 516) charges
that sequential and summary scanning are “highly esoteric concepts for which there could
be no counterexamples [sic³]”. Most prominently, Broccias & Hollmann (2007) have ques-
tioned whether sequential and summary scanning are even a necessary part of the Cognit-
ive Grammar framework (though see Langacker 2008b for a reply in the affirmative).
There have been few attempts to settle this controversy empirically. There is one un-
published experimental study from before 2007 by Catherine Harris, which attempted to
check whether there is a difference in processing time between “verbs which might be
scanned summarily or sequentially (under the hypothesis that summary scanning is faster
than sequential scanning)” (Broccias & Hollmann 2007: 516). This study did not find any
³Strictly speaking, a concept cannot have a counterexample; only hypotheses formulated in terms of a concept
can have counterexamples.
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conclusive results; however, the exact experimental design has not been published, and it is
possible that the study did not correctly operationalise scanning. Also worthy of mention
is an unpublished (to my knowledge) study by Kawabata (2011). This was a production
study, which found that speakers of Japanese are more likely to describe a still picture us-
ing a nominal than using a verb or a clause, whereas they are more likely to describe an
animated scene using a verb or clause than using a nominal. On the surface, this seems to
support the distinction between sequential scanning and summary scanning (since nouns
are necessarily summarily scanned, if indeed they involve scanning at all). However, the
distinction between nouns and verbs in Cognitive Grammar is also one of relationality; and
further, the study does not address the possibility that when a subject describes a picture
using a noun (e.g., tsuri ‘fishing’), they may actually be producing an clause with an implied
verb (e.g., Tsuri desu “[This] is fishing”), and thus be using sequential scanning.
Searching for a way to operationalise scanning was not straightforward; the concept of
scanning is not used much in the psychology of visual perception. An exception is Kosslyn
(1980: 36–52, etc.) (which is in fact cited in Langacker 1987: 5, 110, 136, though in other
contexts); however, here it generally refers to the scanning of a static image, and so is not
strictly relevant.
A more promising line of inquiry rested on the following observation: In sequential
scanning, the conceptualisation at Tn contains only the end state of the event, Rn/tn, and not
any of the initial or medial states. In summary scanning, by contrast, the conceptualisation
at Tn contains all states, initial, medial and final, superimposed on top of each other. Given
that humans tend to attend to endpoints (Regier & Zheng 2007), this means that after a
person has heard a non-finite clause (which involves summary scanning), theywould attend
to all of the component states of the event described, whereas if they had heard a finite
clause (which involves sequential scanning), they would attend to only the final state. A
way of checking this would be to measure how quickly the hearer can identify a picture of
a medial state after hearing a non-finite versus a finite clause; the reaction time should be
shorter in the first case. For final states, there should be no difference in reaction times.
As it happens, a strikingly similar study had already been run by Madden & Zwaan
(2003: 666). Here, however, the structures being contrasted were not finite vs. non-finite
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clauses, but rather finite clauses in the perfective or imperfective aspect (e.g.Theman made
a fire versusThe man was making a fire).⁴ Nonetheless, the pictorial stimuli were exactly of
the kind needed, and these were used in the experiment described in the next section.
4.2 Experiment
4.2.1 Participants
Thirty-seven undergraduate psychology students from the Australian National University
(the same ones as in the experiment in the previous chapter) were used as participants;⁵ 12
were male and 25 were female. They received course credit for their participation.
4.2.2 Materials
Thepictorial stimuli fromMadden & Zwaan (2003) (kindly provided by Carol Madden) were
used in this study. These consist of two pictures each of 28 different events: one picture
of a medial state, and one picture of the final (or near-final) state (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2).
There are also 27 fillers (such as Figure 4.3).
For each of the events depicted in the experimental pictures, two sentences were cre-
ated: one describing the event using a finite subordinate clause, and one describing it using
a non-finite subordinate clause. For example, one of the events was of a girl painting a
picture; the corresponding sentences were She said the girl painted a picture. and She saw
the girl paint a picture. The matrix clause for a finite subordinate clause was always She
said, and the matrix clause for a non-finite subordinate clause was always She saw.
Each of the filler pictures was associated with a single sentence that had nothing to do
with the event or object depicted by the picture. These sentences were again of the form
[She said [finite clause]] or [She saw [non-finite clause]]. (The subordinate clauses here
⁴Madden & Zwaan (2003: 666–667, 668–671) found that subjects respond more quickly to pictures of medial
states after reading imperfective clauses than after reading perfective ones; and there is no significant dif-
ference in reaction times for final states. While they do not refer to Cognitive Grammar, their results are
perfectly consistent with the Cognitive Grammar analysis of perfective and imperfective (or “progressive”)
aspect (Langacker 1991: 25–26): the imperfectivising morpheme -ing “construes [the] states [of the process]
at a level of abstraction that neutralizes their differences”, thus making the medial states just as accessible as
the final state at the end of the sequential scanning entailed by the clause.
⁵The author is indebted to Evan Kidd for his guidance, and for providing access to lab space, equipment (in-
cluding software) and participants.
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Figure 4.1: Picture of a medial state: “painting”.
Figure 4.2: Picture of a final state: “painted”.
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Figure 4.3: Filler: “watching TV”.
were based on the filler sentences in the experiments reported in Madden & Zwaan 2003.)
4.2.3 Procedure
Participants were tested individually, seated in front of a computer running E-Prime. The
“D“ and “K“ keys on the keyboard had been labeled as “Yes“ and “No“, respectively, and
participants were instructed to rest their index fingers on these keys, so that they could
respond as quickly as possible. They saw the following instructions on the screen:
In each of the following screens, you will see a sentence, part of which is un-
derlined.
Read the sentence, then press the spacebar. The sentence will disappear, and
you will see a picture.
You need to decide, as quickly as possible, whether the picture matches the
*underlined portion* of the sentence.
Use the marked “Yes” and “No” keys to indicate your response.
When you are ready to begin, press the spacebar.
Participants were then orally reminded to respond as quickly as possible while being ac-
curate; and they were requested to read the sentences out loud, to ensure that they were
processing the sentences fully, and not simply glancing at the main verb of the subordinate
clause.
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This was followed by 28 blocks of 2 trials each. Each block contained one experimental
trial, and one filler (in a random order). Each trial had the following structure:
1. The fixation cue ***READY*** was shown in the centre of the screen for 1 second;
2. The sentence (with the subordinate clause underlined) was shown until the parti-
cipant pressed the spacebar, or until 10 seconds had passed (whichever was earlier);
3. The picture was shown until the participant pressed Yes or No (D or K) to indicate
their response. Their reaction time was recorded.⁶ The correct answer for exper-
imental trials was always “Yes” (D), and the correct answer for fillers was always
“No” (K).
For the experimental trials an event was chosen at random (without replacement) from
amongst the 28, and the sentence-picture pair was chosen at random from four possibilities:
1. The sentence has a finite subordinate clause, and the picture depicts a final (or near-
final) state;
2. The sentence has a finite subordinate clause, and the picture depicts a medial state;
3. The sentence has a non-finite subordinate clause, and the picture depicts a final state;
4. The sentence has a non-finite subordinate clause, and the picture depicts a medial
state.
Recall that the prediction is that reaction times will be lower for Condition 1 (finite,
final) than for Condition 2 (finite, medial), but there will not be any difference in reaction
times between Conditions 3 and 4 (non-finite, final/medial). A secondary prediction is that
the reaction times will be the same for Condition 1 (finite, final) as for Conditions 3 and 4
(non-finite).
For the filler trials, a filler was chosen at random (without replacement) from among the
28 (there were only 27 filler pictures, but one of themwas duplicated in order to equalise the
⁶The reader may wonder why a computer keyboard was used, rather than a serial response box, which would
allow for more accurate reaction-time measurements. Given that reaction times were being compared across
conditions, and that the absolute reaction times were not of interest, it did not seem to matter if the computer
keyboard introduced a uniform delay in the measurements. (Thanks to Evan Kidd for his advice regarding
this.)
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Table 4.1: Average reaction times.
Finite Non-finite
Final state 792.50 798.50
Medial state 835.04 675.65
numbers of experimental and filler trials). Each filler consisted of a unique sentence-picture
pair. There were no predictions concerning reaction times for the fillers.
4.2.4 Results
Only “Yes” responses from the experimental trials were analysed. The averaged reaction
times were as given in Table 4.1.
There was no significant difference in reaction times for finite clauses between final-
state and medial-state pictures, owing to the huge standard deviations (237.617 for the
final-state condition, and 414.815 for the medial-state condition). There was no signific-
ant difference in reaction times for non-finite clauses either (again owing to similarly huge
standard deviations).
It is interesting to note that there is a (non-significant) trend in the predicted direction, in
that the difference in reaction times is greater for finite clauses than for non-finite clauses,
and that for finite clauses, it is the final-state pictures that lead to lower reaction times.
Unfortunately, nothing can be securely concluded from this.
4.3 Discussion
There are a number of reasons why this experiment may have produced a null result. A
closer look at the experimental result reveals that while overall, each of the four conditions
was presented almost equally often, there were huge differences between participants. In
other words, some participants saw hardly any trials in Condition 1, whereas others had
most of their trials in Condition 1 (and likewise for the other conditions). This was due to
the fact that conditions were assigned to trials in a random manner. It would have been
better if conditions had been assigned in a cyclic fashion, so that each participant saw each
of the four conditions roughly the same number of times.
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It is possible that there were simply not enough participants in the study to obtain a
significant effect. A power analysis was conducted to determine how many participants
would be required to obtain a significant effect of the observed size. The result was that
roughly 500 participants would have been required to get a significant effect of size 0.1351,
which is what was observed. Given the tiny size of this effect, it seems unlikely that there
is any effect of interest to be found.
4.4 Conclusions
Similarly to the previous chapter, we are forced to conclude that there is no clear support for
the Cognitive Grammar analysis of finite and non-finite clauses in English. This suggests
that we should seriously consider the possibility that sequential and summary scanning
may in fact not be necessary in Cognitive Grammar.
Indeed, all of the relevant distinctions in English grammar can be captured using other
available constructs; in particular, all that is needed to characterise a non-finite clause is
the fact that it is not grounded (i.e., not “anchored” to the here-and-now by means of tense
and modality).
While this chapter has only considered the use of modes of scanning to analyse the
finite/non-finite distinction, the notion of scanning is also used in Cognitive Grammar to
analyse fictive motion (e.g., The roof slopes steeply upward; Langacker 2002: 157), as well
as certain quantifiers (e.g., a few politicians vs. few politicians; Langacker 2010d: 76). Any
suggested alternative to scanning will also have to account for these phenomena.
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Chapter 5
Theoretical prerequisites
In the preceding chapters, I have considered three major descriptive constructs of Cognitive
Grammar, namely profile determinacy, focal prominence, and mode of scanning. I have
tried to test whether descriptions of grammatical phenomena using these constructs are
indeed psychologically real. In every case, the results have been at best inconclusive.
Thus, the only conclusion that can safely be drawn from this research is that opera-
tionalising Cognitive Grammar is difficult—a point that has already been made repeatedly
by Langacker (1991, 2008b), etc., as well as Langacker (p.c.). However, this research does
raise the question of whether such hard-to-operationalise descriptive constructs are needed
in Cognitive Grammar in the first place, and whether Cognitive Grammar itself could be
simplified so that it only requires the use of descriptive constructs that are known to be
straightforwardly operationalisable. In this chapter and the next, I propose such a simpli-
fication. As we shall see, it requires fundamental revisions to the framework.
Revising any theoretical framework is a daunting and risky business; but this is espe-
cially so in the case of Cognitive Grammar, which was initially developed over the span
of a decade (1976 to 1987; see Langacker 2008a: vii), and has subsequently remained re-
markably stable in comparison to other grammatical frameworks.¹ Any adjustment of the
framework, then, would need to be able to convincingly describe four decades’ worth of de-
scriptive phenomena. Accordingly, what follows should be understood not as a challenge
to the existing research tradition, but simply as an exploration of what a simpler, more
¹Langacker (2002: x): “To paraphrase a bumper sticker, there was no need [for Cognitive Grammar] to be born
again since it was born OK the first time.”
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easily-operationalisable Cognitive Grammar might look like.
This chapter presents the basic concepts of the proposed framework, motivating them
using illustrative analyses. Along the way, it highlights major departures from (exist-
ing) Cognitive Grammar, giving special attention to finite complementation (which was
treated in Chapter 2), the ditransitive/dative and locative/existential alternations (treated
in Chapter 3), and the distinction between finite and non-finite complements of percep-
tion verbs (Chapter 4). The next chapter focuses on showing that the proposed framework
achieves reasonable descriptive coverage, examining a wide variety of grammatical phe-
nomena (mostly from English).
5.1 Preliminaries
Since the proposed framework departs radically in many ways from standard Cognitive
Grammar, it is important to state clearly at the outsetwhich aspects of the latter are retained—
i.e., what makes the current proposal an “alternate construal of Cognitive Grammar”, rather
than an entirely separate framework. As noted in §1.2.1 (p. 9), the core tenet of Cognitive
Grammar is the “Content Requirement”, which is as follows (Langacker 1987: 53–54):
[T]he only structures permitted in the grammar of a language…are
1. phonological, semantic, or symbolic structures that actually occur in lin-
guistic expressions;
2. schemas for such structures;
3. categorizing relationships involving the elements in (1) and (2).
In Cognitive Grammar, every descriptive construct and grammatical analysis is evaluated
against this standard; it is thus frequently and prominently invoked.² Accordingly, the
Content Requirement forms the conceptual bedrock for the proposed revision.
Part 1 of the Content Requirement raises the question of what “semantic structure” con-
sists of.³ According to Langacker (2008a: 43), “meaning consists of both conceptual content
²Indeed, sometimes to humorous effect, e.g. Langacker (1991: 183): “This practice [of using contentless diacrit-
ics to represent the grammatical gender of nouns] is in any event illegal in cognitive grammar, even among
consenting linguists, because the content requirement proscribes the use of artificial devices…”.
³Phonological structure is less commonly discussed in the framework of Cognitive Grammar, but is comparat-
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and a particular way of construing that content [emphasis in original]”. I have introduced
the terms “conceptual content” and “construal” in §1.2.2; the following reviews and elabor-
ates on the discussion there.
The conceptual content of a linguistic expression is the set of entities that are called
to mind by the use of that expression. Cognitive linguistics in general views meaning in
terms of simulation or mental models (Barsalou 1999; Johnson-Laird 1983; Zwaan 2015); a
hearer typically understands a piece of discourse by imagining the objects or situations de-
scribed, going through the same mental operations that are involved in actually perceiving
or experiencing those objects or situations (though with lower intensity). In these terms,
the conceptual content of an expression is simply the set of (imagined) entities that are part
of the simulation or mental model invoked by that expression. To give an example (from
Croft & Cruse 2004: 14–15): the words circle and radius both invoke the mental model of
a circle which necessarily has a constant radius, and thus these two words have the same
conceptual content; equivalently, it is impossible to imagine a circle that doesn’t have a
radius, or a radius that isn’t (at least potentially) part of a circle.
Here, let me note that this example is slightly more complicated than suggested by
Croft & Cruse (2004: 14–15). In general, there are often multiple ways of imagining an
entity, which differ in terms of which other entities are part of the simulation (and hence
part of the conceptual content). There are usually some entities that are obligatorily part
of the simulation, and others that may be part of it, but which the simulation must always
“leave space for”. Applying this to circle versus radius, we see that, while it’s not possible
to imagine a circle that doesn’t have a radius, it is possible to imagine a circle without
also imagining the radius (not imagining the radius doesn’t imply that the radius doesn’t
exist); thus, circle may include a radius as part of its conceptual content, but does not have
to (though one must always “leave space for” imagining a radius). On the other hand, it
ively easy to describe; see Taylor (2002: 143–163, 243–262), Nesset (2008), and Uehara & Kumashiro (2007) for
examples of Cognitive Grammar approaches to phonology. The important point for what follows is that the
phonological structures that are relevant for grammar—in particular, those that are capable of being associ-
ated with meaning—are the “phonologically free” levels of the prosodic hierarchy, i.e. constituents from the
phonological word upwards. This is strongly suggested by the analysis of the plural suffix -s (in the context
of tables) in Langacker (1987: 337–338): “The actual phonological structure of this morpheme includes more
than just [z]: it consists of [z] embedded as an integral part of the syllabic organization of a schematic stem….
This morpheme is a natural phonological constituent…and this may be true in general”. In other words, it
is not the segment constituting the suffix that bears the meaning of plurality, but rather the word-pattern
created by the suffix. With regard to symbolic structure, see Verhagen (2009) for some important refinements
to the standard Cognitive Grammar treatment.
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does seem impossible to imagine a radius without also imagining the circle that it serves
to define (otherwise, one merely has a line segment); if so, then radius necessarily includes
a circle as part of its conceptual content. Linguistically, this is reflected in the fact that the
noun radius is obligatorily possessed with a circle as possessor (e.g., one can’t say # I drew
a radius without having previously mentioned a circle), whereas circle is not obligatorily
possessed (I drew a circle is fine even if one hasn’t mentioned the radius).
Conceptual content is by itself insufficient for an adequate characterisation of linguistic
meaning; for example, it provides no way of distinguishing between the members of com-
plementary pairs such as parent/child and husband/wife. These distinctions can only be
captured by some notion of “construal”—i.e., by positing that some parts of a simulation or
mental model are somehow more “salient” than other parts.
For example, the difference between the meanings of husband andwife lies in the choice
of which part of the simulation (viz. a married couple) is “designated” by the expression, or
equivalently, which part is “in profile”. Likewise, the prepositions above and below, though
they may have the same conceptual content (two vertically-aligned and separated objects)
and profile (the spatial relation between them), differ in terms of which entity is selected
as the “primary focal participant” or “trajector” (Langacker 2008a: 71).⁴
Profiling and focal prominence are only two of the many kinds of “construal” or “sali-
ence” that are appealed to in Cognitive Grammar; Croft & Cruse (2004: §3.2) list thirteen in
total. But it is far from clear how these various types of construal are related: the relation
between profile and trajector, discussed since Langacker (1987: 187–188), continues to be an
active topic of research (Langacker p.c.). If every proposed type of construal is maintained
to be conceptually distinct, then this poses a significant practical problem for operation-
alisation: one would not only have to find a different way of operationalising each type
of construal, but also test that all of these operationalisations capture distinct phenomena.
This is deeply problematic; although psychologists use a number of techniques for opera-
tionalising salience (including the ones illustrated in previous chapters), it is far from clear
how many independent concepts of salience these are capable of operationalising.⁵ Thus,
⁴Later in this chapter, it will become clear that in the present framework, the prepositions above and below—or
more precisely, prepositional phrases of the form [above NP] and [below NP]—do not in fact profile the same
entities; i.e. profiling is sufficient to account for the semantic difference.
⁵Schmidt (1991), for example, suggests four categories of “distinctiveness”, whereas Pattabhiraman (1992) uses
only two.
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from the perspective of both theoretical elegance as well as practical testability, it is desir-
able to reduce as far as possible the number of different kinds of construal or salience that
are used in Cognitive Grammar. (See Kalyan 2011 for an early—and highly flawed—attempt
at doing this.)
The present proposal takes the reduction of types of salience to its logical extreme,
positing just a single type of salience. This is the type of salience that is at issue when a
discourse referent is said to be “active”, “accessible”, “given”, or “evoked” at a certain point
in a discourse (Ariel 1990; Chafe 1994; Givón 1984; Prince 1981). As will be seen below,
profile and trajector may be defined in terms of the entities that are “textually evoked”
(as opposed to “environmentally evoked”; Prince 1981: 236) by a particular expression, or
which are presupposed as being evoked by the preceding discourse (including the current
utterance). It may well turn out that this approach is impracticably minimalistic; but it is
still worthwhile to see how much can be accomplished by it.
A major advantage to basing the description of semantic structure on evocation (the
term that I will be using henceforth, in the tradition of Prince 1981) is that this notion can
already be operationalised in a simple, intuitive way that does not require the use of soph-
isticated experimental techniques: namely, through the use of anaphoric or demonstrative
nominals, or noun phrases with reduced stress. To check whether, at a given point in a
discourse, a certain entity has been evoked or not, it suffices to test whether that entity can
be felicitously referred to with he, she or it, this or that, [the N], [that N], or [NP̆] (or the
equivalents in whatever language is under study).⁶
Intuitions about the felicity of anaphora or demonstratives seem to be fairly robust,
in the sense that linguists’ intuitions match naïve speakers’ intuitions (even for examples
involving “backwards anaphora”; see Kazanina et al. 2007; Phillips 2009). Moreover, psy-
cholinguists have developed a number of techniques for investigating the activation of ref-
erents and the resolution of anaphora in real time, such as the visual-world paradigm (e.g.
Pyykkönen 2009) and cross-modal priming (e.g. Shillcock 1982). It should thus be possible
⁶As the reader might expect, there are subtle differences in the conditions under which these various ex-
pressions can be used. In particular, phonologically-reduced (clitic) pronouns seem to be used when the
antecedent expression is unstressed (i.e. when the antecedent referent has been mentioned at least twice be-
fore), whereas phonologically free expressions are used when the antecedent introduced its referent into the
discourse for the first time. (See Lambrecht 1994: 204 for a similar analysis of the distinction between the Ger-
man er-series and der-series of pronouns, though here the distinction is not explicitly drawn in phonological
terms.)
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to make analyses of grammatical phenomena in terms of activation/evocation psychologic-
ally testable without extensive methodological innovation.
Many linguistic expressions textually evoke more than one entity; and usually, some
of these entities are characterised in terms of others (i.e., some contain others within their
conceptual content). I will define the “outermost” evoked entities—those that are not con-
tained within the conceptual content of any other textually-evoked entity—as constituting
the “profile” of the expression.
In addition to conceptual content and construal, there is one further notion that is neces-
sary for the description of semantic structure, namely the “grounding” of evoked entities.
Any entity that a speaker evokes as a discourse referent has to be situated with respect to
the common ground⁷, so that the hearer knows whether the entity needs to be added to
his or her knowledge of the world, or whether it suffices to search for the entity within
his or her existing knowledge. In other words, any discourse referent has to be marked
by the speaker as either “hearer-old” or “hearer-new”; see Prince (1992: 6). In addition, the
speaker needs to specify whether the entity can be uniquely located in the common ground
on the basis of the provided conceptual content; in other words, the entity must be marked
as “identifiable” or “non-identifiable” (Chafe 1994: 93 ff.).
To summarise: in addition to the Content Requirement, the following constraint is pro-
posed:
The semantic structure of any linguistic expression consists of the following
three components:⁸
⁷Actually, it has been claimed that Salishan languages such as St’át’imcets do not make any reference to the
“common ground” in their grammars, and thus lack such things as definite pronouns (Matthewson 2008).
However, closer examination of the data seems to reveal that there is simply a cultural assumption in these
communities that the common ground is the same as the speaker’s knowledge; in other words, in these
languages, the speaker can presuppose anything they like, and the hearer will simply be expected to accom-
modate this presupposition.
⁸Note that not all linguistic expressions have a semantic structure. In particular:
1. Some expressions are merely “exponents” of a larger construction (in the sense of Booij 2005: 116); I
would argue that this is the case for determiners (e.g. some, these), auxiliaries (e.g. might), and most
verbs (e.g. gave).
2. Phatic utterances such as Hello orThank you often do not textually evoke any entities. They may evoke
the utterance itself (as in Thank you!—Oh, you don’t need to say that [= the utterance Thank you])—but
this obviously cannot be part of the semantic structure of the utterance. In other words, this entity
is environmentally evoked. Occasionally, phatic utterances can indeed textually evoke an entity (as in
Thank you so much!—Yes, I know that [= the fact that you’re grateful to me]); but this requires some
“extra effort” on the part of the speaker and/or hearer to construe the utterance as being intended to
convey information—and thus, this is probably not the usual case.
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1. Entities that are textually evoked by the expression (or presupposed as
being textually or environmentally evoked in the discourse up to and in-
cluding the current utterance)—the “outermost” such entities constitute
the profile;
2. All entities that are entailed by (or obligatorily simulated with) the above,
whether or not these entities are themselves evoked—i.e. the expression’s
conceptual content;
3. Situation of each evoked entitywith respect to the speech-act participants’
common ground, on the basis of the provided conceptual content—i.e.
grounding of these evoked entities.
The above constraint in conjunction with the Content Requirement will henceforth be
called the Extended Content Requirement.
The remainder of this chapter introduces some of the novel analyses that are neces-
sitated by the adoption of the Extended Content Requirement; these analyses often differ
considerably from the standard ones.⁹ A more systematic overview of the grammatical
structures of English is deferred until the next chapter; here, I beginwith the analysis of pro-
filing, and then consider other major topics such as focal prominence (trajector/landmark
alignment), information structure (topic and focus), and sanctioning (judgments of well-
formedness).
5.2 Profiling
This section explores the consequences of defining the profile of an expression as the “out-
ermost” textually-evoked entity or entities. It examines in turn each of the major types of
syntactic constituents in English, analysing in each case which entities are textually evoked,
3. Intonation units of the sort that are termed “regulatory” (as opposed to “substantive”) by Chafe
(1994: 63–64)—i.e. expressions such as well, in fact, by the way, etc. that aren’t part of any utterance, but
merely serve to rhetorically situate an adjacent utterance—often do not textually evoke any entities. A
few may—e.g. unfortunately, according to NP, etc.—but these are probably in the minority.
Another caveat is that there is actually one further aspect of semantic structure, which just happens to
be of limited relevance for English: namely, the grammatical gender of the expression (or more precisely,
the “target gender”, following the terminology in Corbett 1991: 45–47, 150–160). This will not be discussed
further in this thesis.
⁹On the other hand, some of the analyses will be seen to be reminiscent of—and in some cases inspired by—
HPSG, Role and Reference Grammar, Systemic-Functional Grammar, and other frameworks.
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and which of the evoked entities are entailed by (i.e. contained in the conceptual content
of) which others. Along the way, I revisit the phenomena considered in Chapters 2–4, and
propose analyses that might be easier to operationalise.
It is important to note that at this stage, I will be using the traditional labels for vari-
ous types of syntactic constituents (“noun phrase”, “prepositional phrase”, etc.) purely for
convenience; I do not ascribe any theoretical status to these constructs (and do not claim
that they can necessarily be given consistent definitions under the current framework).
The next chapter will tackle the issue of defining syntactic constituents in a manner that is
consistent with the Extended Content Requirement.
5.2.1 Noun phrases
Many noun phrases are used to designate entities in the real world, which can (in principle)
be pointed at or otherwise identified; such nominals are called “referring expressions” (Ly-
ons 1977: 23). In these cases, it is intuitively obvious that the real-world referent is textually
evoked, becoming available as the target of anaphora.¹⁰ This can be seen with the noun
phrase “Walter Simpson” in the following example from Chafe (1994: 78; indexing added):
(20) a Well,
b then he talked to that … [Wàlter Símpson]i and,
c … hei knóws Càts [i.e. “Caterpillar”-brand tractors].
d .. Hei used to hàve a Cát,
e right now he works on … Dètroit éngines.¹¹
Many noun phrases, however, are non-referring: for example, the nonspecific indefinite
noun phrase in a sentence like Ollie hopes to marry a blonde (Langacker 1991: 103), which
does not designate any particular, identifiable person. This may seem to pose a problem for
the idea that a meaningful unit always textually evokes one or more entities, as it looks as
though the entity designated by the noun phrase is not available as the target of anaphora:
¹⁰Plural noun phrases will of course evoke multiple entities. This is left aside in what follows, but will be picked
up again in the next chapter.
¹¹Indications of stress in this example have been reproduced exactly from Chafe (1994); however, the indication
of primary and secondary stress in lines d and e seems to be backwards. It is almost certainly háve a Càt and
Détroit èngines.
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the sentence cannot be followed by She is rich without forcing a blonde to be read as a
specific indefinite (“a certain blonde”).
However, this problem is only apparent, and disappears once we take into account the
rôle of mental spaces (see Langacker 1991: 104–105). The predicate hopemakes reference to
a mental space consisting of the situation that the subject hopes to bring about, but which
has not yet been realised; in this case, the situation of the subject (Ollie) marrying a blonde.
Crucially, the referent of a blonde exists only in this mental space. Thus, only an anaphor
in the same mental space can refer to it. For example, the sentence could be followed by
She should be rich, too, where the modal should places the entire conceptual content of the
clause in the mental space of unrealised ideals.
Another kind of “non-referring” noun phrase is a predicate nominal, which again does
not seem to be capable of serving as the antecedent of an anaphor.
(21) I’m a linguisti. *Hei says strange things.
Again, the problem is only apparent: the predicate nominal does not refer to any particular
linguist (as the grammaticality judgment above would presuppose), but rather evokes a type
of person known as a “linguist”. An anaphor can certainly refer to this type:¹²
(22) a. I’m a linguisti. Iti’s someone who studies language scientifically.
b. I’m a policemani.—Thati’s the kind of person we need more of around here!
c. That’s a lioni. Iti’s one of the (kinds of) animals I’m afraid of.
Thus, to summarise the above: a noun phrase textually evokes the entity that it is in-
tuitively understood to designate or refer to. Moreover, if this is the only entity that is
evoked by the noun phrase, then this entity is by default the “outermost” one, and is hence
the profile.
However, not all noun phrases evoke just the referent: some may evoke a type as well
as an instance, and some may also evoke the set of all entities belonging to that type (i.e.
the “reference mass” or “maximal extension of the type specification”: Langacker 1991: 82).
Consider the following examples:
(23) I just got a bread machine. [singular count noun]
¹²Note that the anaphor must be inanimate (it or that): in the first two examples, it would be unacceptable to
use he or she. This is what we would expect given that the anaphor refers to a type, rather than a person.
81
5.2. PROFILING
a. Have you used it [= the bread machine] yet? [instance]
b. It [= a bread machine] is something I’ve been wanting to get for some time.
[type]
c. Aren’t they [= bread machines] a bit expensive? [reference mass]
(24) He gave her some floppy disks. [plural count noun]
a. They [= the floppy disks] were badly corrupted. [instance]
b. That [= some floppy disks] is apparently what shewanted for her birthday.[type]
c. Those [= floppy disks] are apparently still used at his company.[reference mass]
(25) Here’s some milk. [mass noun]
a. It [= the milk] has been pasteurised. [instance]
b. That [= some milk] is what you usually have at this time, right? [type]
c. It [= milk] is good for you, you know. [reference mass]
A predicate nominal may also evoke a reference mass (in addition to a type):
(26) That’s a kangarooi. Theyi [= kangaroos] are everywhere these days. [reference
mass]
A noun phrase may also evoke other entities, if it has another constituent (e.g. a pre-
positional phrase) embedded inside it:
(27) The football [under the table]i is mine. In fact, everything therei is mine.
In general, it isn’t possible to predict, based purely on formal properties, whether a noun
phrase evokes a type or reference mass in addition to an instance. Rather, it is a matter of
what the speaker wishes to draw attention to: whether the speaker wishes to present an
entity as a representative of a category, or simply to talk about the entity without relating
it to anything broader. Impressionistically, a type or reference mass is more likely to be
evoked if the category they represent is somehow “unusual” (as with the category of floppy
disks these days), or perhaps if the category is a subordinate-level category (e.g. greyhound),
rather than basic-level (dog) or superordinate-level (animal; Mervis & Rosch 1981). Such
claims can easily be tested experimentally.
A good heuristic, however, is to test whether the noun phrase can be paraphrased by
one that includes a generic plural which explicitly profiles the reference mass, or includes a
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generic indefinite that profiles a type. Thus, in the examples above, a bread machine could
be paraphrased as one of those “bread machines” or something known as a “bread machine”,
and a kangaroo could be paraphrased as one of those “kangaroos”.
A final point is that in these cases, the instance contains the type and reference mass in
its conceptual content (since it is explicitly characterised as an instance of the type and a
member of the reference mass), but the type and reference mass do not contain the instance
in their conceptual content (since these are characterised independently of the instance);
this is particularly obvious in the above paraphrases. For this reason, it is the instance that
is the “outermost” evoked entity, and hence the profile.
To summarise this subsection: a (simple) noun phrase profiles the entity that it intu-
itively refers to, and may additionally evoke a type and the set of entities belonging to
this type (the “reference mass”). This may be expressed diagrammatically as follows:¹³
instance
reference mass
type
Here, the arrows indicate that every member of the reference mass is an instance of the
type, and the dotted line indicates that the profiled instance is a member of the reference
mass.
5.2.2 Prepositional phrases
In Cognitive Grammar, a prepositional phrase¹⁴ is taken to profile a stative relation between
two things. Thus, the profile of above the tree is a particular spatial relation holding between
a schematically-characterised thing and a tree (Langacker 1987: 467). In addition, the entit-
ies that are directly involved in the relation (the trajector and landmark) are considered to
be part of the relational profile (Langacker 1987: 215).
¹³The diagram illustrates the case of a “count noun”, where the reference mass consists of multiple, distinct
entities (only three are shown, for simplicity). If the instance is a mass, then the reference mass will consist
of just a single entity, namely the universal mass (e.g. the universal mass of “milk”).
¹⁴For full typological generality, this subsection should be titled “adpositional phrases”, to accommodate lan-
guages which have postpositions rather than prepositions. Here “prepositional” is used because it is a more
familiar term, and because our examples come from English.
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At a low level, a relation is defined in terms of an array of “comparison events” (Lang-
acker 1987: 222–228, 237–242); however, it is still not entirely clear in Langacker’s frame-
work exactly what kind of discourse referent a relation constitutes, and how onewould ana-
phorically refer to a relation (as opposed to some reification of it). This makes it problematic
to empirically test whether a given linguistic expression profiles a relation in Langacker’s
sense.
We can observe that a prepositional phrase generally evokes a location (also known as
a “search domain”; see Langacker 1987: 286, ultimately following G. A. Miller & Johnson-
Laird 1976: 44 etc.):
(28) I just saw some mice [under the dining table]i.—No wonder; it’s quite messy therei!
In some cases, the landmark (the object with respect to which the location or search domain
is defined) may also be evoked:
(29) There’s a bee [inside [my shirt]i].—Take iti off, then!
However, this is not always the case:
(30) Today the children went [to school]i.
a. They’ll learn many useful things therei. [location]
b. # It [= the school] has an indoor swimming pool.¹⁵ [landmark]
Again, whether the landmark is evoked or not cannot be predicted from the form of the
prepositional phrase, but is rather partly a matter of what the speaker wishes to draw at-
tention to (or what the hearer infers that the speaker wishes to draw attention to). Con-
trary to what might be expected from Langacker’s analysis, the trajector (the referent of
some mice, a bee, or the children in the above examples) is not evoked by the prepositional
phrase, as the conceptual content of the trajector is nowhere to be found within that of the
prepositional phrase.
It seems clear that, when a prepositional phrase evokes both a location and a landmark,
the location contains the landmark in its conceptual content (since it is explicitly defined
with respect to the landmark), but the landmark does not contain the location in its concep-
tual content (since the landmark is independently defined). Thus, it is the location that is the
¹⁵But cf. Today our children went to [the new junior high school]i. Iti has an indoor swimming pool.
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“outermost” evoked entity, and hence the profile (this can also be seen from the constituent
structure of the prepositional phrase).
The above concerns spatial (and also temporal) prepositional phrases, which are usually
taken as a model for analysing more abstract prepositional phrases such as those involving
to, of, for, etc. Langacker (1991: 404), in particular, suggests that both abstract and spa-
tial/temporal prepositional phrases can be analysed as profiling a relation between two
things. However, this equivalence is less plausible in the present framework: if it were
indeed the case that abstract prepositional phrases are to be analysed analogously to loca-
tional ones, then we would expect that a phrase such as for his mother would evoke some
sort of “location” or “search domain”, perhaps in addition to the referent of his mother. Yet
it is very hard to imagine what such a “location” would be; and in fact the only entity that is
made subsequently available as a discourse referent is the “landmark” (‘his mother’). This
strongly suggests that it is in fact the latter that is the profile of the “prepositional phrase”,
and consequently, that what we are dealing with is effectively a case-marked noun phrase.
This is not an unprecedented analysis: Van Eynde (2000), in the framework of HPSG,
argues that so-called “case-marking prepositions” do not contribute any “content” to the
prepositional phrases of which they are the (syntactic) head, and that their complement is in
fact the “semantic head” of the prepositional phrase. In other words, what are convention-
ally thought of as “prepositional phrases” are not all alike; some have a semantic value over
and above that of the preposition’s complement, whereas others are simply case-marked
NPs. (See Matlock 2004: ch. 3 for a very similar analysis in the framework of mainstream
generative grammar.) This possibility has not so far been raised in the framework of Cog-
nitive Grammar, but is strongly motivated by an analysis of profiling in terms of textual
evocation.
An obvious question that remains is that of how to distinguish between different abstract/case-
marking “prepositional phrases”, or between a case-marking “PP” and an NP that isn’t
(overtly) case-marked. In other words, how is a speaker to know (e.g.) that He baked a
cake for her means something different from He baked a cake with her, if for her and with
her have the same profile? A full answer will have to wait until the next chapter; but in
brief, the difference lies not in the semantics of the prepositional phrases themselves (much
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less that of the syllables for and with), but rather in that of clause-level constructions of the
form (e.g.) [Sbj [V Obj [for…]Obj]Pred]S vs. [Sbj [V Obj [with…]Obj]Pred]S;¹⁶ each of these
constructions entails different sorts of semantic relations between the entity profiled by the
prepositional phrase and the other entities evoked by the clause.
To summarise this subsection: a spatial (or temporal) prepositional phrase profiles a
location, and may also evoke the landmark; an abstract “prepositional phrase” profiles
the “landmark”, and is better thought of as a case-marked NP.The first of these statements
may be expressed diagrammatically as follows:
landmark
location
5.2.3 Finite clauses
In Cognitive Grammar, a finite clause is taken to profile a “process”, which is defined as a
relation with a “positive temporal profile”, i.e. which is “sequentially scanned” (Langacker
1987: 244). I have already noted the difficulties with the notion of “relation”, and in Chapter
4, have raised questions concerning the validity and necessity of the notion of “scanning”.
Thus, a different approach is required for defining the profile of a finite clause.
If we look at the entities evoked by a declarative finite clause, we find the following:
1. The actants and circumstants¹⁷ of the clause (if any, as well as whatever evoked en-
tities are conceptually contained within the actants and circumstants);
2. an eventuality-type, i.e. a type of state/activity/accomplishment/achievement/etc. (see
e.g. Vendler 1957);
3. (optionally) a higher-order eventuality-type, or generalisation of the (lower-order)
eventuality-type, with one of the arguments “blanked out”;
4. a state of affairs or “fact”, i.e. the (present) state of the world that corresponds to the
specified instantiation of the lower-order eventuality-type.
¹⁶The notational conventions here will be given precise definitions later in this chapter and in the next.
¹⁷Following e.g. Lazard (2015: 114), and in the tradition of Tesnière (1959), I use “actant” and “circumstant”
instead of “argument” and “adjunct”, to make it clear that I am talking about entities within the semantic
structure of the clause; the terms “argument” and “adjunct” will be reserved for those constituents of the
clause which profile actants and circumstants, respectively.
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In addition, a finite clause may environmentally evoke an “utterance” or “attitudinal
object” (Moltmann 2014), in other words, the product (in the sense of Twardowski 1911) of
the speech act that the speaker is performing. This may be a statement, question, command,
etc.
The entities justmentionedmay be illustrated as follows (based on Langacker 1991: 32):¹⁸
(31) Harvey taunted the bear last Tuesday.
a. Why did he do that?/Did it get angry? [actants]
b. That [= last Tuesday] wasn’t a good day for trying such pranks! [circumstant]
c. It [= him taunting the bear] doesn’t happen very often. [eventuality-type]
d. I thought that [= taunting the bear] is strictly forbidden! [higher-order
eventuality-type]
e. That [= (the fact) that he taunted the bear last Tuesday] surprises me. [state of
affairs]
f. That [= the statement that he taunted the bear last Tuesday] is a bit misleading—
he just provoked it slightly. [utterance]
From this, it is possible to see that the entities evoked by the clause are related as follows:
(In later diagrams, the environmentally evoked entity—the utterance—will often be omitted
for simplicity.)
actants
higher-order eventuality
actants
eventuality
circumstants
state of affairs
…
utterance
¹⁸For examples of finite clauses that do not evoke a higher-order eventuality, see the §5.5.2 below on the
thetic/categorical distinction.
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(The small caps indicate the fact that “actant” and “circumstant” are not types of entities,
in the way that eventualities and states of affairs are; rather, they are labels for structural
rôles in the above semantic configuration. See Chomsky 1969: 69 ff. for similar comments.)
Thus, the state of affairs is clearly what is profiled by the clause.
The various kinds of abstract entities that a finite clausemight evoke can be (a) identified
with different kinds of clause nominalisations (as shown by the glosses of it and that in
square brackets above), and (b) distinguished from each other in terms of what sorts of
predicates can apply to them. In particular:
• An eventuality usually corresponds to a “gerundive nominalisation” with or without
a subject (Heyvaert 2008;Quirk et al. 1985: 1064 etc.)—e.g. [NP V-ing NP], [NP’s V-ing
NP],¹⁹ or [V-ing NP]. In the case of a real (as opposed to hypothetical) eventuality, it
may correspond to an “ingof” nominalisation (e.g. [NP’s V-ing of NP]). An eventuality
has properties that depend on its aspectual class. For example:
– An achievement (i.e. a punctual event, e.g. ‘the furnace exploding’) can happen.
– An accomplishment (e.g. ‘Mary taking a shower’) can take a certain amount of
time.
– A process (activity or accomplishment, e.g. ‘me driving a car’) can be easy or
difficult, or tiring, or fun, or in general have an effect upon some experiencer.
• A state of affairs or fact may correspond to a gerundive nominalisationwith a genitive
subject (e.g. [NP’s V-ing NP]; Heyvaert 2008: 41–42, Lees 1960: 71–72), or to an “ingof”
nominalisation (e.g. [NP’s V-ing of NP]; Zucchi 2013: 206) or to a (the fact) that-clause.
It can
– be (actually or potentially) surprising, or disturbing, or (un)important, or in gen-
eral have some impact on the person conceptualising it;
– imply (or be implied by) another state of affairs;
– in the case of actual states of affairs (i.e., facts; Zucchi 2013: 207–208), be known,
realised, noticed, observed, told, or in general be the object of any factive verb.
¹⁹The latter is used when the subject referent has already been evoked in the preceding discourse.
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• An utterance may correspond to a (the statement) that- or (the question) whether-
clause; furthermore,
– it can be said, spoken, whispered, repeated, paraphrased, translated, written, en-
coded, or in general be the object of anymanner-of-speech ormode-of-communication
verb;
– in the case of a statement (or “proposition”), it may be (actually or potentially)
true or false, or informative, or misleading, etc.; or be believed, questioned, eval-
uated, refuted, etc.;
– in general, it may be (un)important, or politically (in)correct, or (un)necessary,
etc.
Taking the above into account, it is thus possible to provide semantic analyses of not only
finite clauses, but also various types of non-finite and nominalised clauses.
Before leaving the topic of clauses, it would be desirable to say something about non-
finite complements of perception verbs (e.g. She saw him wipe the table), which were dis-
cussed in Chapter 4. These can be seen to profile an eventuality, and also evoke a higher-
order eventuality and one or more actants or circumstants; crucially, they do not evoke a
state of affairs or an utterance:
(32) She saw him wipe the table.
a. It [= the table] hadn’t been cleaned for weeks. [actant]
b. It [= his wiping (of) the table] had never happened before. [eventuality]
c. She was glad she wouldn’t have to do it [= wiping the table] herself.[higher-
order eventuality]
d. # Did you know that [= the fact that he wiped the table]? [state of affairs]
e. #That [= the statement that he wiped the table] is not true—he didn’t! [utter-
ance]
Thus, to summarise this subsection: a declarative finite clause profiles a state of affairs,
and textually evokes actants and circumstants, an eventuality, and possibly a higher-
order eventuality; it also environmentally evokes an utterance. Environmentally evok-
ing an utterance is arguably what distinguishes finite from non-finite clauses (though it is
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possible to draw the distinction elsewhere, e.g. defining a finite clause to be any expression
that profiles a state of affairs).
5.2.4 Adjectival phrases
In Cognitive Grammar, adjectives are taken to profile a univalent relation, i.e., a relation
that has a trajector but no landmark (pace Langacker 1987: 232–233, which is not followed in
subsequent work). The reader is directed to the preceding comments regarding the notion
of “relation”.
If we examine the entities that are evoked by an adjective (or more precisely, an ad-
jectival phrase), we find that it evokes (and profiles) a “property”—which is a particular
kind of eventuality, namely a type of state:
(33) John is talli. Iti [= tallness/being tall] runs in his family.
This is true for attributive adjectives as well:
(34) He married a talli woman. Iti [= tallness/being tall] is a quality that he finds attract-
ive, for some reason.
Thus, to summarise: an adjectival phrase profiles a property, in other words, a state-
type.
5.2.5 Adverbial phrases
Adverbs (or adverbial phrases) in Cognitive Grammar are again taken to profile a univalent
relation, being distinguished from adjectives solely in that their trajector is a relation rather
than a thing (Langacker 1991: 43).
Starting with manner adverbs, we find that they generally evoke (and profile) the man-
ner in which the modified type of action is performed, and also evoke a property of this
manner:
(35) She handled the situation admirably.
a. It [= the manner in which she handled the situation] was admirable. [manner]
b. That [= being admirable] is typical of the way she copes with adversity. [prop-
erty]
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(36) He told the story beautifully.
a. It [= the manner in which he told the story] was beautiful. [manner]
b. That [= being beautiful] is typical of the way he speaks. [property]
This is further supported by the fact that admirably and beautifully can be paraphrased as
in an admirable way and in a beautiful way, respectively, which more transparently evoke
these entities.
Some manner adverbs, however, seem to profile a property of the subject:
(37) She left angrily.
a. That [= being angry] is typical of her.
b. But why should she be ø [= angry]?
c. # It [= the manner in which she left] was angry.
(38) He approached her fearfully.
a. That [= being fearful] isn’t typical of him.
b. He needn’t have been ø [= fearful]!
c. # It [= the manner in which he approached her] was fearful.
This is further supported by the fact that angrily and fearfully can be paraphrased aswith/in
anger andwith fear, respectively, whichmore transparently evoke these properties; and also
by the fact that the sentences could be paraphrased using adjectives instead of adverbs, i.e.
She left, angry and He approached her, fearful.
Sentential adverbs (contra Langacker 2010d: 288–289) do not profile any entity:
(39) Unfortunately, it looks like your application was rejected.
a. #That [= being unfortunate] is typical of the events in my life these days.
(40) Optimistically, we should be able to finish the project in two weeks.
a. #That [= being optimistic] is typical of you, isn’t it?
(41) Hopefully, he’ll be back sometime before noon.
a. #That [= being hopeful] isn’t typical of you!
This is not surprising, given that sentential adverbs fall under the category of “regulatory
intonation units” (Chafe 1994: 63–64)—ones that do not form part of an utterance—and these
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do not necessarily have a semantic structure.
Likewise, intensifying adverbs do not have a profile:
(42) She’s surprisingly modest about her accomplishments!
a. #That [= being surprising] is typical of her qualities.
(43) He is extremely wise.
a. #That [= being extreme] is unusual for his qualities—mostly he’s an average
person.
These “adverbs” (alongwith very, really, so, and so on) are better thought of as “determiners”
of adjectives, i.e. as mere exponents of adjective-phrase constructions, which don’t have an
associated semantic pole of their own.
Thus, to summarise, adverbial phrases are by no means homogeneous:
1. a (prototypical) manner adverbial phrase profiles a manner, and also evokes a
property of this manner;
2. some manner adverbs profile the same property as their corresponding adjectives;
3. all other “adverbs” have no identifiable profile on their own, and are merely expo-
nents of larger constructions.
The first two possibilities may be diagrammed as follows:
property
manner property
5.2.6 Profile determinacy and finite complementation
Before leaving the topic of profiling, it will be useful to consider how the present framework
handles the concept of “profile determinacy”, and in particular how this might be applied
to the analysis of finite complementation in English (treated in Chapter 2).
In the present framework, the profile of an expression consists of those evoked entit-
ies which are not contained within the conceptual content of any other evoked entities—in
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brief, the “outermost” entities. A profile determinant of a construction would thus be a sub-
constituent whose outermost evoked entities are the same as those of the larger expression,
as follows (illustrated assuming that each profile consists of just one entity):
… …
Semantic pole:
Phonological pole:
(Following standard conventions, a dotted line within the semantic pole stands for referen-
tial identity, whereas a dotted line between the phonological and semantic poles stands for
symbolisation.)
Yet this would lead to a paradox: the entity profiled by the construction would simul-
taneously be the outermost evoked entity, and not the outermost evoked entity (since the
entities represented by the inner and outer boxes are referentially identical). Thus, it is not
possible to define the concept of profile determinacy in a coherent manner in the present
framework.
Phenomena traditionally analysed in terms of profile determinacy will be considered in
the section on grounding below, as well as in the next chapter;²⁰ here I will focus on finite
complementation. Even though it is not possible to speak of the propositional-attitude verb
or the content clause as the “profile determinant” of the sentence, it still makes sense to talk
about the “prominence” of the content clause and the propositional-attitude clause, in the
sense of whether their content is asserted by the speaker. This can be checked using well-
known tests such as having the addressee agree with the speaker using That’s true, and
checking what that refers to:
(44) I think John knows about the exam.
a. That’s true; he does.
b. #That’s true; you do think so.
(45) He denies that the Earth is warming.
a. #That’s true; it is.
b. That’s true; he does.
²⁰In general, what is conventionally analysed as the “profile determinant” in a construction is either an
exponent—e.g. the preposition in a prepositional phrase—or a constituent that profiles a “type”—e.g. the noun
stem in (some) noun phrases, or a verb phrase in a clause.
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(46) For some reason, she claims that she’s tone-deaf.
a. #That’s true; she is.
b. That’s true; she does.
In the first example, the content clause’s content is what is asserted; in the second and third
examples, the content clause is not asserted, but the content of the matrix clause is.
Thus, to summarise: under the proposed framework, there is no “profile determinacy”;
however, in the case of finite complementation, the prominence of a clause is usefully
defined as whether its content is asserted by the speaker; more concretely, whether it is
“addressable” (Boye & Harder 2007: 578).
5.3 Focal prominence
In Cognitive Grammar, any relation that has two or more participants has a hierarchy of
prominence among these participants, such that one of them is the “trajector” or “primary
figure”, and the others are “landmarks” or “secondary/tertiary/(etc.) figures”. In the domain
of clausal structure, the trajector is the subject, and the landmark(s) the object(s). Given that
one aim of the present framework is to reduce as far as possible the number of different
types of salience that are appealed to, it is worth asking whether the notions of trajector
and landmark (at least as applied to clausal structure) are really necessary for the purposes
of grammatical description.
The first question is whether grammatical relations are necessary in the first place.
There are endless debates as to whether subjects can be characterised consistently across
languages (see e.g. Donohue 2002; Lazard 2015 for insightful contributions and extensive
references), and whether “subject” is even a useful notion in the description of individual
languages (Croft 2001: 203–240). The reason for these debates is that the subject in a lan-
guage is usually defined as the actant that tends to serve as the “pivot” (i.e. the shared
actant) in multi-clausal constructions. Different languages may prefer different pivots: in
English, the pivot is usually {S,A} (where S is conventionally used to denote the sole actant
of an intransitive clause, and A is used to denote the actant of a transitive clause that has
more agent-like coding), whereas in so-called “(syntactically) ergative” languages such as
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Dyirbal (Pama-Nyungan), the pivot is often {S,P} (where P is used to denote the actant of a
transitive clause that has more patient-like coding):
(47) ŋuma
father-abs
yabu-ŋgu
mother-erg
bura-n
see-nfut
banaga-nʸu
return-nfut
mother(A) saw father(O) and he(S) returned.
(Dixon 1994: 12; Dixon uses O rather than P. The point is that the zero-coded S
of ‘returned’ (banaganʸu) is necessarily coreferential with the P of ‘saw’ (buran),
whereas in EnglishMother saw father and returned, the S of ‘returned’ is necessarily
coreferential with the A of ‘saw’; i.e. the only interpretation is Mother saw father
and she returned.)
Furthermore, even within a language there may be no global preference for any particular
pivot, as in Jakaltek (Mayan; see Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 284–285 for details). For these
reasons, Van Valin & LaPolla (1997) and others argue that pivots are construction-specific,
and that it is often not useful to generalise over pivots within a single language, let alone
generalise across languages.
At the same time, there are certain phenomena that seem to universally pick out an
{S,A} grouping of actants, even in languages that are otherwise syntactically ergative: this
includes the addressee of imperatives (øS Jump!, øA Seize himP!), the pivot of control con-
structions (e.g. She wants øS to sleep, She wants øA to meet himP, *She wants him to meet
øP [= her]), and the controller of reflexives (HeA saw himselfP, *HimselfA saw himP; Dixon
1994: 131–139). Thus, Dixon (1994: 124–125) defines {S,A} as a universal notion of “subject”
(similar to “logical subject” in Sweet 1900: 16–17, 19, as opposed to “grammatical subject”;
cf. also the notion of “reference subject” in Lazard 2015: 123, and “a-subject” in Andrews
2007: 197–221), and this is presumably the notion that ought to be captured by a language-
independent notion such as “trajector”.
The next question is whether the (“logical”, “reference”, or “a-”) subject of a clause can
indeed be characterised as a trajector or a primary figure. As was discussed in detail in
Chapter 3, this idea seems to find support in Tomlin (1997), which found that the actant
that the speaker is paying attention to (and hence perceives as the figure) at the moment of
utterance formulation is virtually guaranteed to be coded as the subject by English speakers.
However, later studies (such as Griffin & Bock 2000, Myachykov 2007, and Gleitman et al.
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2007) find weaker support for this hypothesis.
In addition, a limitation of all the above studies (which to my knowledge has not been
addressed so far) is that the responses to the stimuli tend to be instances of what Lam-
brecht (1994: 223) calls “predicate-focus” structures, where the subject is also a sentence
topic. Thus, it is entirely possible that what has been shown is that the actant that is at-
tended to at the moment of utterance formulation tends to be coded as a topic, rather than
necessarily as the subject. Indeed, this is further supported by the results of Myachykov
& Tomlin (2008), who find that in spoken Russian, where left-dislocation is a far more
common strategy for topicalising the P argument than is the use of passive voice, it is left-
dislocation that speakers tend to use when they are made to attend to the patient at the
moment of utterance formulation. To be really sure that attention determines the subject,
and not just the topic, one would have to elicit not only predicate-focus structures, but also
sentence-focus/argument-focus structures, where the subject is not a topic. For example,
if the speaker sees a clip of a red fish eating a cued blue fish, one would have to show not
only thatThe blue fish was eaten by the red fish is more likely thanThe red fish ate the blue
fish; but also that The blue fish was eaten by the red fish is more likely than The red fish
ate the blue fish. It would be extremely hard to construct a pragmatic context in which the
latter two sentences would be natural, without biasing the responses in some other way.
Asking a leading question such as Which fish was eaten by the red fish? or Which fish ate
the blue fish? would of course pre-determine the syntactic structure of the response.
Given these difficulties, it is necessary to look for another characterisation of subject,
which is easier to operationalise, and in particular, which can be clearly distinguished from
the notion of “topic”.²¹ It so happens that just such a characterisation is made available by
the above-mentioned notion of “higher-order eventuality”. Notice that in a sentence such
as Harvey taunted the bear, the evoked higher-order eventuality, viz. ‘taunting the bear’,
does not involve the referent of Harvey in any way. On the other hand, the higher-order
²¹The reader might wonder why I have not simply used {S,A} as the definition of “subject”, following Dixon
(1994: 124–125). The reason is that notions such as S, A and P, though extremely useful for typological com-
parison, do not strictly adhere to the (Extended) Content Requirement, as they are not defined purely in terms
of semantic and phonological structure. More specifically, A and P are actants that are coded the same way as
the agent and patient actants in a clause describing a prototypical transitive event (with a verb such as ‘kill’
or ‘break’; see e.g. Haspelmath 2011a: 545–551, Lazard 2015: 119); this definition explicitly makes reference
to morphosyntactic form, and requires some arbitrary judgment of what counts as the “same coding” in any
given language. The definition of subject that I will be proposing here is purely in terms of semantic structure.
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eventuality does involve the referent of the bear. Thus, I would propose to define the subject
of a clause as “the entity that is included in the conceptual content of the lower-order
eventuality but excluded from that of the higher-order eventuality”.²² This definition
makes no reference to the notion of “trajector” or “figure”, and instead makes reference
only to the notion of textual evocation; thus it is consistent with the Extended Content
Requirement.
We can check that a subject, so defined, is distinct from an agent, by noting that a passive
clause evokes a higher-order eventuality that excludes the “underlying” P but may include
the “underlying” A:
(48) The poor bear was taunted by Harvey.
a. I know how unpleasant that [= being taunted by Harvey] is!
Likewise, we can check that a subject is distinct from a topic, by noting that a clause evokes
the same eventuality regardless of whether its subject is a topic or a focus:
(49) I heard Bill taunted the bear.—No, Harvey taunted the bear.
a. Really? Why did he do that [= taunting the bear]?
The proposed definition of “subject” is highly reminiscent of theway the subject-relation
was defined in early versions of generative grammar, namely as “the relation holding between
the NP of a sentence of the formNP ) Aux ) VP and thewhole sentence” (Chomsky 1969: 69;
see also Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 243–244, Taverniers 2005: 654–655); note that a higher-
order eventuality is in fact often profiled by a constituent that we could call a VP (see
next chapter for details). However, a disadvantage of defining subjects in terms of VPs
is that this definition cannot be used in languages that lack a (surface) VP, e.g. Celtic or
Semitic languages, which are VSO—unless one assumes an “underlying” SVO or SOV order,
from which the “surface” word order is derived by obligatory transformations (as argued in
Kayne 1994). The present definition of subjects does not have this disadvantage, as even in
languages that lack a (surface) VP constituent, clauses may still evoke higher-order even-
tualities. This is evidenced by the fact that such languages do have “VP anaphora”; see the
following example from St’át’imcets (Salishan; Davis 2005: 41–42):
²²See Taverniers (2005) for a similar analysis (following Davidse 1997) which draws on notions from Systemic-
Functional Grammar. In a similar manner, it is natural to define the objects of a clause as the entities that are
included within the higher-order eventuality.
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(50) t’elkw-ílc
dismount-aut
kw=s=Tmícus
det=nmlz=Tmícus
lhel=ta=ts’qáxa7-s=a
from=det=horse-3poss-exis
xíl-em
do-mid
t’it
also
kw=s=Pikáola
det=nmlz=Pikáola
‘Tmícus got off his horse. Pikáola did so too.’
Here the antecedent of xílem ‘do (so)’ is the higher-order eventuality ‘getting off one’s
horse’, even though this is not profiled by any constituent in the sentence (t’elkwílc…lhel-
tats’qáxa7sa cannot be a constituent, as it is phonologically discontinuous).
As an additional piece of cross-linguistic evidence for the proposed definition of “sub-
ject”, there are indications that this definition corresponds to an {S,A} grouping of argu-
ments (as expected) even in languages that are syntactically ergative, or show mixed-pivot
behaviour. In particular, in Balinese (Artawa & Blake 1997), the unmarked transitive con-
struction is ergative, as shown by its behaviour in a number of syntactic environments:
(51) Nyoman
Nyoman
lempag
hit
tiang
I
‘I hit Nyoman.’
(Artawa & Blake 1997: 484)
(52) tiang
I
ane
rel
[] gugut
bite
cicing
dog
‘I am the one the dog bit.’ [pivot of relative clause = P]
(Artawa & Blake 1997: 493)
(53) ia
3sg
opak
scold
tiang
I
lantas
then
[] ngeling
cry
‘I scolded him/her, then he/she cried.’ [pivot of coordination = P]
(Artawa & Blake 1997: 495)
Thus, the pivot for most purposes is {S,P}. However, VP anaphora points to {S,A} (as do the
phenomena discussed in Dixon 1994: 131–139):
(54) surat
letter
tulis
write
tiang
I
tur
and
belin
brother
tiang-e
I-poss
masih
also
keto
that
‘I wrote a letter and so did my elder brother.’ (Artawa & Blake 1997: 504)
Here, the antecedent of keto ‘that’ is the higher-order eventuality ‘writing a letter’, even
though there is no constituent profiling this entity (surat tulis, though contiguous, is known
to not be a constituent, whereas tulis tiang is in fact a constituent). I have not been able to
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locate any other discussions of VP anaphora in syntactically ergative languages, but this is
already highly suggestive.
Thus, to summarise: the (“logical”, “reference”, or “a-”) subject of a clause—which
turns out, cross-linguistically, to be {S,A}—is the entity that is contained in the lower-
order eventuality but not in the higher-order eventuality. It is not clear that a notion of
“grammatical subject” (or “predication subject”—see Lazard 2015: 123—or “p-subject”—see
Andrews 2007: 198) can be given such a consistent definition; as argued by LaPolla (2006), it
is probably more fruitful to describe syntactic pivots in terms of the semantic composition
rules for individual multiclausal constructions.
The proposed definition of “subject” (and “object”) can be expressed diagrammatically
by amending the above diagram of the entities evoked by a finite clause:
object(s)
higher-order eventuality
subject
eventuality
circumstants
state of affairs
5.3.1 Impersonal subjects
While on the topic of “subjects”, an issue to be considered (raised in Chapter 3) is the ana-
lysis of impersonal subjects, such as there inThere is a book on the table, or it in It‘s raining.
In Cognitive Grammar, these are analysed as subjects, i.e., as trajectors, which refer to the
“ambience”, “field” or “scope of attention” (e.g. Langacker 2010e: 147, following Bolinger
1973; Bolinger 1977: ch. 4). Chapter 3 reported on an attempt to test this analysis for sen-
tences of the type There is a book on the table by cueing attention either diffusely (to the
locative scene as awhole) or narrowly (to the located object), and seeingwhether this would
affect whether the speaker uses the existential construction (There is a book on the table)
or the locative construction (A book is on the table). This attention manipulation had no
measurable effect.
Under the present framework, there is no requirement that impersonal there or it have
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independent meaning; they may simply be exponents of certain clausal constructions. Fur-
thermore, if we examine the entities evoked by these constructions, we find that these
constructions behave very differently from the canonical finite clauses considered above.
In particular, there is no evidence that either the existential construction or the “weather”
construction evokes a higher-order eventuality (and indeed, it is hard to imagine what such
a higher-order eventuality would look like). Only one eventuality is evoked:
(55) There’s a cup of coffee on the table.
a. That [= there being a cup of coffee on the table] is unusual!
(56) Oh no, it’s raining!
a. Don’t worry; that [= (the state of) it(s) raining] usually only lasts a few minutes.
The implication of this is that these constructions have neither subject nor object—and
indeed, the weather construction has no actants whatsoever. Some cross-linguistic support
for this lies in the fact that the actant of an existential clause is treated in some languages
like a subject, and in others like an object (and no doubt in still others like neither). For
example, in English the actant of an existential behaves like a subject in that it triggers
agreement on the verb (There is a book vs. There are books), whereas in German the actant
of an existential behaves like an object in that it must be coded using the Accusative case
(Es gibt einen Mann ‘There is a man’).
Thus, to summarise: there are no impersonal subjects; “impersonal-subject” construc-
tions do not evoke a higher-order eventuality, and so do not have subjects or objects.
This can be expressed diagrammatically as follows:
actant
eventuality
circumstants
state of affairs
5.3.2 Double-object constructions
We have just seen some cases of clauses which do not have a subject or object, and indeed
may not even have any actants. There are also clauses that have more than one object (i.e.
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more than one evoked entity immediately contained within the higher-order eventuality).²³
This is the case with clauses that have an “oblique object” in addition to a “core” object, as
well as clauses that have two “core” objects:
(57) She ate the soup with a spoon.
a. That [= eating the soup with a spoon] is just what you’d have expected a West-
erner to do. [higher-order
eventuality]
b. Apparently it [= the soup] was too hot to sip. [core object]
c. It [= the spoon] was a clay one that she had made herself. [oblique object]
(58) She gave the children flowers.
a. No one else had thought of doing that [= giving the children flowers]. [higher-
order eventuality]
b. They [= the children] were delighted. [1st core object]
c. They [= the flowers] were freshly cut ones. [2nd core object]
(The distinction between core and oblique argumentswill be re-examined in the next chapter,
and somewhat refined.)
Given this, we may now reconsider the dative alternation (discussed in Chapter 3). In
Cognitive Grammar, the first and second objects in the ditransitive construction are ana-
lysed as the primary and secondary landmark, i.e., as secondary and tertiary figures. In
principle, this distinction could be operationalised in a similar way to that between tra-
jector and (primary) landmark; however, as we saw in Chapter 3, adapting the experimental
paradigm of Tomlin (1997) and Myachykov (2007) does not support this analysis.
The question remains as to how the present framework would capture the differences in
usage between the alternants in the dative alternation. Here we may refer to the valuable
quantitative work done by Bresnan et al. (2007), who show (building on numerous earlier
proposals in the functionalist tradition) that in either construction, the first object is likely
to be given, animate, or definite, whereas the second object is likely to not have these attrib-
utes. Given that givenness, animacy and definiteness are commonly invoked as properties
²³It appears to be impossible for a clause to have more than one subject. While this is consistent with all
grammatical frameworks as far as I am aware, it is unclear why this should, a priori, be the case.
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of topics, this seems to suggest that the first object tends to be a topic, and the second tends
not to be.²⁴ It will be possible to specify this proposal more precisely after the discussion of
topics and foci below; the crucial point here is that the functional difference between the
ditransitive and dative constructions can be adequately described without appealing to the
notion of primary vs. secondary landmark, and indeed, without appealing to the notion of
grammatical relations at all.
5.4 Grounding
In Cognitive Grammar, it is proposed that certain types of entities (namely, things and
processes) may be “grounded”, i.e., that the speaker and hearer may jointly establish “men-
tal contact” with these entities (Langacker 1991: 91). In the conventional terminology of
grammatical description, a grounded thing is what is profiled by a full noun phrase, and a
grounded process is what is profiled by a finite verb or clause. All other expressions profile
“ungrounded” entities: for example, bare nouns, non-finite verb phrases, and prepositional
phrases.
There is some inconsistency (pace Langacker 2010b) between the way the notion of
“grounding” is applied to nominals and to verbs/clauses. In the case of nominals, grounding
is essentially a matter of definiteness; i.e., a grounded nominal is one that is specified as
either definite or indefinite (or more precisely, as profiling an entity that either is or is not
uniquely identifiable on the basis of the nominal’s conceptual content; see Chafe 1994: 93
ff.). With verbs and clauses, on the other hand, grounding is a matter of finiteness, i.e.,
whether the profiled process is situated with respect to the here-and-now.
Langacker (2010b) argues in detail that nominal and clausal grounding are essentially
of the same kind, on the basis of analogies between demonstratives and tense marking
(which both indicate “distance” from the deictic centre), and between modality and def-
initeness (which both make reference to the “Control Cycle”, though in different ways).
However, the consensus among linguists in general appears to be that the clausal equival-
²⁴Of course, there are also other factors that account for the difference between the alternants. For example, the
ditransitive construction can only be usedwhen the recipient is somehow affected by receiving the transferred
object: thus, *He sent the library a book is odd, but He sent the library his vast collection of philosophy journals
is fine.
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ent of definiteness is not finiteness, but rather presupposition vs. assertion (e.g. Lambrecht
1994: 77–79). Presupposition and assertion, like definiteness and indefiniteness, are a mat-
ter of whether an entity (in this case, a state of affairs) is uniquely identifiable as part of
the common ground on the basis of the provided conceptual content. Being situated with
respect to the here-and-now is logically independent of whether an entity is specified for
identifiability: a noun phrase such as a cat is specified as having a referent that is non-
identifiable, but it is unclear in what way this referent might be situated with respect to the
here-and-now (independently of the clause which the noun phrase appears in).
The above explains why I have chosen to define “grounding” as “the situation of an
entity with respect to the common ground, on the basis of the provided conceptual content“.
And yet, given this definition, one wonders if it is possible for any evoked entity to not be
grounded. Intuitively, it seems hard, if not impossible, to perceive or imagine any entity
without either recognising it or not recognising it. It thus seems more natural to assume
that the textual evocation of an entity necessarily entails its grounding.
This poses problems for the idea that there might be expressions that profile an “un-
grounded” entity. In fact, upon closer inspection, such (putative) expressions—insofar as
they profile any entities at all—do turn out to ground these entities:
(59) John was showing us his new [bread machine]i. Apparently thati [= (the kind of
thing known as) a bread machine] is what everyone uses these days. [type]
(60) We might [go for a drink]i. You do thati [= (the activity of) going for a drink] every
Friday! [higher-order eventuality]
(61) I just saw some mice [under the dining table]i.—No wonder; it’s quite messy therei
[= (in the space) under the dining table]! [location]
In every case, the profiled entities are identifiable (and in particular, the expressions are
specified as being “definite”, as can be seen from the glosses using the definite article).
More specifically: Noun stems (insofar as they evoke anything on their own) profile a type,
which is specified as being part of the common ground (e.g. the speaker and hearer already
know that there exists a type of thing known as a bread machine); and moreover, this type
is (by its very nature) specified as being uniquely identifiable (e.g. the speaker and hearer
both know that this expression, in this context, can pick out only this one type of thing).
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A non-finite (or at least non-TAM-marked) verb phrase profiles a higher-order eventu-
ality, which is specified as being part of the common ground (e.g. the speaker and hearer
already know that there is a kind of activity known as “going for a drink”). Moreover,
this eventuality is uniquely identifiable (e.g. the speaker and hearer both know that this
expression, in this context, can pick out only this one type of activity).
Finally (as we saw earlier), a spatial prepositional phrase evokes a location, which may
or may not be part of the common ground depending on whether the landmark is part
of the common ground (e.g. given that the dining table is already known to the speaker
and hearer, the region under the dining table is also known to them). Further, the location
may or may not be uniquely identifiable, depending on whether the landmark is uniquely
identifiable (e.g. given that the dining table is uniquely identifiable for the speaker and
hearer, the region under it is also uniquely identifiable).
To summarise this section: grounding corresponds to definiteness for nominals, and
presupposition/assertion (not finiteness) for clauses. Finiteness, as discussed earlier, could
be defined as profiling a state of affairs (which is necessarily situated with respect to the
present), as opposed to an eventuality (which has no temporal location). Moreover, every
evoked entity is necessarily grounded; there are no “ungrounded” entities.
5.5 Topic and focus
Information structure (or information packaging) is an important part of how speakers use
grammar to convey conceptual content; yet the questions that are dealt with in studies of
information structure have received little attention so far in Cognitive Grammar research
(see Langacker 1991: 313–317 for an exception, in addition to recent work such as Langacker
2010a, 2014).
So far, among the topics usually considered to be part of information structure, we
have already dealt with activation (Lambrecht 1994: §3.3), identifiability (ibid., §3.2), and
presupposition/assertion (§2.3). This section deals with the notions of “topic” (ibid., ch. 4)
and “focus” (ch. 5).
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5.5.1 Focus types
By way of introduction, let us consider the three basic information-structure patterns or
“focus structures” proposed by Lambrecht (1994: 222), and see how they might be described
in accordance with the Extended Content Requirement. These focus structures are predicate
focus (or “topic-comment articulation“), argument focus (or “identificational articulation”),
and sentence focus (“event-reporting” or “presentational” articulation). These three focus
types are illustrated as follows (based on Lambrecht 1994: 223):
(62) Predicate-focus structure:
A: What happened to your car?
B: My car broke down.
(63) Argument-focus structure:
A: I heard your motorcycle broke down?
B: My car broke down.
(64) Sentence-focus structure:
A: What happened?
B: My car broke down.
As suggested by the labels, Lambrecht argues that the essential difference between these
three types of sentences resides in which part of the sentence constitutes the focus; whether
it is the predicate (broke down), an argument (my car), or the entire sentence.
Let us consider in a bit more detail what it means for a particular part of a sentence
to be in “focus”. Lambrecht (1994: 207) defines the focus of a sentence as “the element of
information whereby the presupposition and the assertion differ from each other [em-
phasis in original]”.²⁵ The idea is that, for example, in the argument-focus sentenceMy car
broke down, the presupposition is of the form ‘speaker’s x broke down’, and the assertion
is of the form ‘x = car’ (Lambrecht 1994: 228); what differentiates the assertion from the
presupposition is the noun car, which is thus the focus.
Lambrecht (1994) does not provide explicit criteria for determining the form of the pre-
supposition and the assertion of a sentence; I would thus propose a slightly different for-
²⁵This definition presupposes that every sentence has one, and only one, focus. This is different from the
approach taken here.
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mulation. Every declarative utterance profiles a state of affairs that is new to the hearer
(i.e. an assertion); but in many cases (though not all), the conceptual content of that state of
affairs specifies not only what is the case, but also what isn’t the case. Thus, when saying
My car broke down, the state of affairs that the speaker is introducing into the common
ground is not merely ‘the fact that my car broke down’, but rather ‘the fact that my car
broke down and all other things of mine didn’t break down’. (This can be seen from the
fact that if one were to say My car broke down, not anything else of mine, one would not
be “adding any new information”.)
In such cases, I propose to define a focused entity as “an evoked entity by which what
is affirmed differs from what is denied”. In the argument-focus example, the profile of my
car is obviously a focus by this definition; so is the eventuality evoked by the sentence (‘my
car breaking down’). Applying this definition to sentence focus, we see that the state of
affairs profiled by the sentence-focus example is ‘the fact that my car broke down and all
other things that might have happened didn’t happen’; thus, the evoked eventuality (‘my
car breaking down’) is in focus, but not the profile of my car (which does not correspond
to any entity in what is denied).
The proposed definition of focus does not work as expected for the above example of
“predicate focus”. Here, the profiled state of affairs is ‘the fact that my car broke down and
all other things that might have happened to my car didn’t happen to my car’; however, it
is not the case that the higher-order eventuality ‘breaking down’ is in focus, because this
eventuality is not evoked by the sentence in the first place:
(65) My car [broke down]i.—#Thati happened to my motorcycle last week!
Here, the only entity that can be said to be in focus is the lower-order eventuality (‘my
car breaking down’). Thus, this is not truly an example of “predicate focus”; nonetheless,
it is easy to think of true examples of predicate focus, where a higher-order eventuality is
evoked and focused:
(66) My car [got a flat tyre]i.—Thati happened to my motorcycle last week!
So far, I have proposed a definition of “focus” in terms of a comparison between what is
affirmed and what is denied by an utterance. The notion of “topic” can be defined in similar
terms: specifically, as an evoked entity that is shared between what is affirmed and what
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is denied.²⁶ Applying this definition to the above examples of Lambrecht’s focus types, we
find the following (the reader may wish to refer back to the above descriptions of what is
affirmed and denied by each example sentence):
1. In the “predicate focus” example, the subject is a topic (this is the case with “true”
examples of predicate focus as well).
2. In the argument focus example, the subject is not a topic. If the sentence evoked
a higher-order eventuality (e.g. I heard your motorcycle had a flat tyre? My car
had a flat tyre), then this would be a topic.
3. In the sentence focus example, again, the subject is not a topic. Here, though, if the
sentence were to evoke a higher-order eventuality (as in What happened?—My car
had a flat tyre), this would not be a topic either (as it would have no counterpart in
what is denied).
In the above, I have attempted to reduce Lambrecht’s three focus types to various con-
figurations of topical and focal evoked entities—much as Lambrecht (1994: 221–238) does,
but defining the notions of topic and focus in terms of the more basic notion of a com-
parison between what is affirmed by an utterance and what is denied. In general, it will
be more convenient to work with the notions of topic and focus than with focus types, as
this will allow for greater flexibility in discussing the information-structure properties of
grammatical constructions.
The definitions of topic and focus proposed in this subsection may be summarised in
the following diagram:²⁷
=
+
−
topic focus neither
²⁶This definition is more precise than the standard definition of a topic (e.g. Lambrecht 1994: 118) as “the thing
which the proposition expressed by the sentence is about [emphasis in original]”. It thus addresses the com-
ment by Polinsky (1999: 572) in her review of Lambrecht (1994) that “[l]inguists have essentially given up on a
rigorous definition of topics—almost everyone…mentions the aboutness condition and thenmoves on to more
mundane matters of topichood or topicalization”. It is worth noting, however, that the proposed definitions
of topic and focus are highly reminiscent of the proposal in Deane (1991: 40–41) and Deane (1992: 36–37) to
define topic and focus in terms of “convergent activation” and “divergent activation”, respectively.
²⁷It is interesting to compare this three-way typology with the distinction drawn in Markman & Gentner
(1996: 236) between “commonalities”, “alignable differences”, and “nonalignable differences” (respectively)
in the context of similarity judgment.
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In other words:
1. only “contrastive” utterances that simultaneously affirm one state of affairs and
deny another can have topics and foci;
2. a topic is an evoked entity that is shared between what is affirmed and what is
denied;
3. a focus is an evoked entity bywhichwhat is affirmed contrasts withwhat is denied;
4. an entity that is present in what is affirmed but not in what is denied is neither a
topic nor a focus.
5.5.2 The thetic/categorical distinction
An important application of the concepts of information structure is to the prediction of
stress placement in sentences (Lambrecht 1994: 257–286, 322–333; see also Ladd 2008: ch. 6,
among others). Lambrecht (1994: 113) proposes that a constituent is given primary stress
(in English, at least) whenever its referent is either new (i.e. not previously evoked) or fo-
cused. (Thus, a distinction is made between an “activation accent” and a “focus accent”. It
is entirely possible for an utterance to have no primary stress, only secondary stress: e.g.
Ìs it cléan?—Ìt’s clèan/#Ìt’s cléan.)
An often-discussed problem in the intonational phonology of English is that of how to
predict when an intransitive clause has primary stress on both subject and predicate, and
when it has primary stress on just the subject—in other words, to explain the difference in
usage between “thetic” and “categorical” sentences. Sasse (1987) notes that, even if context
is held relatively constant, there are certain intransitive sentences that strongly favour a
thetic reading (indicated with accentuation only on the subject), and others that favour a
categorical reading (Sasse 1987: 521):
(67) Thetic:
a. What’s new?—Harry’s coming./*Harry’s coming.
b. How’s the weather?—The sun’s shining/*The sun’s shining.
(68) Categorical:
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a. What’s going on outside?—Harry’s singing./*Harry’s singing.
b. What has happened?—The princess sneezed./*The princess sneezed.
For Lambrecht (1994: e.g. 236), the thetic/categorical distinction reduces to the distinction
between sentence focus and predicate focus. Yet the differences illustrated in the above
examples cannot be in terms of focus structure (see also Sasse 1987: 520), since in all of
the above discourse contexts, the eventuality evoked by the sentence is what is intended
to be in focus—nothing else. Thus, since the differences in accentuation cannot be due to
the placement of focus accents, they must be due to the placement of activation accents; in
other words, the distinction must be in terms of which entities are (newly) evoked by each
sentence type.
I propose that in those sentences where only the subject has primary stress (i.e. thetic
sentences), the sentence does not evoke any higher-order eventuality, and thus there is
really no predicate that might be eligible for an accent (whether a focus accent or an activ-
ation accent). This can be seen from the following examples:
(69) Harry’s coming.—#John’s doing that, too.
(70) The sun’s shining.—#The moon’s doing that, too.²⁸
This proposal is consistent with existing accounts of the thetic/categorical distinction.
For example, Allerton & Cruttenden (1979) observe that thetic sentences tend to involve
verbs that are either “semantically empty”/“predictable”, or verbs of appearance and disap-
pearance, or verbs denoting a misfortune. It is hardly surprising that “semantically empty”
or “predictable” verbs do not evoke a higher-order eventuality; as for verbs of appearance
or disappearance, we saw above that existential sentences do not evoke a higher-order
eventuality—and appearance or disappearance is not far removed semantically from exist-
ence. The claim regarding verbs denoting a misfortune is disputed by Sasse (1987: 526).
More generally, all accounts of the thetic/categorical distinction state in one way or
another that in thetic sentences, the predicate doesn’t “add much information” on top of
the identity of the subject. For example, Bolinger (1954: 152) states that the predicate con-
veys information only “of a hackneyed sort” about the subject referent; likewise, Sasse
²⁸Note that one can say, Harry’s coming—So is John!, or The sun’s shining—So is the moon!. However, as we
will see in the next chapter, the [So aux NP] construction does not refer anaphorically to a higher-order
eventuality, but only to a lower-order one (in fancier terms, it is not a case of VP anaphora).
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(1987: 522–526) proposes that categorical statements are used when the hearer is expecting
information about the subject referent, with thetic sentences used otherwise. Sax (2012)
refines these accounts using the framework of Relevance Theory (Sperber & Wilson 1986),
and proposes that the deaccentuation of the predicate in thetic sentences results from the
fact that the predicate’s content is “weakly predictable” by the time the hearer has finished
processing the accented subject. All of the above accounts can be seen to be consistent with
the fact that in thetic sentences, the “predicate” does not evoke any entity, and thus has no
reason to bear primary stress (since the subject already does, on behalf of itself as well as
the whole clause).
Thus, to summarise: following Lambrecht (1994: 113), a constituent receives primary
stress whenever its referent is either new or focused. In accordance with this, the reason
why thetic sentences have an unaccented predicate is that there is no “predicate”.
5.6 Sanctioning
What are the aims of a grammatical description? Many linguists would agree with the
following (due to Chomsky 1964: 28–29):²⁹
1. A grammatical description must have observational adequacy: it must “present the
observed primary data correctly”, in other words, correctly discriminate between
well-formed and ill-formed structures;
2. it must have descriptive adequacy: it must “give a correct account of the linguistic
intuition of the native speaker, and specify the observed data…in terms of significant
generalizations that express underlying regularities in the language”: in other words,
it must provide a “structural description” (p. 34) of each well-formed usage event, and
thereby account for the speaker’s ability to discriminate well-formed and ill-formed
structures;
3. it must have explanatory adequacy: “the associated linguistic theory [must] provide
a general basis for selecting a [descriptively adequate] grammar over other [observa-
²⁹I thank Arie Verhagen for correcting my understanding of Chomsky’s views.
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tionally adequate] grammars that [are not descriptively adequate]”.³⁰
Thus far, I have addressed only (certain aspects of) descriptive adequacy: I have tried to
illustrate (and will continue to illustrate in the next chapter) how the proposed framework
is capable of providing descriptions of various grammatical structures. This section looks
at observational adequacy (and the remaining aspects of descriptive adequacy): how well-
formedness and ill-formedness are captured—or in the terminology of Cognitive Grammar,
how usage events are “sanctioned” by the grammar. (Explanatory adequacy has not spe-
cifically been treated, but is implicit in any attempt to build a general descriptive frame-
work.)
In keeping with the Cognitive Grammar account of sanctioning (Langacker 1987: 409–
447), as well as that in many versions of Construction Grammar (e.g. Fillmore 1998), I as-
sume that the sanctioning of a usage event proceeds by comparing the usage event with a
number of “schemas” or stored units, and ensuring that none of the relevant comparisons
results in a mismatch. The main question, then, is what constitute “schemas”, and what
constitutes a “relevant comparison”.
With regard to schemas, a useful starting point is Croft’s (1995: 872) “IU (= intonation
unit) storage hypothesis”:
The IU storage hypothesis
The constructions [= schemas] that are stored or precompiled are the
GUs [grammatical units] that (normally) occur in a single IU.
An intonation unit (or IU; a term adopted from Chafe 1994: 53 ff.) is a stretch of speech
that is defined by a continuous intonation contour, typically characterised by a decline
in pitch, loudness and/or speech rate, and often (but not necessarily) bounded by pauses
(Chafe 1994: 57–60). Chafe (1994: 108–119) argues that intonation units are units of speech
planning, and that an intonation unit typically does not contain more than one new piece of
information (the “one new idea constraint”; see also the “one-clause-at-a-time hypothesis”
of Pawley & Syder 2000). Croft (1995) further shows, on the basis of an analysis of the Pear
Stories narratives, that more than 97% of IUs consist of a full grammatical unit (the “full
³⁰The “associated linguistic theory” here is what came to be known as Universal Grammar; but the principle
can be understood in a theory-independent way.
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GU condition”), and that an IU almost never consists of a complex grammatical structure
that isn’t already conventionalised (or even grammaticalised); this is the basis on which
he proposes the IU storage hypothesis. These results have been replicated for Japanese
(Matsumoto 2000), Mandarin (Tao 1996), Korean (Park 2002), and the Australian languages
Wardaman (Croft 2007a) and Dalabon (B. Ross, Fletcher & Nordlinger 2016).
The IU storage hypothesis as formulated by Croft defines constructions (or schemas)
in terms of GUs, and only secondarily in terms of IUs. GUs are taken in this context as
a pretheoretical notion; but it would be desirable (from the point of view of the Extended
Content Requirement) to do awaywith such notions as far as possible. I would thus propose
the following, simpler formulation (pace Croft 2007a: 9, 30–31):
The strong IU storage hypothesis
The schemas that are stored or precompiled are IUs.
This still leaves unanswered the question of the level of generality at which schemas are
stored. Cognitive Grammar does not a priori place any constraints on this, and would thus
allow for highly specific IU schemas (e.g. [[John] [saw [Mary]]]), highly general ones (e.g.
[Sbj [V Obj]]), and anything in between (e.g. [Sbj [saw Obj]]). Each schema is however
given a weightage or “salience” that is determined by the interplay between its frequency
(more frequently-instantiated schemas have higher salience) and its concreteness (more
concrete schemas have higher salience); see Langacker (1987: e.g. 414) for details.
Unfortunately, there is no general, widely-agreed methodology for measuring the sali-
ence of a schema. This represents a significant problem for operationalising the Cognitive
Grammar account of sanctioning; it would thus be desirable to have a more constrained
theoretical account of which schemas are stored. Such an account is suggested by psycho-
linguistic evidence that, below the level of intonation units, the units of speech planning are
phonological words (Wheeldon & Lahiri 1997, 2002)—more specifically, that the amount of
time required to plan an IU is directly proportional to the number of phonological words it
contains. In particular, this suggests the following hypothesis:
The strong IU storage hypothesis (final version)
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The schemas that are stored or precompiled are IUs. Each IU schema
specifies one phonological word, and leaves the rest schematic.
The idea that schemas of the above kind are the only ones necessary for describing lan-
guage can of course only be supported by attempting to describe a language using only
such schemas; this will be attempted in the next chapter. For now, let us preview a few
consequences of the strong IU storage hypothesis. It is clear that the hypothesis permits
“verb-frame” schemas such as [Sbj [saw Obj]Pred]S,³¹ since this sequence does occur as a full
IU (e.g. John saw Mary), and it specifies only one phonological word (/ˌsɒ/). However, there
cannot be a “lemma-level” schema [Sbj [see Obj]Pred]S, since no part of this is phonologic-
ally specific. (The generalisations that are normally captured by the notion of a “lemma”
are instead dealt with using “second-order schemas”; see below.)
What about noun phrases? Noun phrases do sometimes occur on their own as IUs
(e.g. Canberra // is a small city); in these cases we might have schemas such as [Canberra],
assuming that this occurs frequently enough as a full IU.³² However, noun phrases most
commonly occur inside clausal IUs (e.g. John found my key; I just saw John); this would lead
to schemas such as [ [John]Sbj [V Obj]Pred]S and [Sbj [V [John]Obj]Pred]S. It may seem that
this approach makes overly fine distinctions, effectively forcing us to distinguish between
“nominative” and “accusative” NPs in English, even when these are homophonous. But
this is not necessarily a bad thing, if we accept that linguistic knowledge is item-based;
moreover, the task of describing the emergence of case-marking in a language is made
simpler if we assume that the relevant distinctions are already available to speakers to
begin with (rather than speakers having to suddenly introduce a wholly new distinction
into their mental grammars).
The above gives some idea of what schemas would look like under the strong IU storage
hypothesis. Turning back to the question of how to describe sanctioning, it would seem ob-
vious that sanctioning proceeds by searching for a set of schemas that provide a “complete
³¹Here Sbj and Obj are as defined earlier; Pred(icate) is shorthand for a constituent that profiles a higher-order
eventuality (a “verb phrase”); and S(entence) is shorthand for a constituent that environmentally evokes an
utterance.
³²We would, however, need a way of capturing the syntactic rôle of this unit, i.e. how the IU relates to the
utterance as a whole, as well as to the adjacent IU(s) (if any). Specifically, we would need to specify that
the IU is followed by a Predicate IU, and that these combine as subject and predicate to form a complete
utterance. This would be captured by a schema of the form { [Canberra]Sbj {Pred} }S, where curly braces are
used to enclose structures that lie outside the IU being defined.
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phonological covering” of the usage event; if no complete phonological covering can be
found using the available schemas, then the usage event is judged as ill-formed.
This would be a viable account of sanctioning for a language that had no morphology.
However, once we allow for productive morphology, it immediately becomes clear that it
will often be impossible to find a complete phonological covering in the manner described:
for example, if a speaker hears the plural noun octopi³³ for the first time, they will be unable
to locate a schema with precisely this phonological content. Yet speakers are perfectly
capable of accepting and understanding such novel morphological forms; the question is
how to account for this in the present model.
The typical approach to the description of morphology—the “Item-and-Arrangement”
approach—is to say that the speaker represents a morphologically-complex word as a com-
bination of a stem and affixes. In this case, the claim would be that the speaker represents
octopi as consisting of a stem octop- ‘octopus (unspecified for number)’ and an affix -i ‘pl’;
there would then be a “plural noun” schema of the form [Nstem-i]Npl , and the speaker would
be able to recognise octopi as instantiating this schema, having already extracted the stem
octop- from the singular form octopus. (See Booij 2010 for a detailed exposition of such an
approach to morphology.) However, this approach is incompatible with the present frame-
work, as the “stem” does not constitute a full phonological word,³⁴ and thus cannot have a
semantic pole. Furthermore, in languages which exhibit “non-concatenative” morphology,
it is often impossible to separate stem from affixes in the speech stream (see Rubba 1993
for a careful treatment of non-concatenative morphology in a dialect of modern Aramaic
using Cognitive Grammar).
A different approach tomorphological description—a “Word-and-Paradigm” approach—
would be to make use of the notion of a “second-order schema” (Nesset 2008: 18–21), or a
pattern of relatedness between two types of (first-order) schemas. In this case, “Latinate
second-declension pluralisation” (as exemplified by an octopus→ octopi) would be captured
by second-order schemas such as [ [Sbj [V [/ənV…əs/]Obj]Pred]S→[Sbj [V [/V…aɪ/]Obj]Pred]S].
This schema summarises the observed regularity (which occurs with moderately high type
frequency) that whenever one finds an generic plural noun phrase in object position begin-
³³This is an innovative plural form; the standard form is octopuses, and the correct Greek plural is octopodes
(/ɒkʽtəʊpədiːz/).
³⁴I am assuming here that phonological words cannot be nested; this is not uncontroversial.
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ning in a vowel and ending in /aɪ/, one often also finds an existing first-order schema with
a corresponding singular indefinite noun phrase in object position, which has /əs/ at the
end instead of /aɪ/, and which has /ən/ added on at the beginning. This model of morpho-
logy is consistent with the present framework, as it does not require assigning meaning to
phonological units below the level of a word.
Turning back to the description of sanctioning, I would propose that the process runs
as follows: the speaker, upon hearing octopi (in a particular sentential context), compares
it with all stored (first-order) schemas. For every such pair (e.g. (an octopus, octopi)), the
speaker searches for a high-type-frequency second-order schema thatmatches along the se-
mantic pole (e.g. (indefinite singular, generic plural)); and if any such second-order schemas
are found, the speaker checks whether any of them also matches along the phonological
pole (e.g. (/ənV…əs/, /V…aɪ/)). The usage event is judged as well-formed only if, for every
pairing of a phonological word with a stored first-order schema, if there is at least one high-
type-frequency second-order schema that matches this pairing semantically, then at least
one of those second-order schemas also matches phonologically.
Tomake this clearer, let us consider an example of a (novel) usage event that is judged to
be ill-formed, e.g. *I drinked it all (Langacker 1987: 432). Here, the speaker compares drinked
(in the context of this usage event) with a schema such as [Sbj [is drinking Obj]Pred]S. There
is indeed at least one high-type-frequency second-order schema that semantically matches
the pairing of this first-order schema with drinked, namely the present-progressive–to–
past-tense schema [ [Sbj [/ɪz…ɪŋ/ Obj]Pred]S →[Sbj [/…d/ Obj]Pred]S]—and this schema also
matches phonologically. However, the speaker also compares drinked to the schema [Sbj
[drank Obj]Pred]S. There is a high-type-frequency second-order schema that semantically
matches this pair as well, namely the “semantically null” [ [Sbj [/…/ Obj]Pred]S →[Sbj [/…/
Obj]Pred]S]. But this second-order schema is also phonologically null—and this mismatches
the drank/drinked pairing. Thus, the usage event I drinked it all is ruled to be ill-formed.
(An important point raised by this analysis is that in practice, a large amount of thework
of sanctioning is done by semantically and phonologically “null” second-order schemas,
which merely check whether the usage event matches up with a stored first-order schema.
Thus, the model of sanctioning adopted here is a generalisation of the “naïve” model which
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does not make use of second-order schemas.)
Thus, to summarise:
1. (First-order) schemas in the grammar
(a) are IU-sized, and
(b) specify exactly one phonological word.
2. An IU is sanctioned one phonological word at a time, by
(a) comparing that word (in its context) with all stored first-order schemas;
(b) for each pairing, searching for high-type-frequency second-order schemas
that match semantically;
(c) if any are found, checking whether any of the second-order schemas also
matches phonologically.
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Chapter 6
Descriptive application
This chapter builds on the theoretical proposals presented in the last chapter, and attempts
to show how a number of grammatical phenomena in English (at least) can be adequately
described without violating the Extended Content Requirement or the strong IU storage
hypothesis.
The chapter starts by defining some relevant units of discourse, in particular the “sen-
tence”. It then focuses on (declarative) finite clauses and their constituents: verbs (or verb
complexes), arguments, and adjuncts. Finally, we consider clause structures that are tra-
ditionally analysed as being “derived” from a basic clause structure using movement or
deletion operations (which are of course forbidden by the Content Requirement); this in-
cludes wh-questions, relative clauses, topicalisation, and various kinds of ellipsis.
In this chapter, to a much greater extent than in the previous chapter, diagrams will
be used (for their succinctness) as the primary way of expressing the proposed analyses,
with the surrounding text serving mainly to justify and gloss the diagrams, and to highlight
important aspects of them. Accordingly, precise notational conventions will be developed
over the course of this chapter, which the reader is encouraged to become familiar with.
6.1 Units of discourse
The largest unit of discourse that will be considered within this framework is the (conver-
sational) turn, or the interval between when a speaker starts speaking and when he or she
“hands off” to the next speaker. Every turn is composed of one or more “Turn Construction
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Units” (TCUs), a term first introduced by Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson (1974: 701, 720–723)
in the framework of Conversation Analysis (CA). A TCU can be understood as a unit that
could potentially stand on its own as a full turn; more precisely, a TCU is a stretch of speech
at the end of which the next speaker may take the floor if they so wish (but may also allow
the first speaker to continue speaking). In the terminology of Conversation Analysis, a TCU
is defined as a stretch of speech that ends in a “Transition Relevance Place” (TRP; Sacks,
Schegloff & Jefferson 1974: 703). To put it another way, a TCU is over when the speaker
has “made a point”; in written language, a TCU would correspond roughly to a “paragraph”
(and a turn to a “text”).
Each TCU, in turn, consists of one or more “sentences”. “Sentence” is a term that en-
joys little favour in CA and related approaches, since units that are “grammatically com-
plete” are often not pragmatically complete (Ford & S. A. Thompson 1996: 153 ff.)—in other
words, speakers often speak in “run-on sentences”. Thus, CA and related approaches do not
make use of a construct that corresponds to the notion of a “sentence” (though see Chafe
1994: 139–144 on “centers of interest”). However, I believe there is one way of defining a
sentence-like notion that not only is relevant to discourse, but also corresponds fairly well
to the notion of a syntactically complete unit. Specifically, I propose to define a sentence
as a stretch of speech that environmentally evokes an utterance (or “attitudinal object” in
the sense of Moltmann 2014)—intuitively, a stretch of speech which “does something” inter-
actionally, or which contributes towards making a point. A sentence can be followed by a
change of speaker; but unless the sentence occurs at the end of a TCU, the next speaker can
only respond with a minimal “back-channel” response (a “continuer”, in the terminology
of Schegloff 1982: 81) such as uh-huh or yes?, and must immediately yield the floor back to
the original speaker until she has finished making her point.
The type of sentence most commonly described in descriptive grammars (and arguably
most frequent in discourse) is a finite clause (which profiles a state of affairs and evokes
eventualities, etc., as we saw in §5.2.3); accordingly, this chapter will primarily focus on
finite clauses and their constituents. However, there are alsomany other types of sentences,
some of which Langacker (2008a: 475–477) discusses under the heading of “expressives”.
Some expressives have a profile, though the profile may not be identical to that of the
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nearest clausal paraphrase:
(71) Fire! [≈ There’s a fire!]
a. Where is it [= the fire]? [actant]
b. #That [= there being a fire] hasn’t happened for a while. [eventuality]
c. #That [= the fact that there’s a fire] doesn’t surprise me. [state of affairs]
(72) A snake! [≈ There’s a snake!]
a. Get it [= the snake] off me! [actant]
b. #That [= there being a snake] is unusual at this time of day. [eventuality]
c. #That [= the fact that there’s a snake] makes it likely that there are others.[state
of affairs]
Other expressives may not have a profile at all:
(73) Hello! [≈ ‘I greet you’?]
a. #That [= you(r) greeting me] is unusual. [eventuality]
b. #That [= the fact that you’re greeting me] makes me wonder if we’ve met be-
fore. [state of
affairs]
(74) Thank you! [≈ ‘I thank you’?]
a. #That [= you(r) thanking me] hasn’t happened for a while. [eventuality]
b. #That [= the fact that you’re thanking me] surprises me. [state of affairs]
All expressives, however, environmentally evoke an utterance (and hence qualify as sen-
tences by the definition proposed above):
(75) Fire!
a. That [= the cry of “Fire!”] is a stupid thing to yell in a crowded room like this!
(76) Thank you!
a. And thank you for saying that [= the politeness expression “Thank you”]!
The above observations can be summarised diagrammatically as follows:
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(77)
ˈfaɪɐ
a fire
the cry of “Fire!”
Fire!
Semantic pole:
Phonological pole:
ˈθæŋkju
the phrase “Thank you”
Thank you!
Here, the outermost boxes denote the environmentally-evoked utterances, which concep-
tually contain both the phonological and (if applicable) semantic poles of the sentence.
The rest of this chapter will focus exclusively on sentences that are finite clauses (i.e.
which profile a state of affairs).
6.2 Verbs
We will begin our discussion of finite-clause sentences with sentences that occupy a single
IU. We will extract first- and second-order schemas for finite verbs and verb-complexes.
The next section will consider schemas for arguments and adjuncts, and introduce finite
clauses that are split across multiple IUs.
6.2.1 Valency
As we saw in the last chapter, finite-clause sentences fall into two main types: those that
are organised into subject and predicate, and those that lack subject-predicate organisation.
Another way of stating this is that some sentences (such as The=príncess snéezed¹) evoke
a higher-order eventuality (e.g. ‘sneezing’) and thus have a subject (defined as the entity
that lies outside the conceptual content of the higher-order eventuality but within that of
the lower-order one: in this case ‘the princess’), whereas others (such as The=máil is=hère,
or It’s=ráining) do not evoke a higher-order eventuality, and thus cannot have a subject
as such; in some cases (such as It’s ráining), they may not even have any actants. The
following are representations of the sentences The=príncess snéezed, The=máil is=hère, and
It’s=ráining:
¹In this chapter, following Chafe (1994), acute and grave accents will be systematically used to indicate primary
and secondary stress in sentences. Every phonological word will carry exactly one accent mark. The equals
sign (=) will be used to join orthographic words that belong to the same phonological word. In diagrams, the
phonological poles will be given in ipa transcription, following standard British English phonology (though
my own dialect is closer to standard American English). Here, too, primary and secondary stress will be
indicated, using the ipa symbols /ˈ/ and /ˌ/, respectively.
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(78) a. The=príncess snéezed.
sneezingprincess
def
the princess sneezing
that the princess sneezed
ðəˈpɹɪnsɛs ʼsniːzd
the statement that the princess sneezed
b. The=máil is=hère.
mail
def
the mail being here
that the mail is here
ðəˈmeɪl ɪzˌhɪɜ
the statement that the mail is here
c. It’s=ráining.
raining
that it’s raining
ɪtsˈɹeɪnɪŋ
the statement that it’s raining
(In these representations, the specification “def” is given outside the boxes that it applies to,
to make it clear that it is an aspect of grounding, i.e. a property of the descriptions of certain
entities, rather than a property of those entities themselves. Grounding specifications will
often be omitted to keep diagrams uncluttered; strictly speaking, every box representing an
evoked entity needs to have one.)
In the above diagrams, each box that represents a (textually or environmentally) evoked
entity is provided with an informal gloss; the correspondences between the glosses and the
types of abstract entities that I claim are evoked by a finite clause (as discussed in §5.2.3)
121
6.2. VERBS
are given in the following table:
Higher-order eventuality sneezing – –
Lower-order eventuality the princess sneezing the mail being here raining
State of affairs that the princess sneezed that the mail is here that it’s raining
Utterance the statement that […]
On the basis of the first two diagrams above (and those of other sentences involving
snéezed and is=hère that the speaker may have come across), it is possible to extract the
following first-order schemas:
(79) sneezingx
x sneezing
that x sneezed
… ʼsniːzd
the statement that x sneezed
[Sbj [snéezed]Pred]S
x
x being here
that x is here
… ɪzˌhɪɜ
the statement that x is here
[Arg is=hère]S
(Note that, since is=hère is not a predicate, its argument is not, strictly speaking, a subject—
hence I have abbreviated it as Arg(ument) instead.)
At this stage it will be useful to explicitly state a (hypothetical) procedure for how
schemas are extracted from usage events; the following proposal is consistent with the
formulation of the strong IU storage hypothesis in the previous chapter:
A schema can only be extracted from a set of IUs that
1. have the same “constituent structure” (i.e. the same meronomic configur-
ation of semantic and symbolic structures, regardless of their actual con-
tent), and
2. share one phonological word, and the semantic pole that this word (at
least partially) symbolises; thesemust be in the same positionwith respect
to the shared constituent structure of all the IUs.
In addition to the shared constituent structure and the shared phonological
word and semantic pole, the schema will also preserve any abstract semantic
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structure (e.g. grounding of evoked entities, relations among entities, etc., but
not evoked entities themselves) that is constant throughout the set of IUs.
This constraint is sufficiently restrictive to provide a clear procedure for (1) selecting a set
of IUs to generalise over, and (2) extracting a precise schema from them. This procedure—
which I will call for convenience the Schema Extraction Procedure (SEP)—will be followed
rigorously in the remainder of this chapter. The reader can verify that the above schemas
for snéezed and is=hère are exactly the ones we would obtain by following the SEP (is=hère
only partially symbolises ‘that x is here’; only the whole clausal IU fully symbolises it).
So far we have considered only intransitive clauses—clauses which do not have an ob-
ject, i.e. any constituent within the predicate. It is not hard, though, to see what the rep-
resentation of a transitive clause would look like, e.g. for Jóhn àte sálad:
(80)
salad
eating salad
John
John eating salad
that John ate salad
ˈdʒɔn ˌeɪt ˈsæləd
the statement that John ate salad
Jóhn àte sálad
Applying the SEP, we can see that it is possible to extract the following schema for àte:
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(81)
y
eating y
x
x eating y
that x ate y
… ˌeɪt …
the statement that x ate y
[Sbj [àte Obj]Pred]S
The above schema accounts for sentences where the subject, verb and object are all
phonologically separate. However, it fails to account for a sentence such as Jóhn àte=a
sándwich, where the indefinite article encliticises to the verb, thus forming a phonological
word with it, and is separated from the head noun. Under most approaches, we would say
that there is a “mismatch” between syntax and phonology (see e.g. Lahiri & Plank 2010,
among many others): although a sándwich constitutes a syntactic constituent (and is thus
capable of bearing meaning), it does not constitute a phonological constituent in this sen-
tence. Such an approach is analytically convenient, in that it allows us to use the same
syntactic analysis for both [[Jóhn] [àte [sálad]]] and [[Jóhn] [àte [a sándwich]]]. However,
it requires a level of structure (syntactic constituency as distinct from phonological con-
stituency) that is neither properly phonological nor properly semantic (and not reducible
to a combination of the two)—and which thus cannot be detected “on the surface” of a us-
age event.² It would thus be desirable to work only with phonological constituency (as
this is directly observable), and assume that all meaning-bearing units (i.e. what syntactic
constituents are supposed to be) are phonological constituents³ (see e.g. Steedman 2000 for
similar arguments—and see the “phonological syntax” of Trager & Henry Lee Smith 1957
²It is important to note that most standard diagnostics of syntactic constituency—e.g. whether a particular
portion of a sentence can be displaced or interrupted—depend on distributional tests, and thus do not refer
exclusively to properties that are observable in the usage event itself. Also, experimental tests of syntactic
constituency (e.g. Gee & F. Grosjean 1983; F. Grosjean, L. Grosjean & Lane 1979; Levelt 1970a,b, pace Garrett,
Bever & Fodor 1966) invariably find a kind of structure that corresponds more closely to phonological con-
stituency than to syntactic constituency as traditionally understood (see also Bybee & Scheibman 1999: esp.
589–593).
³The converse is not true: it is quite possible for a phonological constituent to not be a meaning-bearing unit,
as is the case with the verbs (as opposed to the verb phrases) in the above schemas.
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for an intriguing precedent to this approach from the late Bloomfieldian era).
Thus, given the phonological constituency of Jóhn àte=a sándwich, it would be prefer-
able to posit sándwich (rather than a sándwich, which is not a phonological constituent
here) as the meaning-bearing unit that profiles the sandwich, as shown in the following
representation:
(82)
sandwich
indef
eating a sandwich
John
John eating a sandwich
that John ate a sandwich
ˈdʒɔn ˌeɪtə ˈsændwɪtʃ
the statement that John ate a sandwich
Jóhn àte=a sándwich
(The encliticisation of =a is accounted for by the relevant second-order schema on page
129.) Applying the SEP, we get the following schema for àte=a:
(83)
y
indef
eating y
x
x eating y
that x ate y
… ˌeɪtə …
the statement that x ate y
[Sbj [àte=a Obj]Pred]S
Note that the indefiniteness specification on the object is preserved in the schema, as it is
present without exception in all the usage events covered by the schema.
At this point, two questions naturally arise. Firstly, doesn’t it need to be specified in
the schema that the object noun needs to start with a consonant (*Jóhn àte=a ápple)? And
secondly (following on from the first question), how would the present framework describe
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the encliticisation of an to a preceding verb, while imposing the correct constraints on the
use of a versus an?
Let us start with the second question. It appears that in English, while a is often phon-
ologically separated from the following noun when it is encliticised to a preceding verb, an
never is; thus we have Jóhn ate=an=ápple rather than *Jóhn àte=an ápple. This means that
in this sentence, ápple is not a phonological constituent, and thus cannot bear meaning on
its own—which suggests the following analysis:
(84)
apple
indef
eating an apple
John
John eating an apple
that John ate an apple
ˈdʒɔn eɪtəˈnæpl ̩
the statement that John ate an apple
Jóhn ate=an=ápple
Note, too, that a remains joined to the following noun (even when encliticised) when the
noun begins with an unstressed syllable: thus we have Jóhn ate=a=banána rather than
*Jóhn àte=a banána; this would be analysed analogously to the above case.
In these cases, what we are dealing with is effectively a special “inflected form” of
the noun, which would thus be captured using a second-order schema such as [Sbj [V
the=•]Pred]S [Sbj [ate=an=•]Pred]S. The constraint that an requires a noun beginning in a
vowel, or that a requires a noun beginning in a consonant, would be captured by mak-
ing the appropriate specifications on the “•” in the second-order schema (e.g., [Sbj [V
the=/V•/ ]Pred]S > [Sbj [ate=an=/V•/ ]Pred]S).
For a followed by a noun starting with a stressed syllable (as in …àte=a sálad), the fact
that the noun must begin with a consonant would be captured by more general phonotactic
constraints of English. For example, one might argue that in English, a phonological word
can never begin with a vowel; even when it appears at the beginning of an IU, a vowel
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automatically acquires a glottal stop onset (e.g. [ʔ]Apples are delicious).⁴ To answer the ori-
ginal first question: no, the schema for àte=a doesn’t need to specify that the following
noun must start with a consonant. (The importance of all this argumentation is that it sug-
gests that schemas do not contain phonological specifications for anything other than the
phonological word on the basis of which they were extracted. This keeps the SEP simple.)
So far, we have considered only clauses where the arguments are full noun phrases.
However, in natural discourse, the arguments of a clause (and especially the subject) are
very often pronominal, and in particular bound pronouns. This may result in another kind
of claimed “mismatch” between syntax and phonology: even in transitive clauses, where
the verb and object supposedly form a syntactic unit (a “verb phrase”) that is separate from
the subject, the subject and verb may form a phonological constituent that excludes the
object. As before, it is desirable to avoid positing two types of constituency, and preferable
to assume that only phonological constituents may be meaningful units. This suggests
schemas such as [he=àte=a Obj]S:
(85)
y
indef
eating y
him
him eating y
that he ate y
…hiˌeɪtə
the statement that he ate y
[he=àte=a Obj]S
Note that here, “àte=a Obj” is not treated as a meaningful unit, since it is not a phonological
constituent.
Let us now briefly consider clauses with more than one object, such as those involving
verbs of transfer. The following is a schema for gave in a dative frame, [she=gàve=a Thm
⁴This raises the point that the framework being developed must have a systematic way of stating these kinds
of phonotactic constraints. This issue will not be discussed here, for lack of space; but suffice it to say that
the most natural approach would be along the lines of Radical Templatic Phonology as proposed by Vihman
& Croft (2007).
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Rec]S:⁵
(86)
y
indef
z
giving y to z
her
her, giving y to z
that she gave y to z
… …ʃiˌɡeɪvə
the statement that she gave y to z
[she=gàve=a Thm Rec]S
(Note that this schema only covers cases where the constituent profiling the theme begins
with a consonant-initial stressed syllable, e.g. She=gàve=a bóok…. For other cases, such
as She=gave=an=ápple…, or She=gave=a=banána…, different schemas will be needed.) The
reader should be able to work out corresponding schemas for gave in a ditransitive frame
(e.g. [she=gàve Rec Thm]S or [she=gàve=him Thm]S).
So far, we have considered only first-order schemas; we are thus not yet able to prop-
erly account for the sanctioning of novel usage events, and in particular, productivity in
argument structure (i.e. the ability to take a verb that has been witnessed in one argument-
structure configuration, and use it in another argument-structure configuration, as de-
scribed and analysed extensively in e.g. Goldberg 1995). This is fairly straightforward,
however. Let us introduce the use of second-order schemas with the simple example of
taking a verb without an encliticised indefinite article (e.g. àte), and using it in a context
where it does have an encliticised indefinite article (i.e. àte=a). This could be described as
follows:⁶
⁵Note that it is not specified that Rec must begin with the preposition to, since only one phonological word
can be specified by a schema. This information would instead be captured by the appropriate noun-phrase
schema for the oblique object in the dative frame. See the discussion of oblique objects below.
⁶In second-order schemas, thick lines will be used to indicate the phonological word that changes between
the source and the target—the “focus” of the second-order schema, as it were. This is of course the phon-
ological word that is specified by the first-order schemas that instantiate the source and target. Since a
second-order schema generalises over a number of pairings of first-order schemas, e.g. àte/àte=a, sàw/sàw=a,
wànted/wànted=a, etc., the focus is typically at least partly schematic. This is not a violation of the SEP, as
the requirement for a schema to specify exactly one phonological word only applies to first-order schemas.
The dashed arrows indicate a relationship of “extension” or “partial schematicity” between the source and the
target, and between corresponding structures within the source and target; see Nesset (2008: 18–19).
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(87)
y
Ving y
x
x Ving y
that x V y
… • …
the statement that x V y
y
indef
Ving y
x
x Ving y
that x V y
… •ə …
the statement that x V y
Encliticisation of indefinite article to a transitive verb
The above second-order schema would be able to sanction a comparison between a novel
usage event such as Jóhn àte=a sálad and the schema [Sbj [àte Obj]Pred]S, in accordance
with the sanctioning procedure laid out in the last section of the previous chapter.
To take another simple example, the following is a schema for deriving a transitive
clause with the bound subject pronoun you from one with the bound subject pronoun he:
(88)
y
Ving y
you
you Ving y
that you V y
…jʊ•
the statement that you V y
y
Ving y
him
him Ving y
that he V y
…hi•
the statement that he V y
Replacement of bound subject pronoun you with he
This schema is of course just one of a number of second-order schemas (involving different
pairings of bound subject pronouns), which together constitute a “paradigm” of pronominal
subject marking on English transitive verbs. (See Bybee 1985: ch. 3, 5 for the model of
paradigms adopted here.)
Turning now to cases of productivity in argument structure (or to put it another way,
valence-changing operations), here is a second-order schema for deriving a ditransitive use
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of a verb from its transitive use (i.e., [Sbj [[•]V Obj]Pred]S > [Sbj [[•]V Rec Thm]Pred]S):
(89)
y
Ving y
x
x Ving y
that x V y
… • …
the statement that x V y
y z
Ving z for y
x
x Ving z for y
that x V z for y
……•…
the statement that x V z for y
Coercion of a transitive verb into the ditransitive construction
Likewise for extending a transitive verb using the caused-motion construction (i.e., [Sbj
[[•]V Obj]Pred]S > [Sbj [[•]V Obj PP]Pred]S):
(90)
y
Ving y
x
x Ving y
that x V y
… • …
the statement that x V y
y z
Ving y so y goes to z
x
x Ving y so y goes to z
that x V y so y goes to z
……•…
the statement that x V y so y goes to z
Coercion of a transitive verb into the caused-motion construction
To conclude, let us move from valence-increasing operations to valence-decreasing op-
erations, in particular the family of phenomena called null instantiation by Fillmore (1986).
Let us start with Definite Null Instantiation (DNI), where a verb appears with one fewer
complement than it would normally take, but the identity of the referent of the missing
complement is recoverable from the context due to being highly salient. For example (Fill-
more 1986: 98), Why did you marry her?—Because Mother insisted ø [= on it]. The pattern
whereby the object of a transitive verb could be subjected to DNI may be notated as fol-
lows:
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(91)
y
Ving y
x
x Ving y
that x V y
… • …
the statement that x V y
y ∈ A
Ving y
x
x Ving y
that x V y
… •
the statement that x V y
Definite Null Instantiation
(Here A refers to the set of all entities that are active in the discourse; y ∈ A is thus used
as shorthand for “some entity y which is currently active”. We could just as well have used
it/him/her.) It so happens that in English, DNI is unproductive, and completely lexically
determined (Fillmore 1986: 98–102); however, in so-called “pro-drop” languages, it is easy
to see that DNI is massively productive.
The second type of null instantiation mentioned by Fillmore (1986) is Indefinite Null
Instantiation (INI); this is where a verb appears without a complement that it would nor-
mally be expected to have, and the referent of this missing complement is filled in with a
conventional, generic entity rather than an entity that is currently active in the discourse.
For example (Fillmore 1986: 96), We’ve already eaten ø [= a meal]; I’ve tried to stop drinking
ø [= alcohol]. The pattern whereby the object of a transitive verb could be subjected to INI
may be notated as follows:
131
6.2. VERBS
(92)
y
Ving y
x
x Ving y
that x V y
… • …
the statement that x V y
Ving somethingx
x Ving something
that x V something
… •
the statement that x V something
Indefinite Null Instantiation
Unlike DNI, INI is at least partially productive in modern English; a possible example of a
relatively recent novel instance of INI is the expression holding ø to mean “having drugs to
sell” (Urban Dictionary 2016: s.v. holding).
The third type of null instantiation introduced by Fillmore (though not discussed in
Fillmore 1986) is Free Null Instantiation (FNI), whereby some actant of the clause is left
unexpressed, andmay be filled in with either a contextually salient entity or a conventional,
generic entity. FNI is usually used to describe non-core arguments, e.g. Croft (2001: 276):
(93) a. She took some blue stationery out of the cupboard and wrote a letter ø [= on it].
b. She wrote a letter ø [= on something].
One way of analysing this would be to say that these usages of the verb write are product-
ively derived from a schema such as [Sbj [wròte=a Obj Loc]Pred]S, by way of second-order
schemas that are exactly analogous to the ones above for DNI and INI. Details are omitted
for reasons of space.
6.2.2 TAM marking
Thus far we have mainly been considering verb schemas that differ according to how many
arguments are present; in other words, that differ by argument structure. In this subsection,
we consider schemas that differ by the tense/aspect/mood (TAM) of the verb. In doing so,
we will need to begin with a precise understanding of the range of semantic values of each
TAM category.
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Let us begin by considering the past tense, as this is the only TAM category that is
expressed in English by straightforward inflection. In the classic analysis by Reichenbach
(1947: 290), the past tense is the tense where the event time is prior to the speech time,
and equal to the reference time (E = R < S). The terms “event time” and “speech time”
are self-explanatory; the “reference time” (also sometimes called the “topic time”) will be
understood here as the event time associated with a state of affairs evoked in the preceding
discourse.
Typically, the event time of a past-tense clause is identified with the event time of the
preceding clause (which thus serves as the reference time):
(94) Last night I had dinner at home. I ate bread (last night).
This could be captured by a schema such as the following (for the verb eat):
(95)
y
eating y
x
x eating y
that x ate y at time E < S
… ˌeɪt …
the statement that x ate y at time E < S
e
that ∃e at time E
…
the statement that ∃e at time E
[Sbj [àte Obj]Pred]S
This schema specifies that the event time E is in the past (< S), but also specifies that the
preceding discourse includes a clause that has the same event time (i.e., which also evokes
a state of affairs situating some eventuality e at time E).
However, not all uses of the English past tense make use of a reference time: for ex-
ample, a sentence likeMy=cát (just=)dìed can be used discourse-initially (with the implica-
tion that the event time is just prior to the speech time). Likewise, if an event time is stated
explicitly (as in I=àte bréad last=nìght), there is no need to “carry over” the event time from
a previous clause. These cases are thus better described as simply E < S, without R figuring
anywhere.
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Other TAM categories (e.g. future tense, or various modal categories) are analogous to
the above, but may of course presuppose a reference/event time in the future rather than the
past. The following is a schema for the modal auxiliarymight, or more precisely, [Sbjmìght
[V Obj]Pred]S, in the usage where the event time is carried over from a previous clause:
(96)
y
V-ing y
x
x V-ing y
that x might V y at time E > S
… …ˌmaɪt…
the statement that x might V y at time E > S
e
that ∃e at time E
…
the statement that ∃e at time E
[Sbj mìght [V Obj]Pred]S
The above thus corresponds to S < E = R. As with the past tense, futures and modals can
be used in a way that does not make use of a reference time (either by specifying the event
time explicitly, or by implying that the event time is immediately after the speech time).
Contra Reichenbach (1947: 290), the present tense does not make use of a reference
time—it only needs to specify that the event time is equal to the speech time, regardless
of whether the speech time was also the event time of a previous clause (hence, E = S,
rather than E = R = S). (The habitual present, however, may use a reference time: e.g. I see
John every week. We play cards (every week).)
We have briefly covered categories of tense; let us now consider categories of aspect,
starting with the English “perfect” aspect (also called “perfectal”; cf. Sasse 2002: 210), ex-
pressed by the auxiliary have together with a past participle. In Reichenbach (1947: 290),
this corresponds to situations where the event time precedes the reference time (i.e. E <
R = S for present perfect, E < R < S for past perfect, and S < E < R for future perfect). This
analysis clearly holds good for the past and future perfects; these require (in the absence
of an explicitly-specified event time) that the event time be carried over from a previous
clause:⁷
⁷Things are a little more complicated with modal auxiliaries other than will (e.g.might have, would have, etc.).
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(97) a. John came home at eight. He had made a stop at the grocery store.
b. # John had made a stop at the grocery store. [discourse-initial]
(98) a. Let’s meet next week. I’ll have finished writing my chapter.
b. # I’ll have finished writing my chapter. [discourse-initial]
However, this analysis breaks down for the present perfect, for two reasons. Firstly, even
when the event time is not explicitly specified, the present perfect does not require a refer-
ence time; it can, for example, be used discourse-initially (e.g. I’ve sent you an e-mail; take
a look when you can). Secondly, it is not the case that the event time precedes the speech
time (E < S), as illustrated in the following examples (Michaelis 1994: 113):
(99) a. * Harry has joined the navy in 1960.
b. [It was 1972.] Harry had joined the navy in 1960.
Here, the event time (specified by the adjunct) is “1960”. We can see that unlike in the past
perfect, in the present perfect the event time must include the speech time at its right end;
thus, compare the starred sentence to the following:
(100) Harry has joined the navy this year.
Here, the event time is “this year (so far)”, which clearly includes the speech time. See
Michaelis (1994); Richards (1982) and works cited therein for further arguments for this
kind of analysis. (Note that Langacker 1991: 211–225 essentially follows the Reichenbachian
analysis.)
It must be noted that the present perfect also has a “resultative” reading, where the
clause evokes not only the expected higher-order eventuality, but also a derived higher-
order eventuality that represents the result of that action; and the evoked lower-order even-
tuality is an instance of the latter, not the former. This can be seen in the following example:
(101) I’ve finished my lunch!
a. That [= finishing one’s lunch] isn’t such a hard task! [“root” higher-order
eventuality]
These are not necessarily perfects; rather, they may be pasts, allowing for a reference time that is prior to the
speech time. This can be demonstrated by examples such asWhat did she eat last night?—She must have eaten
that bowl of chili, where E is clearly in the past.
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b. That [= having finished one’s lunch] isn’t generally a sufficient excuse for leav-
ing the dining table. [derived higher-order
eventuality]
c. That [= you having finished your lunch] usually means you’re about to burp
loudly. [lower-order eventuality]
See Michaelis (1994), Depraetere (1998), and Croft (2012: 162–164) among others for further
discussion of this and other readings of the English present perfect.
Let us move to the progressive aspect, expressed in English by the auxiliary be together
with a present participle. In terms of Reichenbachian primitives, the progressive tenses
can be characterised in the same way as the unmarked tenses (pace Reichenbach 1947: 290);
what distinguishes them is that the event time covers only a portion of the event (a medial
state), rather than the entire event from beginning to end. Langacker (1991: 207–211) fur-
ther claims that it is this medial state (and not the event as a whole) that is profiled by the
clause; but while this proposal is theoretically well-motivated within Cognitive Grammar
(from the idea that the profile of an expression is curtailed to fit the “immediate scope of
predication”), the understanding of profiling and textual evocation in the current frame-
work does not give any reason to believe that a progressive clause evokes a proper subset
of the event, as opposed to the full event. (Indeed, it is hard to see how such a claim would
even be tested.)
A major strength of the analysis of progressives in Langacker (1991: 207–211) is that
it provides an elegant explanation of why it is not possible to use a stative verb in the
progressive aspect (e.g. *I am knowing it): since a stative verb profiles a process that is
completely homogeneous, a proper subset of the process would look exactly the same as
the full process, and thus the profile of a progressive would look exactly the same as that of
the unmarked aspect. In the present framework, the corresponding analysis would be that
the present progressive specifies that the event time coincides with an identifiably medial
state of the eventuality, i.e. one that is distinguishable from the beginning and end states; in
the case of a stative verb, the evoked eventuality does not have any medial state that could
be distinguished from the beginning and end states, and so using the present progressive
would be semantically incoherent.
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Having considered the perfect(al) and progressive aspects, we need to consider the per-
fect progressive aspect, expressed by the auxiliary sequence have been followed by a present
participle. The present perfect progressive (has been) is fairly straightforward: the event
time includes the speech time at its right end (E ⊃ S and max(E) = max(S)), and the event
time covers only a medial state of the event. However, the past perfect progressive (had
been) and future perfect progressive (will have been) seem to deviate from the normal values
of the perfectal aspect in non-present tenses, in that the event time necessarily includes the
reference time at its right end (E ⊃ R and max(E) = max(R)), whereas normally the event
time and reference time are disjoint. This is illustrated in the following examples:
(102) a. John came home at midnight. He had been drinking. [R = midnight, E = the
hours before midnight]
b. I promise I’ll submit my paper next Monday.—Do you realise we’ll have been
waiting for it for over two months? [R = next Monday, E = the two months
leading up to next Monday]
Having seen the semantic values of various TAM categories in English, let us consider
the (first-order) schemas that are needed to account for their expression in clauses. In
English, (marked) aspectual and (irrealis) modal categories are expressed using “auxiliaries”,
which may either be phonologically free (Jóhn mìght cóme), be encliticised to the subject
(Jóhn=’s sléeping), or be procliticised to the verb (Jóhn // is=enjóying=himself ). Here, for
simplicity, we focus on phonologically free auxiliaries.
We saw above a schema for mìght, [Sbj mìght [V Obj]Pred]S; schemas for other modal
auxiliaries look just the same. (Note that under “modal auxiliaries”, we need to include such
expressions as might=evèntually or would=sòmeday.) Aspectual auxiliaries typically either
procliticise to the verb (if the subject is in a separate IU, e.g. The=Éagle // has=lánded) or
encliticise to the subject (otherwise, e.g. Jóhn=’s sléeping); however, in some cases they
may be phonologically free (Your=váse has=jùst arríved; The=shíp is=nòw sínking; Máry
mùst=have=been surprísed); in these cases, the schemas are analogous to those for free
modal auxiliaries.
There would also need to be schemas for the present and past participles of verbs, as
well as second-order schemas for productively deriving these forms from the finite forms of
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the verb (and vice versa). Let us finish by considering some of these second-order schemas.
The following is a second-order schema for deriving the past-tense form of a transitive verb
from the present participle. This is of course just one of many past-tense schemas:
(103)
y
Ving y
x
x Ving y
that x is Ving y
… …•ɪŋ
the statement that x is Ving y
y
Ving y
x
x Ving y
that x Vpst y
… •d …
the statement that x Vpst y
Derivation of past tense from progressive form of a transitive verb
(Note that the progressive auxiliary is not represented in the source schema, since it nor-
mally encliticises to the subject. There will of course need to be second-order schemas for
sanctioning subjects with encliticised auxiliaries.)
For the perfect participle, we have schemas like the following:
(104)
y
Ving y
x
x Ving y
that x is Ving y
… …•ɪŋ
the statement that x is Ving y
y
Ving y
x
x Ving y
that x has Vperf y
… …•d
the statement that x has Vperf y
Derivation of perfect participle from progressive form of a transitive verb
(Note, likewise, that the perfect auxiliary is not represented in the target schema.)
Finally, for the bare (infinitival) form of a verb (such as would be used following a modal
auxiliary), we have schemas like the following:
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(105)
y
Ving y
x
x Ving y
that x is Ving y
… …•ɪŋ
the statement that x is Ving y
y
Ving y
x
x Ving y
that x V y
…•……
the statement that x V y
Derivation of bare form of a transitive verb from progressive form
(The target of the schema is neutral with regard to modality, and specifies only that the
profiled state of affairs constitutes some actual or potential occurrence of the evoked even-
tualities.)
6.2.3 Voice
Another category that determines the form of a verb complex in English is voice, and in
particular, the passive voice, formed in English with the auxiliary verb be and a passive
participle that is formally identical to the perfect participle.
To put it simply, the function of the passive voice is to take a clause with a higher-order
eventuality of the form ‘V-ing y’, and turn it into a clause with a higher-order eventuality of
the form ‘getting V-ed’, or else ‘getting V-ed by z’, depending on whether an agent is overtly
specified. This function is easily captured by passive-participle second-order schemas such
as the following (for the case where the perfect/passive participle is identical to the past-
tense form):
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(106)
y
Ving y
x
x Ving y
that x Vpst y
… • …
the statement that x Vpst y
being Vpassx
x being Vpass
that x Vpass
… •
the statement that x Vpass
Derivation of passive participle from past-tense form of a transitive verb
(It is worth noting that the lower-order eventuality ‘x being Vpass’ is semantically identical
to the higher-order eventuality ‘Ving x’; this will become important further below in the
discussion of VP anaphora.)
The passive voice can of course be combined with various TAM categories; this would
call for auxiliary schemas such as [Sbj mìght=have=been [Vpass]Pred]S, etc.
6.2.4 A word about notation
So far in this chapter, the notational conventions in the diagrams have been fairly informal;
in particular, the boxes denoting evoked entities are labeled in a mix of natural language
and algebraic notation. Through the rest of this chapter, the diagrams will increase in com-
plexity, and for this reason it will be useful at this stage to introduce some more precise
notational conventions.
To start with an illustration, a sentence such as Jóhn àte sálad would henceforth be
diagrammed as follows:
140
6.2. VERBS
(107)
salad indef
eat.pat
inv
John
eat.agt
occ
E ⊃S >
stat
ˈdʒɔn ˌeɪt ˈsæləd
Jóhn àte sálad
The following changes need to be noted:
1. Whenever an entity can be described as a function of entities that it conceptually
contains, then this is indicated by dashed lines connecting the outer entity with the
inner ones, with labels indicating the nature of the semantic relationships involved.
For example:
(a) The evoked eventuality “John eating salad” can be completely characterised as
“an eventuality that involves ‘eating salad’, and has ‘John’ in the role of ‘eater’”.
This is indicatedwith a dashed line connecting the lower-order and higher-order
eventualities, labeled inv(olves), and with a dashed line connecting the lower-
order eventuality with the subject, labeled eat.agt (“agent of eating”). Relations
such as eat.agt and eat.pat are specific to each predicate. Not too much should
be read into the suffixes .agt and .pat; the relations could just as easily have been
called eat1 and eat2.
(b) The state of affairs “that John ate salad” can be completely characterised as “a
state of affairs that constitutes the actual occurrence of the eventuality ‘John
eating salad’ at some point (E) prior to the moment of speaking (S)”. This is
indicated with a dashed line connecting the state of affairs with the eventuality,
labeled occ(urrence), and with the symbols > and ⊃ indicating that the event
time E is prior to the speech time S, and contains the eventuality.
(c) The utterance “the statement that John ate salad” can be completely character-
ised as “the product (in the sense of Twardowski 1911) of a speech act conveying
the state of affairs ‘that John ate salad’ using such-and-such phonological con-
141
6.3. ARGUMENTS
tent”. This is indicated with a dashed line connecting the utterance with the
state of affairs, labeled stat(ement), and with the appropriate symbolisation
lines connecting the phonological content with the semantic content.
2. Entities that are part of the conceptual content of an evoked entity, but which are
not themselves evoked, are denoted by circles rather than rectangles; in the above
example, this includes the speech time (S) and event time (E). Such entities will often
be omitted from diagrams for simplicity.
3. For clarity, the relationship of symbolisation between a phonological unit and an en-
tity in the semantic pole is denoted by a solid line rather than a dotted line (following
the convention in Langacker 2008a rather than that in Langacker 1987).
Other diagrammatic conventions will also be found necessary, but these will be introduced
as needed.
6.3 Arguments
So far we have considered schemas for the parts of a sentence that are traditionally ana-
lysed as verbs or verb complexes.⁸ In this and the following section, we will consider the
non-verbal constituents of a sentence, namely those typically classified as “arguments” and
“adjuncts”. This section focuses on schemas for arguments, i.e. constituents whose profile
resides within the (lower-order) eventuality evoked by a finite clause.
6.3.1 External structure
Let us consider a noun phrase such as the=bóy. A speaker of English is likely to have
encountered this phrase at least some of the time in the subject position of a transitive
clause occupying a single IU (e.g.The=bóy àte chócolate). Applying the SEP to such contexts,
one is likely to arrive at a schema such as the following:
⁸We can define a “verb” or “verb complex” as “any phonological word that is immediately contained within
a constituent that profiles a state of affairs or an eventuality”. This is a somewhat ungainly definition; but it
corresponds reasonably well to the standard use of these terms.
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(108)
inv
boy
def
occ
stat
ðəˈbɔɪ … …
The=bóy in subject position
(Note that there would be a different schema for the=bóy in the subject position of an in-
transitive clause, and likewise for various argument-structure configurations.)
As noted by Croft (1995: 856–857), subject NPs are sometimes split off intonationally
from the predicate (with the likelihood going up as the complexity of the NP increases),
so we also need to posit schemas for subject NPs that occur in their own IUs. (Object NPs
rarely occur in their own IUs.) This is what such a schema would look like for the=bóy
(though this is arguably not a very likely lone-NP IU due to its shortness):
(109)
boy
def inv
occ
stat
ðəˈbɔɪ …
The=bóy as a subject IU
This schema introduces some new notational conventions, which it is worth commenting
on before proceeding further. As noted briefly in the last section of the previous chapter, a
schema contains information about the relationship between its phonological and semantic
poles and those of the adjacent IUs (if any). So far in this chapter, we were dealing with IUs
that are complete sentences, i.e., which do not bear any grammatical relation to adjacent
IUs; thus, this aspect of schema organisation could be conveniently ignored. From here
onwards, however, we will often be considering IUs that are smaller than a sentence, and
will thus often need to notate the relations between an IU and its neighbours.
These relations will be notated, as above, by drawingwith dashed lines the boxes repres-
enting the neighbouring IUs (in this case, the phonological and semantic poles of the pre-
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dicate), as well as any other structures lying outside the IU being described by the schema
(in this case, the lower-order eventuality, the state of affairs, and the utterance evoked by
the sentence, all of which are built from the material in the current IU as well as in the
next one). It is important to note that the internal structure of the neighbouring IUs must
be left unspecified; this can be seen as a version of the principle of “locality of selection”
in early versions of generative grammar (Chomsky 1969: ch. 2) as well as modern frame-
works such as HPSG (Sag 2007), namely that one constituent may not “peek inside” its sister
constituents.
Let us now consider the noun phrase the=bòy as used in the object position of a transitive-
clause IU (e.g. Máry sáw the=bòy).⁹ After repeatedly seeing this phrase in this particular
syntactic context and applying the SEP, the speaker would arrive at a schema like the fol-
lowing:
(110)
boy ∈ A
def
inv
occ
stat
… … ðəˌbɔɪ
The=bòy in object position
(The fact that the boy has already been evoked in the preceding discourse is captured by
the notation “boy ∈ A”; A stands for the set of entities currently active in the discourse.)
We have considered subjects and (direct) objects. A distinction is usually drawn between
“direct” and “oblique” objects (e.g. Van Valin & LaPolla 1997: 29), where direct objects are
identified (cross-linguistically) as those that appear without an adposition, or in a “dir-
ect” case such as nominative, accusative, ergative or absolutive, and oblique objects are
identified as those that appear with an adposition or in an “oblique” case such as dat-
ive, instrumental, or locative (Van Valin 2005: 1). These definitions are framed in terms
⁹The reason for taking the de-stressed form of the noun phrase (which would be used only when the profiled
entity has already been evoked) is that if bóy were stressed, the article would automatically encliticise to
the verb (Máry sàw=the bóy), and so the=bóy could not be a constituent; this would be less convenient for
expository purposes.
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of purely formal syntactic notions; we need to ask whether there is a way of defining the
direct/oblique distinction in a way that is consistent with the Extended Content Require-
ment.
I would like to suggest that there is such a way: an oblique object (or more generally, an
oblique argument) is one whose schema explicitly specifies a relation between the object’s
profile and some other entity in the conceptual content of the clause. Let us illustrate this
with the phrase with=a=pén (assuming for the moment that this phrase occurs frequently
enough to give rise to a schema). In many attested uses of this phrase, it will occur within
the predicate of a transitive clause, appearing after the direct object (e.g. [Jóhn [wròte=the
lètter with=a=pén]Pred]S). Importantly, in virtually all of these uses, there will be a relation
between the profile of the phrase (i.e. the pen) and the schematic agent that figures in
the evoked higher-order eventuality (which in turn corresponds to the subject). This is
expressed as follows:
(111)
pen
indef
agt
inv
occ
stat
using
… wɪðəˈpɛn……
An oblique object: with=a=pén
Given this definition of oblique arguments, we can note that there are not only ob-
lique objects, but also cases of “oblique subjects” (though they are not usually called such).
These are what are usually called “non-canonical” subjects, i.e. subjects in a case other
than nominative or ergative. These are often found in constructions expressing bodily or
psychological states, as in the following examples (see Hagège 2006 for a cross-linguistic
survey):
(112) a. nē-kku
1sg-dat
paci-kkiṟ-atu
be.hungry-prs-3sg.n
I’m hungry. (Tamil)
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b. boku=ni=wa
1sg=dat=top
kuruma=ga
car=nom
ar-u
exist-npst
I own a car. (Japanese)
In these cases, the schema for the oblique form of the subject (nēkku or boku=ni=wa) spe-
cifies a particular relation between the subject and the higher-order eventuality, namely
that the subject experiences the state specified by the higher-order eventuality. This may
expressed as follows (for the Tamil example):
(113)
inv
1sg
def
occ
stat
exp
ˌneːkɨ …
An “oblique subject”: Tamil nēkku ‘1sg:dat’
So far we have considered only arguments that might be analysed as “noun phrases”
(bearing in mind the view taken here that “prepositional phrases” with an abstract prepos-
ition such as with are actually case-marked noun phrases). It is equally possible, however,
for arguments to be (true) prepositional phrases, or adjectival phrases; this is particularly
the case in copular constructions. Rather than starting with English copular constructions,
I will analyse the postverbal arguments of copular constructions in Spanish, since Spanish
distinguishes formally between different copular constructions that are outwardly identical
in English.
Spanish has two copulas, with infinitives ser and estar (deriving from Latin sedere ‘sit’
and stāre ‘stand’), which may be used with nominal, adjectival, or prepositional comple-
ments. The semantic distinction between these two copulas has been the subject of much
discussion (see Leonetti Jungl 1994 for a review); here we will consider only a subset of the
relevant facts.
With noun-phrase complements, only ser is used; this will not be analysed here, as
it is quite analogous to any other transitive verb. With adjective-phrase complements, the
choice between ser and estar is determined by the kind of state denoted by the complement.
In general, an adjective denoting an “inherent, essential, [or] permanent” state selects for
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ser, whereas an adjective denoting an “accidental, transient [or] accessory” state selects for
estar (Leonetti Jungl 1994: 182); thus, ser capaz ‘to be capable’, ser mortal ‘to be mortal’, but
estar descalzo ‘to be barefoot’, estar angustiado ‘to be anxious’. The “same” adjective can
often appear with both copulas, but with a corresponding difference in meaning: ser feliz
‘to have a happy disposition’, estar feliz ‘to be happy (at the moment)’.
The distinction between these two types of adjectives can easily be characterised as
a difference in the relation between the higher-order eventuality (the predicate) and the
subject of the clause. With adjectives that select for ser, the subject is described as being
characterised by the state profiled by the adjective, as follows:¹⁰
(114)
being capable
inv
occ
stat
char
… kaˈpaθ…
A predicate adjective denoting an inherent property: Spanish capaz ‘capable’
By contrast, with adjectives that select for estar, the subject is described as being temporarily
in the state profiled by the adjective:
(115)
being barefoot
inv
occ
stat
temp
… ðesˈkalθo…
A predicate adjective denoting a temporary property: Spanish descalzo ‘barefoot’
There is, however, one major class of exceptions, namely perfect participles (or perhaps
“resultative participles”) of verbs: even when these denote stable states, they invariably
take estar, e.g.:
(116) La
def.f
carta
letter
ya
already
est-á
be-3sg.prs
escrit-a
write:pfv.ptcp-f
¹⁰Phonological transcriptions follow Peninsular Spanish phonology, even though my L2 Spanish is closer to
Colombian.
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The letter is already written. (Leonetti Jungl 1994: 194)
This can be accounted for by noting that the configuration of evoked entities in this clause
is different from what has been seen so far: in particular, the clause evokes not only the
state of the letter having been written, but also the event of the letter being written, which
results in this state:
(117) The letter is written.
a. Really? When did that [= someone writing the letter] happen?
This consideration results in the following schema for escrito:¹¹
(118)
being written
invres
occ
stat
… esˈkɾito…
A predicative perfect participle: Spanish escrito ‘written’
Here the box around the subject referent represents the event that results in (“res”) the
state of the subject referent having been written.
Finally, with prepositional-phrase (locative) complements, estar is always used (even
when the location is a permanent one), e.g.:
(119) El
def.m
lago
lake
de
of
Como
C.
est-á
be-3sg.prs
en
in
los
def.m.pl
Alpes
Alps
The lake of Como is in the Alps. (Leonetti Jungl 1994: 196)
Here, the schema for the complement could be diagrammed as follows:
¹¹For convenience, I am ignoring grammatical gender; a proper discussion of how grammatical gender is im-
plemented in the current framework would take us too far astray.
148
6.3. ARGUMENTS
(120)
Alps
occ
stat
loc
… enloˈsalpes…
A predicate prepositional phrase: Spanish en los Alpes ‘in the Alps’
where “loc” stands for a locative relationship between the referents of the subject and
complement.
English schemas for adjectival and locative complements of copulas are (I would argue)
perfectly analogous to the ones above for Spanish; it is simply that the formal distinctions
made in Spanish provide a more obvious motivation for the semantic distinctions high-
lighted above.
6.3.2 Internal structure
We have so far considered schemas for arguments insofar as they differ amongst each other
by the relation between the profiled entity and the other entities in the conceptual content of
the clause. In this subsection, we consider how schemas for arguments differ amongst each
other with respect to their internal semantic structure. In particular, we will be considering
the internal structure of noun phrases.
Let us start by examining the use of the definite and indefinite articles (the and a(n)). As
mentioned in the last chapter, definiteness (or more precisely, identifiability) is a property
of a description, not of an entity; this is why definiteness is indicated in the diagrams by
putting def and indef outside the box corresponding to the profiled entity, not inside. The
definite article the is used to indicate that the profiled entity is uniquely identifiable within
the common ground (e.g. Birner & Ward 1994). Prototypically, uniqueness derives from
the fact that the profiled entity has already been evoked; this is illustrated in the following
example from Chafe (1994: 93–94):
(121) (…)
d(B) well Í hèard of an élephant,
e(B) .. that sát dówn on a V̀Ẃ one time.
149
6.3. ARGUMENTS
(…)
q(B) … and the .. élephant was in frónt of em,
r(B) so he jùst procèeded to sìt dòwn on the V̀Ẃ.
Here both the elephant and the VW are introduced into the discourse using indefinite noun
phrases; but once they have been textually evoked, they arementioned later in the discourse
using definite noun phrases, as they can be uniquely identified by virtue of having been
evoked.
The above suggests a schema such as the following for the=èlephant (ignoring for sim-
plicity the syntagmatic context of the noun phrase):
(122)
elephant A ∋
def
ðiˌɛlɪfənt
Anaphoric use of the definite article
As before, A stands for “the set of entities that are currently active, i.e. have already been
evoked”. In previous diagrams, the content of the semantic pole would have been written
as “elephant ∈ A”; here the A is enclosed in a circle to make it clear that it is an entity
that is part of the conceptual content of the noun phrase, but is not evoked by it. Also, the
set-membership sign has the outer box as its source, rather than the word “elephant”, to
make it clear that it is the profiled entity (and not some subset thereof) that belongs to the
set of active entities.
(Demonstratives—such as this and that—are analogous to the above use of the, except
that the profiled entity may be discourse-new, and is uniquely identifiable by virtue of its
location with respect to the deictic centre.)
Of course, not all instances of the definite article are in noun phrases that refer to
previously-evoked entities. Consider an example such as the following (Birner & Ward
1994: 94):
(123) I hated that book. The author is an idiot.
Here, the entity profiled by the author has not been evoked in the previous discourse—but
a related entity (the book) has been. Here, the use of the definite article indicates that
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the profiled entity is an attribute of some entity which has already been evoked; this is
shown in the following schema for the=áuthor (again omitting the syntagmatic context for
convenience):
(124)
author A
attr
∋
def
ðiˈɒːθɜ
Associative use of the definite article
This usage of the definite article is sometimes called “associative anaphora” (anaphore as-
sociative in French: Kleiber 1999); Chafe (1994: 96) uses the term “indirect sharing” to refer
to the kind of identifiability involved.
Turning now to indefinite articles, we note that it is necessary to distinguish between
“specific” and “nonspecific” indefinites, as in the two interpretations ofÓllie hopes=to=màrry=a
blónde discussed in the previous chapter (see Langacker 1991: 103). Traditionally, specificity
is said to be about whether the speaker “has in mind” a particular referent for the profiled
entity (in this case, whether the speaker has in mind a particular blonde). More specific-
ally, a specific indefinite is said to refer to an entity that the speaker has in mind but the
hearer doesn’t, whereas a nonspecific indefinite is said to refer to an entity that neither the
speaker nor the hearer have in mind. Specific and nonspecific indefinites are often seen in
a paradigmatic relationship with definites, which supposedly refer to an entity that both
speaker and hearer have in mind; this is convenient, as it allows specificity and definite-
ness to be defined in terms of the same underlying constructs (this approach is taken in
Langacker 2010b).
However, there are various problems with the formulation of specificity in terms of
“what the speaker has in mind”. As noted by Higginbotham (1987: 64) (cited in von Heu-
singer 2002: §4.4):
In typical cases specific uses are said to involve a referent that the speaker
‘has in mind.’ But this condition seems much too strong. Suppose my friend
George says to me, ‘I met with a certain student of mine today.’ Then I can
report the encounter to a third party by saying, ‘George said that he met with
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a certain student of his today,’ and the ‘specificity’ effect is felt, although I am
in no position to say which student George met with.
Indeed, the sentence Óllie hòpes=to màrry=a blónde can be used with the specific-indefinite
reading as long as Ollie knows which blonde he hopes to marry, even if the speaker has no
idea.
Moreover, definites can be either specific—the more common case—or nonspecific, as
in von Heusinger (2002: 253): They’ll never find the man that will please them.
A more fruitful approach would probably be one stated in terms of mental spaces, e.g.
the analysis in Fauconnier (1985) of the following example (cf. Langacker 1991: 104–105,
which follows exactly this approach):
(125) John Paul hopes that a former quarterback will adopt needy children.
According to Fauconnier (1985: 23), “the space-builder is John Paul hopes, there are two
spaces M, M′, and the connector F maps “reality” onto “hopes.” If the noun phrase a former
quarterback sets up w directly in M′, then w has no counterpart in M; that is, no “real”
quarterback is set up (the so-called nonspecific reading). If the noun phrase sets up a trigger
w in M and a target w′ in M′, then a “real” quarterback, w, is set up, with a counterpart in
M′ (the specific reading)”. In other words, in the mental spaces framework, the difference
between a specific and a nonspecific indefinite is a matter of whether the profiled entity
exists in “reality”, or only exists in a non-real mental space (such as that set up by a predicate
of wanting or hoping).
Drawing on these insights, I would propose the following schema for the nonspecific
indefinite reading of blónde in contexts such as Óllie hòpes=to màrry=a blónde:¹²
¹²Note that in this type of sentence, the main evoked eventuality contains within it a state of affairs (e.g. that
which is hoped for), which in turn contains other evoked entities. This can be seen from evidence such as the
following:
(1) Ollie hopes to marry a blonde.
a. That [= Ollie’s marrying a blonde] would surprise me. [state of affairs]
b. That [= Ollie marrying a blonde] is not likely to happen. [eventuality]
c. That [= marrying a blonde] isn’t as easy as it seems. [higher-order eventuality]
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(126)
blonde R ∌
indef
inv
occ
occ
stat
… … … ˈblɔnd
Nonspecific indefinite: Óllie hòpes=to màrry=a blónde
Here, R stands for the “reality” mental space.
Thus far, I have not discussed plural noun phrases, and have been diagramming only
examples involving singular reference; this has made possible the convenient (though im-
plicit) assumption that every meaningful expression profiles just a single entity. However,
it should be intuitively clear that any plural noun phrase textually evokesmultiple entities—
and that, since these entities are the “outermost” ones in terms of conceptual content, the
profile consists of multiple entities. This is diagrammed as follows for the noun phrase
the=dógs:
(127)
dog1 dog2 ⋯ dogn
def
ðəˈdɔɡz
A plural noun phrase: the=dógs
As indicated by the dashed box, definiteness (i.e. unique identifiability) is a property of the
whole set of profiled entities, not of each individual profiled entity.
Number, thus characterised, is something that can vary continuously from 1 to ∞—or
be indeterminate. However, we need to capture the fact that most languages divide up the
space of “number” into discrete categories: for example, in English, all quantities greater
than 1 are treated as somehow “the same” for the purposes of grammatical agreement (i.e.,
as belonging to the category “plural”). I would propose to notate this using “outside-the-
box” annotations in the same vein as def/indef: grammatical number, like definiteness, is
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a property of the description of a set of entities, rather than of the entities themselves. Thus,
a plural noun phrase such as the=dógs will henceforth be diagrammed as follows:
dogs
def:pl
ðəˈdɔɡz
where it must be understood that the profile consists of multiple entities, not just one.
Having considered plurals, it is now possible to discuss quantifiers—and in particular,
numerals. (Other quantifiers will not be discussed here, for lack of space.) When quantify-
ing a noun, numerals do not have a profile of their own; in this respect, they behave just
like articles or demonstratives:¹³
(128) Thrèe cáts èntered the=ròom.
a. #That [= the number 3] is a prime number.
b. They [= the cats] were all black.
Large numerals, however, often turn the noun phrase into a phrase that evokes a numeral
and a quantity in addition to profiling a multiplicity of entities:
(129) The=petítion=was sìgned by=a=thóusand twò=hundred=and=forty stúdents.
a. That [= 1240] is a suspiciously round number. [numeral]
b. That [= 1240 students] is a lot of students! [quantity]
c. They [= the students] were protesting against an increase in tuition fees.[entit-
ies]
(Note that the quantity ‘1240 students’ is treated as singular, not plural.) Such numerically-
quantified noun phrases are thus quite similar to measure phrases of the following kind:
(130) We=bòught thrée kìlos=of grápes.
¹³Before proceeding, it is worth saying something about pluralia tantum, such as trousers or scissors, which are
formally plural yet cannot be quantified by numerals (*five trousers, *three scissors—leaving aside the fact that
in some dialects, these expressions could be pressed into service to mean ‘five pairs of trousers’ or ‘three
pairs of scissors’). I would propose that pluralia tantum are like regular plurals in that they profile multiple
entities (e.g. individual trouser legs or scissor arms); however, unlike with regular plurals, these entities are
not all conceived as identical (since they come in complementary, matching pairs, e.g. left and right trouser
legs). Numeral quantifiers presuppose that the entities profiled by the noun phrase are conceived of as being
identical, and so they cannot apply to pluralia tantum.
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a. Isn’t that [= three kilos] too much weight for someone your age to carry?[meas-
ure]
b. That [= three kilos of grapes] is a lot for three people to eat! [quantity]
c. They [= the grapes] are in the bag. [entities]
We will now consider constituents of the noun phrase which, unlike articles, demon-
stratives and (small) numerals, have their own profile—starting with adjectives. As men-
tioned in the previous chapter, adjectives (whether attributive or predicative) profile a
(higher-order) state; see §5.2.4 for examples. The following is a schema for the attributive
adjective táll used to modify a noun in object position:
(131)
being tall
char
inv
occ
stat
… … …ˈtɒːl
An attributive adjective (tall) modifying an object
Some apparent “adjectives”, however, do not have a profile of their own, and are basically
(parts of) determiners: e.g. old (or ol’), nice, little (or li’l), great, etc.:
(132) I=had=a=nìce shówer.
a. #That [= being nice] is typical of your showers.
Prepositional phrases that modify a noun (as in the football under the table) can be ana-
lysed in a manner that is exactly analogous to the analysis of adjectives above. Here is
a schema for under=the=táble, where the prepositional phrase modifies a noun in object
position (as in Jóhn caught=sìght=of=the fóotball under=the=táble):
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(133)
under the table
loc
inv
occ
stat
… … ɐndəðəˈteibl ̩…
A prepositional phrase (under=the=táble) modifying an object
Finally, let us consider the marking of possession. Pronominal possessive pronouns
(my, your, etc.) are just like other determiners in that they do not have their own pro-
file (since they are phonologically bound). One detail needs to be mentioned, namely the
distinction between its and the “associative anaphora” usage of the, which also arguably
involves a kind of possessive relationship. The possessive pronoun seems to imply a rela-
tionship of “characterisation” between the possessum and the possessor, which is absent
with the definite article:
(134) I examined the sword.
a. Its hilt was rusty.
b. The hilt was rusty.
(135) I went to the door.
a. # Its knob had some engravings on it.
b. The knob had some engravings on it.
The hilt of a sword is capable of being a distinctive, characteristic part of it, to a greater
extent than the knob of a door.
When a possessor is expressed by a noun phrase, rather than by a bound pronoun, it
takes a special possessive form that is marked by the clitic =’s. The following is a schema
for bòy’s when it modifies a noun in object position (as in Jóhn lòoked=at=the bòy’s shóes):
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(136)
boy def
poss
inv
occ
stat
… … …ˌboɪz
A possessive noun (bòy’s) modifying an object
6.4 Adjuncts
So far, the sentence constituents we have been considering all profile entities within the
(lower-order) eventuality—in other words, they are arguments. This section considers ad-
juncts, which profile an entity that is outside the eventuality. Many adjuncts specify the
time or location of some occurrence of the eventuality (e.g. Yesterday, I stayed home; Under the table,
there was a cat). The following is a schema for yésterday, used on its own as a full IU that
precedes an IU that profiles an eventuality:
(137)
occ
yesterday ⊃
stat
ˈjɛstədeɪ …
Yésterday,…
Note that, following the principle of locality of selection, nothing is specified about the
internal structure of the following IU; all that is specified is that the two IUs together tex-
tually evoke a state of affairs that is built out of the temporal location profiled by yésterday
and the eventuality profiled by the following IU, and environmentally evoke an utterance
of the appropriate kind.
Aside from lexical time adverbials such as yésterday, another way of specifying a time
is to use an adverbial clause, as in Befòre=the Ròmans inváded,…. The following is a schema
for an (intransitive) adverbial clause with befòre=the:
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(138)
invdef
before
⊃
occ
stat
……bəˌfoðə …
[Befòre=the Sbj Pred],…
Note that an adverbial clause, unlike a (main) finite clause, does not evoke a state of affairs; it
does evoke an eventuality, and its profile is a time before the occurrence of that eventuality:
(139) Befòre=the Ròmans inváded…
a. # I didn’t know that [= the fact that the Romans invaded] until last year, you
know. [state of affairs]
b. That [= the Romans invading] happened in 43 ad, I think. [eventuality]
c. That [= the time before the Romans invaded] must have been a relatively
uneventful period! [time]
Also, as indicated in the diagram above, there isn’t any constituent within the adverbial
clause that profiles the eventuality; one might think that Ròmans inváded profiles it in the
example above, but there is no obvious reason for treating this as a constituent phonolo-
gically.
Conditionals (e.g. If they leave,…) are formally parallel to adverbial clauses, but differ in
that instead of profiling a time, they profile a (potential) state of affairs.
(140) If=théy léave, wé’ll lèave as=wèll.
a. In fact, that [= their leaving] is the only circumstance under which we’ll leave.
6.5 Movement and deletion
Given the central importance of the (Extended) Content Requirement in the current frame-
work, it is important to address syntactic phenomena that have traditionally been analysed
in terms of “movement” or “deletion”, i.e. as requiring a distinction between “deep structure”
and “surface structure” (as first proposed in Chomsky 1965). The problem of describing such
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phenomena in a monostratal framework (i.e. one that eschews derivations) is hardly a new
one; HPSG, for example, makes use of a “slash” feature (possibly inspired by the nota-
tion of Categorial Grammar, e.g. Lambek 1958) to indicate that a constituent is “missing a
piece inside” that needs to be supplied at a higher level of syntactic structure (Pollard & Sag
1994: 159). In Cognitive Grammar (and construction grammar more generally), however,
such issues have received relatively little attention (though see e.g. Langacker 1991: 465–466
on wh-movement, and Langacker 2008a: 211–214 on relative-clause extraposition).
In this section, we start with the analysis of wh-questions and the attendant island con-
straints, before moving to relative clauses, topicalisation, clefts, and ellipsis.
6.5.1 Wh-questions and island constraints
Wh-questions differ from declarative sentences primarily in terms of the utterance that they
environmentally evoke. In particular, rather than evoking the product of an act of “saying”,
they evoke the product of an act of “asking”: a question, rather than a statement. Apart
from this, wh-questions evoke the same sorts of entities as declarative sentences do. This
is illustrated as follows:
(141) Whó=was Jòhn tálking=to?
a. I think she [= the person he was talking to] already left. [actant]
b. …and does he think I would enjoy that [= talking to that person] as well?[higher-
order eventuality]
c. It [= him talking to that person] seems to have kept him quite amused. [lower-
order eventuality]
d. It [= the fact that he was talking to that person] worries me slightly. [state of
affairs]
e. You know why I’m asking that [= the question of who he was talking to], right?
[question]
Note that the state of affairs profiled by the above question contrasts John’s talking to the
person who he actually talked to with the (counterfactual) possibility of John’s talking to
someone else instead; in other words, it could be glossed as “the fact that John was talking
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to that person rather than to anyone else”. By the definitions laid out in §5.5, this means that
the profile of the wh-phrase (who, or rather whó=was) is a focus. Here, then, is a schema for
the wh-phrase whó=was (it is typical for a wh-phrase to have an encliticised auxiliary, and
possibly also an encliticised bound subject pronoun, as in Whó=were=you tálking=to?):¹⁴
(142)
inv
someone
foc
occ
E ⊂S >
q
……ˈhuwəz
[Whó=was Sbj Pred?]
(Obviously, not every combination of awh-wordwith an encliticised auxiliary needs to have
its own first-order schema; some less-frequent combinations may be derived from more-
frequent ones by means of the appropriate second-order schemas. Cf. the discussion of
“paradigms” on p. 129.) The important thing to notice in this schema is how the “movement”
of the wh-phrase out of the verb phrase (e.g. “[tálking=to _]”) is represented. The point is
that the verb (e.g. tálking=to) profiles a higher-order eventuality (e.g. “talking to a particular
person”) even though one of the entities within its conceptual content (e.g. the person who
is being talked to) has its conceptual content supplied by a separate constituent (the wh-
phrase). This is indicated in the diagram by representing the entity profiled by the wh-
phrase twice: once outside the higher-order eventuality but inside the lower-order one,
where its conceptual content is directly specified and it is evoked; and once inside the
higher-order eventuality, where it is not evoked, and its conceptual content is specified by
a correspondence with the entity as it appears outside the higher-order eventuality. In a
sense, the second representation of the entity, which is conceptually dependent on the first,
is analogous to a “gap”, “trace”, or slash feature.
A topic that is nearly always discussed in the context of wh-questions is that of “island
constraints”—the observation (since at least J. R. Ross 1967) that the wh-phrase may be
extracted from some constituents but not others. For example, the following (Ambridge &
¹⁴Note that since the clause is necessarily in the past progressive, the event time needs to be specified as being
prior to the speech time (S > E), and as being contained in the eventuality (E ⊂), rather than containing it (as
is usual).
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Goldberg 2008: 358) is a violation of a supposed island constraint against extracting from
noun phrases:
(143) * Who did he just read the report that was about _?
Over the years, many explanations of island constraints have been proposed: in terms of
innate constraints (Chomsky 1964), processing (Kluender & Kutas 1993), attention (Deane
1991), information structure (Erteschik-Shir 1973; Goldberg 2006), and “expectation” (Chaves
2013), to name a few. Space does not permit a fuller consideration of these approaches here;
moreover, the approach proposed below is not intended as a response to any particular ex-
isting approach, but rather as the simplest account that makes use of only the descriptive
constructs permitted in the current framework.
I would propose that a wh-phrase can only be extracted from a constituent in the same
IU; or, to put it in a way that is more consistent with the Content Requirement, the profile
of a wh-phrase can only correspond to an entity in the conceptual content of its own IU.¹⁵
To see this, consider the following contrast (based on Deane 1991: 9):
(144) a. Who did you read a book about?
b. * Who did you lose a book about?
In both cases, the profile of the wh-phrase is made to correspond to an entity in the concep-
tual content of the noun phrase profiling the book; and this noun phrase is clearly in the
same IU as the wh-phrase. However, if we look at the corresponding declarative structures,
we see a different picture (again based on the examples in Deane 1991: 9):
(145) a. I=rèad=a bòok=about Jòhn Írving.
b. I=lòst a=bòok=about Jòhn Írving.
The first sentence has an essentially continuous intonation contour, whereas the second
features a sharp discontinuity—more specifically, a “downstep” or resetting of the pitch to
a lower level—between I=lòst and a=bòok=about. This, combined with other factors such as
the lack of a boundary tone on I=lòst, the possibility of a faster speech rate on a=bòok=about
Jòhn Írving, and indeed the failure of a to encliticise to the preceding verb, suggests that
a=bòok=about Jòhn Írving is actually a full IU that is embedded within the larger IU that
¹⁵There may of course be variation in how an utterance can be split up into IUs (e.g. Cruttenden 1997: 37), and
so this proposal should be taken with the appropriate qualifications.
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comprises the whole sentence. The idea that one IU may be embedded in another is not
accommodated in the framework of Chafe (1994) or in Conversation Analysis—and in fair-
ness, it may not be necessary for describing most natural speech, as can be seen from Croft
(1995)—but it is standard inmany formal approaches to intonational phonology (e.g. Astruc-
Aguilera & Nolan 2007), and is obviously useful for describing “parentheticals”, among
many other constructions.
To return to the example, certain verbs seem to favour an object consisting of an em-
bedded IU, whereas others allow for an object that is in the same IU as the verb. This is true
in questions as well as statements:
(146) a. Whén=did=you rèad=a bòok=about Jòhn Írving?
b. Whén=did=you lòse a=bòok=about Jòhn Írving?
(Note again the discontinuity between lòse and a=bòok=about in the second sentence.) Thus,
the reason why *Who did you lose a book about? is unacceptable would be that there is
no way of sanctioning a wh-question usage of lose where the object is in the same IU as
the verb (as would be required by the proposed constraint), given that virtually all other
relevant usages of lose have the object in an embedded IU.
6.5.2 Relative clauses
Relative clauses come in three varieties: restrictive, nonrestrictive, and adjoined. The
terms “restrictive” and “nonrestrictive” are familiar from traditional grammar; Langacker
(1991: 419) illustrates this distinction with the following examples:
(147) a. She told a funny story which greatly amused me. [restrictive]
b. She told a funny story, which greatly amused me. [nonrestrictive]
Themain difference lies in whether the relative clause (which greatly amused me) lies inside
or outside the noun phrase profiling the funny story; apart from this, in terms of conceptual
content the two sentences are equivalent. Langacker (1991: 419) notes that “[the nonres-
trictive example] has another interpretation, whereby which does not refer to the story
but rather to the fact that she told it. This latter construction defies traditional classifica-
tion”. Accordingly, the term “adjoined relative clause” has been adopted, following Croft
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(1995: 843–844), from descriptions of similar phenomena in Australian languages. (The term
“sentential relative clause” is also used—e.g. Brinton 2000: 215—but I was unaware of this
at the time of writing.)
Common to all three types of relative clause is the fact that they all occupy an IU of their
own. Let us consider each in turn. Restrictive relative clauses are prosodically embedded
within the noun phrase that they modify. The following is a schema for that=Jòhn in a
context such as The=bóok that=Jòhn wróte is=quìte pópular (note that that=Jòhn wróte is
spoken at a lower pitch than the surrounding material):
(148)
inv
John
occ
stat
…ðətˌdʒɔn…
Subject of a restrictive relative clause: …[that=JòhnSbj Pred]RC…
Note that, following locality of selection, the internal structure of the IU in which the relat-
ive clause is embedded is not specified, except for one entity that corresponds to an entity
in the conceptual content of the relative clause—namely, the profile of the noun phrase that
is being modified. The reader may doubt that a relative clause profiles a state of affairs,
based on data such as the following:
(149) The book that John wrote is quite popular.—#His adviser actually doubts that [= the
fact that John wrote that book].
However, the reason that the above does not work is that the sentence containing the ana-
phor does not immediately follow the IU that comprises the relative clause. Adjusting the
example accordingly improves acceptability:
(150) The book that John wrote—his adviser actually doubts that (fact), for some reason—
is quite popular.
In addition to schemas for restrictive relative clauses themselves, it is also necessary to
have schemas for noun phrases that contain a restrictive relative clause (since one cannot
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occur without the other). The following is a schema for the=bóok followed by a restrictive
relative clause, the whole serving as the subject in a transitive clause:
(151)
invdef
occ
stat
………ðəˈbʊk
Head of a restrictive relative clause (the=bóok), in subject position
Note that, again by locality of selection, there is no specification of the internal structure
of the relative clause, except that there is some (unevoked) entity within its conceptual
content that corresponds to the profile of the noun phrase headed by the=bóok.
Nonrestrictive relative clauses are “parenthetically embedded” within a clause. This
means that the clause within which the relative clause is phonologically embedded does
not feature the conceptual content of the relative clause in any way; in other words, a
nonrestrictive relative clause is an “aside” which can be removed with no effect whatsoever
on the semantic pole of themain clause. Here, then, is a schema forwhìch in a nonrestrictive
relative transitive clause with the gap in object position:
(152)
inv
3sg.n
occ
stat
……ˌwɪtʃ
Subject of a nonrestrictive relative clause (whìch)
stat
… …
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Note that the only specification of the “matrix” IU is the constituent that corresponds se-
mantically to the relative pronoun, i.e. the noun phrase that the relative clause modifies
(which must immediately precede the relative clause).
Adjoined relative clauses can be analysed in a very similar way:
(153)
inv
A∈
occ
stat
……ˌwɪtʃ
stat
…
Subject of an adjoined relative clause (whìch)
(In the sample of discourse used by Croft 1995, all adjoined relative clauses have the relative
pronoun in subject position; accordingly, this is the configuration that is diagrammed here.)
In other words, the relative pronoun whìch, when used in an adjoined relative clause, is
an anaphor that is constrained to be coreferent with the state of affairs profiled by the
preceding statement.
Before leaving the topic of relative clauses, let us consider relative clause extraposition
(see Kuno & Takami 2004 and Francis & Michaelis 2014 for some recent approaches; the
present approach is quite different, however). It is necessary to distinguish between two
types of relative clause extraposition, depending on whether the noun phrase modified by
the relative clause is definite or indefinite:
(154) a. The=pízza=is hère that=you=órdered.
b. A=mán=is hère, who=would=lìke=to sée=you.
Definite relative clause extraposition requires that the modified noun phrase be the last
complete constituent (i.e. meaning-bearing unit) that precedes the relative clause; indefinite
relative clause extraposition has no such restriction:
(155) a. * The=pízza=is búrnt that=you=órdered.
b. A=mán was=just=admìring=the gárden, who=would=lìke=to sée=you.
Note that (154a) is a thetic sentence, and thus does not evoke a higher-order eventuality;
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thus the only complete meaning-bearing unit that precedes that=you=órdered is the=pízza,
which is the noun phrase modified by the relative clause. On the other hand, (155a) is a
categorical sentence; is=búrnt profiles a higher-order eventuality, and is the last complete
meaning-bearing unit before the relative clause. Since this is not the modified noun phrase,
relative clause extraposition fails.
In accordance with the above analysis, here is a schema for the complementiser in a
relative clause extraposed from a definite noun phrase:
(156)
inv
2sg
occdef
stat
…ˌðætju… adj…
Extraposition of a relative clause from a definite noun phrase: [thàt=you Pred]RC
Here the phonological pole of the noun phrase is specified as being “adjacent” to the phono-
logical pole of the relative clause, in the sense defined above. Note that there are two “gaps”,
one in the semantic pole of the noun phrase, which is filled by the state of affairs profiled
by the relative clause, and one in the semantic pole of the relative clause, which is filled by
the entity profiled by the noun phrase. Note also that even though the complementiser is
procliticised to the subject pronoun, the resulting word does not profile the second-person
singular referent. (The reader’s intuition may differ on this last point; but it would not
affect the analysis in any fundamental way.)
Likewise, here is a schema for the complementiser in a relative clause extraposed from
an indefinite noun phrase:
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(157)
inv
2sg
occindef
stat
…ˌðætju… ……
Extraposition of a relative clause from an indefinite noun phrase
The only difference between this schema and the previous one (apart from the definiteness
of the modified noun phrase) is that there is no longer any specified relation (besides simple
anteriority) between the phonological poles of the noun phrase and relative clause.
6.5.3 Topicalisation
“Topicalisation” in English is prototypically exemplified by sentences such as Bágels, I=líke
(see the discussion of this example in Chafe 1994: 84). Yet the “topic” in this sentence (bágels)
does not fit the definition of “topic” used in the current framework; as noted by Chafe
(1994: 84), “the bagels [are] ‘preposed’ to heighten their contrastiveness, presumably with
other foods that I don’t like”—i.e., the preposed constituent is actually a focus.
It is worth examining this contrastiveness more closely, in terms of what is affirmed and
what is denied. The clause Bágels I=líke might occur in a context such as Ì=don’t génerally
lìke Jèwish=food—but=bágels I=líke. Here, the referent of bágels in the affirmed state of
affairs is contrasted with Jewish food as a whole in the denied state of affairs. In general,
in this construction the entity profiled by the focus is contrasted with a set that contains
it; I thus propose to call this “element focus”. Accordingly, a schema for bágels in such
an element-focus construction might look as follows (where “ele-foc” is shorthand for
“element focus”):
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(158)
inv
bagels
ele-foc
occ
stat
……ˈbeɪɡlz̩
Left-dislocation: “element focus”
A “true” case of topicalisation would be an example such as the following:
(159) Thèse=things you=hàve=to stúdy (…no one learns them without effort).
Here, the profiled state of affairs contrasts something that is true (that you have to study
these things) with something that is false (that people can learn these things without effort);
importantly, the profile of thèse=things is shared between the two, and is hence a topic.
A schema for thèse=things as a topicalised object in a transitive clause would thus be as
follows:
(160)
inv
things
top
foc occ
stat
……ˌðizθɪŋz
A topicalised noun phrase: thèse=things
6.5.4 Clefts
Clefts may be exemplified by It’s=bágels that=I=líke. Clefts are usually considered to be ca-
nonical argument-focus constructions (see discussion in Lambrecht 1994); thus, the above
example would be equivalent to (one reading of) I=lìke bágels. However, these two con-
structions are not exactly equivalent, as can be seen from the following examples:
(161) What do you usually like for breakfast?
a. # It’s=bágels that=I=líke.
b. I=lìke bágels.
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(162) You usually like pancakes for breakfast, right?
a. # Nò, it’s=bágels that=I=líke.
b. Nò, I=lìke bágels.
(163) You usually like pancakes rather than bagels, right?
a. Nò, it’s=bágels that=I=líke.
b. Nò, I=lìke bágels.
Clearly, a cleft requires that the focused constituent profile an entity that has already been
evoked, and moreover, that this entity be contrasted with another entity that has already
been evoked. I will refer to this type of focus as “replacive focus”. A schema for the focus
it’s=bágels would thus be as follows:
(164)
occ
bagels
rep-foc
stat
ɪtsˈbeɪɡlz̩ …
A clefted noun phrase: It’s=bágels that=I=líke
Note that the portion after the focus is an embedded IU; this can be seen from the sharp
intonational discontinuity in the example sentence:
(165) It’s=bágels
that=I=líke.
6.5.5 Ellipsis
A final topic that is traditionally analysed in terms of transformations is “ellipsis”, or more
generally, “surface anaphora” (a term introduced by Hankamer & Sag 1976). The most
widely-studied type of surface anaphora is “VP ellipsis” (also called “Post-Auxiliary Ellipsis”
in Sag 1976: 53), illustrated by examples such as Did you remember to get the milk?—Yes I
did _ (P. Miller & Pullum 2013: ex. 2d). Like other kinds of surface anaphora, VP ellipsis is
generally believed to constrain not only the meaning of the antecedent (as is the case with
pronouns and other “deep” anaphora) but also the syntactic form of the antecedent (in this
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case, as a VP). A consequence of this is that the antecedent must be expressed linguistically,
and not merely be inferable from context (examples from Hankamer & Sag 1976: 392):
(166) a. [Hankamer attempts to stuff a 9-inch ball through a 6-inch hoop]
Sag: #It’s not clear that you’ll be able to.
b. Hankamer: I’m going to stuff this ball through this hoop.
Sag: It’s not clear that you’ll be able to.
While it is clear that VP ellipsis generally requires that the antecedent be linguistic (though
see P. Miller & Pullum 2013 for an important class of exceptions), there are many attested
cases where the antecedent does not take the form of a VP, e.g. the following examples (P.
Miller & Pullum 2013: ex. 8):
(167) a. Actually I have implemented it [= a computer system] with a manager, but it
doesn’t have to be [implemented with a manager]. (Kehler 2000: 549, (24))
b. Mubarak’s survival is impossible to predict and, even if he does [survive], his
plan to make his son his heir apparent is now in serious jeopardy. [COCA: CBS
Evening News]
This leads one to suspect that the constraints on the antecedent of VP ellipsis are in fact
semantic rather than syntactic. Indeed, in the present framework, it makes sense to say that
the antecedent of VP ellipsis is required to be a textually-evoked higher-order eventuality.
Accordingly, here is a schema for the sentence He=díd:
(168)
At∈
inv
3sg.m
occ
E ⊃S >
stat
hiˈdɪd
VP ellipsis: He=díd _
This does not, however, address the question of how to analyse cases where there is
no linguistic VP antecedent, since it still needs to be shown that there is something in the
previous discourse that evokes the appropriate higher-order eventuality. Let us consider, in
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particular, cases of “voice mismatch”, where (for example) the clause exhibiting VP ellipsis
is active, whereas the clause containing the antecedent is passive. Kertz (2008) notes that
only some such cases are acceptable (exx. 3, 1):¹⁶
(169) a. A lot of this material can be skipped, and often I do.
b. #The material was skipped by the instructors, and the TAs did too.
To explain this pattern of acceptability, let us note that in the first example, the antecedent
would have to be the higher-order eventuality “skipping a lot of this material”. It may at first
appear that there is nothing in the antecedent clause which evokes this entity—but note that
the clause evokes a lower-order eventuality of the form “a lot of this material being skipped”.
A moment’s reflection reveals that the two are absolutely indistinguishable semantically;
thus, the correct antecedent for the VP ellipsis is in fact provided by the semantic structure
of the previous clause.
For the second (unacceptable) example, the antecedent would have to be the higher-
order eventuality “skipping the material”. This is indeed not evoked by the clause The ma-
terial was skipped by the instructors; the only eventualities that it evokes are “the material
being skipped by the instructors” and “being skipped by the instructors”.
To the above analysis it needs to be added that the subject in the clause exhibiting VP
ellipsis must be understood as being an agent—otherwise, there would be no unambiguous
way of integrating it with the higher-order eventuality from the previous clause.
It is necessary at this point to say something about the analysis of do it and do so, which
are considered to be cases of “deep anaphora”, which do not require an antecedent with
a particular syntactic structure. Since the proposed analysis of VP ellipsis has dispensed
with the deep/surface anaphor distinction, it remains to account for the differences in usage
between do it and do so on the one hand, and do _ on the other. As noted by P. Miller &
Pullum (2013: ex. 10), all examples of VP ellipsis fall into either the category of “Auxiliary-
Choice” or the category of “Subject-Choice”, depending on whether the auxiliary or the
subject is stressed. In contexts which do not call for either of these types of focus, VP
ellipsis is unacceptable, and a “deep anaphor” must be used (P. Miller & Pullum 2013: exx.
¹⁶While Kertz (2008) shows experimentally that sentences such as (169a) are preferred over sentences such as
(169b), this does not necessarily mean that the former are fully acceptable in an absolute sense. This partial
(or variable) acceptability will ultimately have to be accounted for.
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12, 14):
(170) A. He shops in women’s.
B. No, he doesn’t. [COCA] [Auxiliary-Choice]
#No, he doesn’t do it /this /that.
(171) A. He shops in women’s.
B. He never does it alone. / He does it all the time. / He does it because that’s the
only place he can find things his size. [≠ Auxiliary- or Subject-Choice]
#He never does alone. / #He does all the time. / #He does because that’s the
only place he can find things his size.
In addition it must be noted that do so differs from do it in that it requires that the
antecedent be textually (rather than environmentally) evoked (Houser 2010), and that the
evoked (lower-order) eventuality be identical to the one evoked by the clause containing
the antecedent (P. Miller 2011: 91):
(172) [Hei recently retired as vice president of technology standards at Sony Electronics]j.
[Hei did so]j because the Stooges need him again.
Indeed, it appears that the antecedent of do so is not in fact a higher-order eventuality, but
rather a lower-order one. Accordingly, here is a schema for he=díd=so:
(173)
inv
3sg.mA∈
occ
E ⊃S >
stat
hiˈdɪdsoʊ
Overt VP anaphora: He=díd=so
Another type of ellipsis is what is known as NP anaphora, instantiated in English by
(among other possibilities) “anaphoric one” (example from Goldberg & Michaelis 2016: 2):
(174) Chris found a job and Pat found one, too.
It is often assumed that anaphoric one is a surface anaphor whose antecedent is required
to be an N′ constituent (i.e. a noun phrase minus its determiner). However, as has been
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pointed out by a number of researchers (see Goldberg & Michaelis 2016: 4–5 for a review
and examples), it can just as easily represent a bare nominal, a noun phrase minus a com-
plement, a discontinuous phrase, a subpart of a compound word, or an environmentally
evoked entity. I would propose (see Goldberg & Michaelis 2016 for a similar proposal) that
the antecedent of anaphoric one is a set of entities, usually a type-mass (i.e. the set of all
entities conforming to a particular description).¹⁷ This can be seen for the above example
as follows:
(175) Chris found a job—they [= jobs] are rather hard to find these days—and Pat found
one, too.
Accordingly, the following is a schema for anaphoric òne:
(176)
A pl∈∈
inv
occ
stat
ˌwɐn……
Anaphoric one in object position
Finally, let us consider ellipsis in responses to wh-questions, as inWhát=did=you búy?—
A=bóx. These structures have so far received little attention in Cognitive Grammar; but
Langacker (p.c., 1 October 2010) writes,
I doubt that a simple answer suffices for the question of what an elliptic
expression profiles. The essence of ellipsis is that an expression is not appre-
hended independently, though locally it appears alone. Possibly, then, what it
profiles depends on whether one considers its full apprehension or focuses on
its local value.
It is possible to give an answer to the question of what an elliptic expression profiles using
the notion of profiling defined in the current framework. It is easy to see that A=bóx in
¹⁷This analysis is only claimed to be valid for the phonologically free anaphoric one; phonologically bound uses
(e.g. thís=one, the=òne=that [Relative Clause]) may need to be analysed differently.
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the above example evokes not only the box itself, but also all of the entities that would
be evoked (textually or environmentally) by the sentence I=bòught=a bóx (and no others).
Thus it follows that A=bóx in this context profiles a state of affairs of the form “the fact that
I bought a box”, and environmentally evokes “the statement that I bought a box”.
More generally, a noun phrase used elliptically as the answer to a wh-question profiles
the same state of affairs as the question, but specifies the focus more precisely as the entity
that would ordinarily be profiled by the noun phrase in the context of a clause. Thus, here
is a schema for the elliptic noun phrase a=bóx, used in response to an object wh-question:
(177)
box
foc:indef
inv
occ
A∈
stat
əˈbɔks
A=bóx as an elliptic answer to a wh-question
6.6 Conclusion
In order to keep the size and complexity of this chapter within reasonable limits, a number
of topics that the framework is capable of handling have been left out: most significantly,
coordination and subordination; comparatives, gapping, and other staples of transforma-
tional grammar; cataphora; and also less widely-discussed but nonetheless important topics
such as compositional idioms (Nunberg, Sag & Wasow 1994) and grammatical constraints
on code-mixing (Di Sciullo, Muysken & Singh 1986).
In this chapter I hope to have shown that it is possible to develop a grammatical frame-
work in accordance with the minimalistic and empirically-grounded ontology laid out in
the previous chapter (with the Extended Content Requirement and the strong IU storage
hypothesis), and that such a grammatical framework achieves a level of descriptive cov-
erage and cognitive plausibility that is arguably no worse than that of current versions of
Cognitive Grammar. Some broader implications are laid out in the next chapter.
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Conclusions
This thesis has been of a rather heterogeneous nature: what started as a series of attempts
to operationalise grammatical analyses in Cognitive Grammar had to be abandoned, and
instead it was found necessary to revise the descriptive framework from the ground up, in
a way that avoids reference to any construct that is not already known to be operation-
alisable. The basic guiding principles of Cognitive Grammar—in particular, the Content
Requirement—are still there; but the elaboration of these principles has led in a very dif-
ferent direction from that taken in Langacker (1987, 1991, 2008a). The previous chapter
attempted to show that this new approach is capable of handling a reasonably wide range
of descriptive phenomena (though a proper demonstration of its adequacy would take con-
siderably more space). This chapter focuses on broader issues: operationalising the frame-
work, application to some recurrent theoretical debates, and its relation to other subdiscip-
lines of linguistics.
7.1 Operationalisation
While in the preceding chapters it was asserted in general terms that the framework ought
to be operationalisable because of the constraints imposed on the kinds of descriptive con-
structs that are allowed, it has not yet been explicitly argued that this operationalisation is
possible. To do so, let us begin by examining the kinds of descriptive constructs that are
used in the framework, and then consider how each of these might be operationalised. We
may classify the descriptive constructs as follows:
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1. Prosodic structure: in particular, the division of speech into intonation units and
phonological words (as well as the embedding of intonation units).
2. Semantic structure, in particular:
(a) Which entities are (textually or environmentally) evoked by an expression (or
presupposed as already having been evoked in the preceding discourse).
(b) Which of the evoked entities are conceptually contained in which others; and
thus, which entities constitute the profile of an expression.
(c) Properties of a description, rather than of a conceived entity or entities, including
i. Identifiability of the profiled entity or entities (i.e. their uniqueness within
the common ground) on the basis of the provided conceptual content.
ii. Agreement features such as person, (grammatical) number and gender.
3. Schema availability: Which of the first-order schemas that could be extracted from a
particular array of usage events are in fact stored in the speaker’s mind; and likewise,
which pairings of first-order schemas gives rise to second-order schemas.
There is already considerable evidence for the psychological reality of prosodic constitu-
ency, particularly at the level of intonation units and phonological words, and accordingly
there are well-established empirical methods for identifying these phonological constitu-
ents. For example, Schuetze-Coburn, Shapley & Weber (1991) show that intonation units
can reliably be identified acoustically in terms of pitch declination (though this is only a
sufficient and not a necessary criterion); and Wheeldon & Lahiri (1997, 2002) show in a
series of ingenious experiments that phonological words are the smallest units of speech
planning, using them to predict latencies in speech production. (Remember, too, the com-
ments in the previous chapter to the effect that studies purporting to find experimental
evidence of syntactic constituency—e.g. Gee & F. Grosjean 1983; F. Grosjean, L. Grosjean
& Lane 1979; Levelt 1970a,b, pace Garrett, Bever & Fodor 1966—actually seem to be opera-
tionalising phonological constituency.)
The question of which entities are evoked by an expression has been addressed in the
preceding chapters by following the expression with a sentence in which the entity that is
hypothesised to be evoked is referred to with an anaphoric pronoun, and judging whether
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this sentence is acceptable. So far, these judgments of acceptability have been mine alone
(following a venerable tradition in theoretical linguistics); but it is not hard to see that
the arguments of the previous two chapters could be tested more rigorously by collecting
acceptability judgments from a large number of linguistically naïve English speakers. In
this case, the methodologies discussed in experimental syntax textbooks such as Schütze
(1996) and Cowart (1997) could be applied without modification.
(In principle it should be possible to apply on-line experimental methodologies such
as the visual world paradigm or cross-modal priming, which have already been used ex-
tensively in the study of anaphora resolution; e.g. Hemforth, Konieczny & Scheepers 2000;
Pyykkönen 2009; Shillcock 1982. However, many of the entities that are hypothesised to be
evoked are highly abstract—e.g. eventualities, states of affairs, and utterances or attitudinal
objects—and thus do not lend themselves to visual depiction, as would be needed in eye-
tracking studies. Likewise, semantic associations of the sort used in priming studies would
likely be too coarse-grained to differentiate between these kinds of abstract entities.)
The remaining aspects of semantic structure (conceptual containment of entities, iden-
tifiability, agreement features) are increasingly hard to operationalise without appeal to
meta-linguistic intuitions; indeed, in the case of agreement features, this is almost defini-
tionally impossible. However, it is possible to frame at least some of these intuitions in a
way that does not presuppose linguistic training. For example, an important type of evid-
ence for whether evoked entity A is conceptually contained in evoked entity B is whether
the expression in question can be paraphrased in such a way that a constituent that profiles
A is phonologically contained in a constituent that profiles B. This kind of reasoning was
used in Chapter 5, e.g. when discussing adverbs: the adverb loudly evokes a manner and a
property of that manner, and we can see that the property is conceptually contained in the
manner because the adverb can be paraphrased as in a loud manner, where the constitu-
ency at the phonological pole mirrors that at the semantic pole. Likewise, for identifiability,
questions of the form “Do you know which X she’s talking about (based on what she told
you about it)?” are highly accessible to intuition, and indeed are discussed as a matter of
course in many everyday interactions.
Finally, operationalising the availability of schemas is a simple matter of measuring the
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frequency with which a schema is instantiated in usage. This may come as a surprise, given
the emphasis placed by Langacker (1987: e.g. 414) on the idea that the strength of a schema
is a function of both its frequency as well as its “elaborative distance” from the usage event
to be sanctioned—i.e., its concreteness or schematicity (see also Nesset 2008: 15, who uses
the term “conceptual overlap” instead of “elaborative distance”). However, in the present
framework, the SEP fixes the level of schematicity of each schema in a very specific way,
meaning that the only axis of variation among schemas is precisely the frequency of their
instantiation. We have not encountered any problems with this approach, and it eliminates
a potentially large amount of arbitrariness in terms of determining the levels of generality
at which schemas should be stated (see Kalyan 2012c: esp. 551 for further discussion). Also
note that, by virtue of the way in which second-order schemas are extracted—by general-
ising over pairs of first-order schemas, rather than directly over usage events—their salience
is necessarily determined by their type frequency rather than their token frequency, which
is exactly what we would expect (Bybee 1985, 2001, inter alia).
7.2 Further theoretical issues
This section dealswith the consequences of the proposed framework for some long-standing
debates in grammatical theory.
7.2.1 Parts of speech
In most grammatical descriptions, words are classified into parts of speech such as noun,
adjective and verb, and the part-of-speech affiliation of each word is taken to predict the
range of constructions in which it may appear. However, Croft (2001) and others have
argued that this approach, taken to its logical conclusion, would result in an unmanage-
ably large number of part-of-speech categories, potentially as many as there are slots in
constructions (see also Culicover 1999: ch. 2; Gross 1979); and that since each language
has its own unique inventory of constructions, the part-of-speech categories of different
languages may be mutually incomparable. Croft thus suggests that rather than assigning
words to parts of speech, it would be more fruitful to approach the description of a lan-
guage by starting with the constructions, and specifying for each construction the range of
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words that can appear in each of its slots. For the purpose of cross-linguistic comparison,
he proposes to define nouns, adjectives and verbs as prototypes involving the conjunction
of a semantic class with a pragmatic function: thus, a (unmarked) noun is a word used for
reference to a (physical) object; an (unmarked) adjective is a word used for modification by
a property; and a (unmarked) verb is a word used for predication of an action. The prag-
matic functions of “reference”, “modification” and “predication” are held to be universal, in
that every language has constructions that serve these functions.
At first glance, it may seem that Croft’s Radical Construction Grammar is at odds with
Cognitive Grammar, in that the latter claims that notions such as noun, adjective and verb
can be given universal definitions that are purely semantic: a noun profiles a thing (a re-
gion in a domain); a verb profiles an uninstantiated (and possibly ungrounded) process; and
an adjective profiles an atemporal relation with a thing as its trajector. However, it is im-
portant to remember that in Cognitive Grammar, “semantics”, by virtue of encompassing
construal as well as conceptual content, covers some of the territory traditionally reserved
for “pragmatics”. Indeed, a closer examination of the uses to which Langacker puts his
definitions of parts of speech reveals that what is being characterised is neither semantic
categories (as traditionally understood) nor distributional classes, but rather the pragmatic
functions of reference, modification, and predication (Croft 2001: 104). This can be seen
from the fact that, e.g., when a verb is used productively in the function of “reference” (as
in the cook or have a drink), the word in question is analysed as profiling a thing (and as
being zero-derived from an identical-looking word that profiles a process); when an adject-
ive is used in the function of “predication” (as in John is tall), it is analysed as profiling a
process (though it is zero-derived from an identical-looking word that profiles an atemporal
relation); and so on. For Langacker, a word is a noun precisely in those contexts where it
is used to profile a thing (i.e., in the function of reference); and nounhood is an inherent
property of the word only to the extent that such a usage is conventionalised. Thus, even
in so-called “pre-categorial” languages where (seemingly) any content word can be used in
any of the three pragmatic functions, it is possible to identify nouns, adjectives and verbs
on the basis of how frequently they are used for reference, modification and predication
(Langacker 2005: esp. 113–121; see e.g. Mosel 2011 for a very similar view).
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The present framework bears important similarities to the above approaches, but differs
in that words are not stored as isolated units in the grammar (and thus cannot be said to
fall into classes). Rather, what is stored is the use of a word in a particular IU pattern.
This means that there is no need to refer to the classification of a word in order to predict
which constructions it may appear in; this information is already captured by the first-
order schemas that show the constructions in which the word has already been attested,
and the second-order schemas that show how its attested range of usage might be extended
to new constructional contexts. This shows that (as argued by Croft 2001) part-of-speech
categories are not necessary for language description; andmoreover, it does so in a way that
directly addresses the question of how constructions are to be identified if not in terms of
parts of speech (the “most frequently asked question about Radical Construction Grammar”,
according to Croft 2001: 51).
As for the typological prototypes of noun, verb and adjective: the pragmatic functions of
reference, modification and predication can be given very precise definitions in the present
framework. In particular:
1. “Reference” is the function served by a word whose corresponding schema does not
specify any semantic relation between the profile of the word and any of the other
entities evoked by the IU (cf. the diagrams for the=bóy—both in subject and object
position—in the previous chapter, and compare these with any of the diagrams for
oblique arguments, verbs, etc.).
2. “Modification” is the function served by a word in whose schema the word’s profile
is immediately contained in an entity serving the “reference” function.
3. “Predication” is the function served by a word (or other constituent) whose schema
specifies a relationship of instantiation between the higher-order eventuality profiled
by the word/constituent and an eventuality that involves it. Cf. any of the schemas
for verb phrases in the previous chapter, and compare with schemas for other types
of constituents.
See further below for more on defining cross-linguistic comparative concepts.
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7.2.2 Lemmas
A concept that is frequently used not only in mainstream grammatical frameworks but
also in most varieties of construction grammar is that of a “lemma”: an abstraction over
the different inflected forms of a noun, adjective or verb, which can serve as a term in a con-
struction schema. E.g., Croft (2001: 26), when illustrating a taxonomic hierarchy of clause
types, includes items such as Sbj sleep , Sbj kiss Obj , and Sbj kick the bucket , which all
involve verb lemmas; such examples could be multiplied indefinitely from publications on
construction grammar and idiomatic language. (The notion of lemma does not seem to
play a prominent rôle in Cognitive Grammar, even notationally; thus I have not cited any
examples from Cognitive Grammar.)
On the surface, the notion of lemma seems perfectly compatible with the Content Re-
quirement; it is simply a schema that abstracts over the semantic and phonological vari-
ation among a set of inflected forms. However, a closer look reveals that things are not so
simple (see Edwards 2016 for a thorough discussion). In particular, how does one draw the
boundaries of a lemma, including all forms that are inflectionally related to a given word,
but excluding forms that are related by derivation, or forms that are not morphologically
related at all, but merely happen to be phonologically and semantically similar? One way
of answering this is to eliminate the problem by pointing out that inflection and deriva-
tion lie along a gradient (Bybee 1985), and defining morphological relatedness as nothing
more than the conjunction of phonological and semantic similarity (Bybee 2001). Yet this
solution is not entirely satisfactory, as it fails to capture the intuition that (e.g.) go and
went are incontrovertibly members of the same lemma, despite being highly unprototyp-
ical in terms of their phonological (dis)similarity. Moreover, appealing to “similarity” is
problematic to begin with, as the notion of similarity is notoriously pliable (Bybee 2010;
Kalyan 2012c; Medin, Goldstone & Gentner 1993); it is of little use to say that two things
are similar without specifying the respects in which they are similar.
In the present framework, it is possible to give a precise definition of “lemma” for verbs
and nouns—or more precisely, verb phrases and noun phrases. Two verb-phrase forms may
be said to belong to the same lemma if they both profile the same higher-order eventuality.
This, then, is what unites go and went: the fact that [go PP] and [went PP] both profile the
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higher-order eventuality “going to [the location profiled by PP]”:
(178) a. We might go to Scotland. We’ve never done that [= going to Scotland] before!
b. Last summer, John went to Scotland. He had never done that before.
More generally, changing the tense andmoodmarking on a verb doesn’t change the profiled
eventuality, and so doesn’t change the lemma; thus we may say that tense and mood are
“inflectional” categories. Changing the aspect, on the other hand, may change the profiled
eventuality (but not always): as we saw in the last chapter, the resultative reading of the
present perfect (as in I’ve (already) eaten my lunch) changes the profile of the verb phrase to
the resultant state of the action. Thus we can say that aspect is sometimes (but not always)
a “derivational” category.
Two noun-phrase forms may be said to belong to the same lemma if they both profile
entities with identical conceptual content. This means that case marking and definiteness
marking are inflectional, as they leave conceptual content unchanged. However, number
marking must be analysed as derivational, because the set of entities profiled by a plural
noun phrase is clearly different from that profiled by the corresponding singular. This
analysis may seem counterintuitive; but note that Langacker (1991: 78–81) analyses plural
noun phrases as having a different type specification from the corresponding singular; and
that cross-linguistically, plural nouns often show a different system of gender classification
from singular nouns (Corbett 1991: ch. 7).
7.2.3 Lexical rules vs. constructions
A long-standing debate in construction grammar (and between proponents of construction
grammar and its critics) is the extent to which the meaning of a sentence may be attributed
to the main verb as opposed to the construction (i.e. the argument-structure pattern). In
particular, when using a verb in a novel argument-structure pattern, in an example such
as She baked him a cake, does the meaning of “transfer” arise from the verb undergoing a
change of meaning (via a “lexical rule”), which then determines the argument structure?
Or does the meaning arise from the argument-structure pattern itself, which is then integ-
rated with the basic meaning of the verb? As noted by Croft (2003: 63), “this question is not
decidable by purely linguistic evidence”; and indeed, arguments one way or the other often
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rely on judgments of theoretical elegance, or (more convincingly) psychological plausibil-
ity. Langacker (2005: 147–155) proposes that both views on the question are partly right:
while the meaning of “transfer” certainly does derive from the ditransitive construction,
it also derives from the verb to the extent that the use of that verb in that construction is
conventional. Goldberg (2006: 107–113) takes the same idea further by empirically meas-
uring the “cue validity” of verbs and argument-structure patterns for particular meanings
(though see Croft 2009: 158 for some reservations about this procedure).
In the present framework, verbs do not carry meaning on their own, unless they are
intransitive (and thus constitute a full verb phrase); and in any case, they are always repres-
ented in the context of a particular IU pattern (i.e. a particular argument-structure config-
uration). Moreover, there are no fully-schematic argument-structure constructions, since
all first-order schemas are required to have one specific phonological word and correspond-
ing semantic pole. This all suggests an approach whereby sentence meaning is derived not
from a (context-independent) verb, and not from a (fully-schematic) argument-structure
pattern, but rather from a verb-specific construction (or an extension thereof, sanctioned
by a second-order schema). This approach most closely resembles that of Croft (2003).
7.3 Looking outwards
This section suggests some consequences of the present framework for other subfields of
linguistics. The proposals in this section will necessarily be programmatic, and quite pos-
sibly ill-thought-out.
7.3.1 Processing
An issue which has not been addressed so far in this framework (but which has increasingly
been receiving attention in Cognitive Grammar: e.g. Langacker 2010a, 2014) is how lan-
guage is produced and comprehended in real time. It is somewhat dangerous to speculate
on this without being able to cite experimental evidence (though see Croft 2007b: 346–348);
but some guesses can be made as to what a model of comprehension and production might
look like.
Let us start with production (cf. Chafe 2005; Croft 2007b for related models). We might
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suppose that the speaker starts with an idea of the speech act she wishes to perform; if
there is already a fully phonologically-specified IU schema that can be used to perform this
speech act (e.g. Hello!), then nothing more needs to be done, besides selecting this unit and
producing it. However, in many cases there is no available schema that is fully phonolo-
gically specified; this is especially often the case when the speech act involves conveying
conceptual content (i.e. verbalising experience, in the terminology of Croft 2007b). In this
case, the speaker would need to decide on the conceptual content to be conveyed, and
then pick some entities within this conceptual content to be textually evoked (since the
only way of conveying conceptual content to an addressee is to evoke some of the entities
therein). (The procedure thus far corresponds roughly to the “subchunking” and “propos-
itionalising” stages in the model of Croft 2007b.) The speaker could then take one of the
entities to be evoked, and search for IU-sized (first- or second-order) schemas that (a) con-
tain a constituent that profiles an entity that is schematic for the one to be evoked, and (b)
are otherwise compatible with the conceptual content to be conveyed. (This corresponds
to the “categorisation” stage.) Repeating this for each of the entities to be evoked would
result in a pool of schemas, of which some subset is likely to be capable of being integrated
into a complete, phonologically-specific IU. Once the speaker has finished assembling one
IU, she then plans the next IU, following the same procedure. Obviously, the steps laid out
above are not strictly sequential; they may occur independently, and at different rates, for
different parts of each IU.
Comprehension is somewhat simpler to describe: The hearer takes the first phonological
word he hears, and matches it with stored (first- or second-order) IU schemas. This (in
conjunction with contextual information of various kinds) determines the semantic pole
that corresponds to the phonological word, and provides hypotheses about the structure of
the remainder of the IU. This then makes it easier to process (and assign a semantic pole to)
the next phonological word, and so on. As with production, comprehension proceeds one
IU at a time.
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7.3.2 Typology
In a number of recent publications, Haspelmath (2010a,b, 2011a) has emphasised the need
to separate “descriptive categories”, or categories that figure in the grammars of particular
languages, from “comparative concepts”, or concepts that are used for the purpose of ar-
riving at typological generalisations. (Similar ideas have been expressed in, e.g., Bybee &
Dahl 1989.) The arguments for this separation are familiar from Croft (2001): each language
has its own inventory of constructions, and we cannot expect that the distributional classes
defined by constructions in different languages will necessarily correspond.
Haspelmath (2010a: 665) states that comparative concepts “are defined on the basis of…
universal conceptual-semantic concepts, general formal concepts, and other comparative
concepts”; by “formal concepts” aremeant concepts such as ‘precede’, ‘identical’, and ‘overt’
(which are not specific to linguistics) and also concepts fromphonology (Haspelmath 2010a: 670).
This is highly reminiscent of the Content Requirement, and suggests that Cognitive Gram-
mar (and developments thereof) could be fruitfully used to arrive at definitions of compar-
ative concepts.
Comparative concepts for “noun phrase”, “adjective phrase” and “verb phrase”—or equi-
valently, reference, modification and predication—were presented in the section on parts
of speech. Here I take a couple of examples of comparative concepts from Haspelmath
(2010a,b), and attempt to reformulate them in the present framework.
Haspelmath (2010a: 672) proposes the following definition for the comparative concept
‘question word’ (or ‘wh-word’):¹
Definition: A question word is a word that can be used as a question
pronoun (or adverb), that is, to represent the questioned content in a content
question.
In the present framework, a “content question” may be defined as an IU (or sequence of
IUs) that profiles a contrastive state of affairs, and environmentally evokes the utterance
produced by the act of obliging the addressee to specify that state of affairs more concretely.
The “questioned content” may be defined as a focus of the utterance, as discussed in the
¹In light of the reservations expressed by Haspelmath (2011b) about the notion ‘word’, it would probably be
more accurate to speak of ‘question phrases’ or ‘wh-phrases’.
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previous chapter. Yet this would necessarily also include the profiled state of affairs itself,
though we would not normally want to call the entire question a ‘wh-phrase’. Thus, it
might be better to define the “questioned content” as a focus that is profiled by a proper
subconstituent of the question. This leads to the following definition of the comparative
concept (which could still be refined further, though this will not be done here for reasons
of space):
A question phrase is a proper subconstituent of a content question (defined
above) which profiles a focused entity.
Haspelmath (2010b: 697) suggests a definition of ‘clause’ as “an expression that contains
one predicate and potentially at least some of its arguments and that can be independently
negated”. As we have seen in the preceding chapters, if we understand a ‘predicate’ as a
constituent that profiles a higher-order eventuality, then we have to recognise that not all
clauses have predicates: in particular, thetic sentences (of theMy car broke down type) lack
a predicate. A definition in terms of the possibility of negation would also be problematic
in the present framework, since in general, definitions in terms of potential behaviour (as
opposed to behaviour observed in the usage event itself) are not allowed by the (Extended)
Content Requirement.
I would propose to define a clause as “an expression that profiles a state of affairs”. This
is general enough to include both finite clauses as well as non-finite clauses such asHarvey’s
taunting the bear, while excluding e.g. non-finite verb phrases such as taunting the bear. On
the other hand, this would be inconsistent with the idea that “from a crosslinguistic point of
view, the possibility of negation corresponds best to our intuition about what should count
as a clause” (Haspelmath 2010b: 697), since non-finite verb phrases can also be negated
(not taunting the bear). Thus it might be better to define a clause as “an expression that
profiles a state of affairs, or an”. This definition, though, would also encompass adjectives
(which profile a property, i.e. a higher-order state); andmoreover, it is now a heterogeneous,
disjunctive definition, which is less than desirable.
We see that defining comparative concepts rigorously (and in accordance with wide-
spread intuitions) can be difficult. However, a grammatical framework that strictly adheres
to the Content Requirement provides a metalanguage for formulating definitions that are
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independent of language-particular categories, and that use only universally-definable no-
tions. According to Haspelmath (2010a: 665), comparative concepts “are not psychologic-
ally real [pace Bybee & Dahl 1989], and they cannot be right or wrong. They can only be
more or less well suited to the task of permitting crosslinguistic comparison”; thus, the
test of the present framework as such a metalanguage will be in whether the definitions it
provides ultimately prove useful in typological research.
7.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, I have attempted to show that the framework developed in this latter part
of the thesis is not only adequate for the purpose of describing the grammars of languages
in a consistent, non-arbitrary and psychologically plausible manner, but also provides clear
answers to long-standing problems in grammatical theory, and provides some useful tools
for thinking about language processing and linguistic typology.
The framework of Langacker (1987, 1991) introduced many important insights into lin-
guistics which, at the time, were firmly against the mainstream (cf. Langacker 1986: 1:
“What follows is a minority report”). Surely the most significant of these was the Con-
tent Requirement; while it has proven necessary to readjust almost every other aspect of
Cognitive Grammar in some way, these readjustments themselves have arisen from an un-
wavering adherence to this fundamental principle.
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